CICERO: DE AMICITIA

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INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. **Marcus Tullius Cicero**, the greatest of Roman orators, was born near Arpinum in 106 B.C. His family was of equestrian rank, but had never held any office in Rome. Cicero was accordingly a *novus homo*, and his struggle to obtain the praetorship and consulship was on that account made harder. He was sent while still a young lad to Rome, and there studied under the best masters, such as Archias. In B.C. 91 he assumed the *toga virilis*, and then attended the lectures of orators and lawyers. He was entrusted by his father to the special care of Mucius Scaevola, the Augur, from whose side he hardly ever departed. At that time one of the easiest methods of obtaining fame and success was by means of oratory, and as Cicero had a natural talent for this art, he cultivated it in preference to devoting himself to a military life. However, he served, as was usual with young Romans who aspired to public office, one campaign, and this happened to be in the Social War (89 B.C.) under Cn. Pompeius Strabo (the father of Pompeius the Great). For the next six years he took no part in public affairs, but devoted his time to the study of rhetoric and the various schools of philosophy; from Phaedrus he learned the Epicurean system, from Philo that of the New Academy, and from Diodŏtus that of the Stoics.

The first of his extant speeches is that *Pro P. Quinctio*, which was delivered in 81 B.C. Next year, in a criminal trial, he defended Sextus Roscius Amerinus, whose accuser was Chrysogŏnus, the powerful freedman of Sulla. It was bold in Cicero to undertake this defence and thereby

to risk the anger of Sulla, but his boldness was equalled by his eloquence, and his success on this occasion placed him at once amongst the best orators of the day. Ill-health obliged him to retire to Rhodes and Athens, where he continued his study of rhetoric and philosophy for two years, returned to Rome in 77 B.C., and was elected quaestor for the year 75 B.C. He served this office at Lilybaeum in Sicily, and acquired golden opinions from the natives through his integrity, impartiality, and self-denial. In 74 B.C. he returned to Rome, and again devoted himself to his profession as an advocate. In 70 B.C. he undertook the impeachment of Verres, who was charged by the Sicilians with having been guilty of misgovernment, oppression, and extortion when pro-praetor in Sicily, 73-71 B.C. Hortensius, the consul-elect for the following year, was Verres' advocate, and on behalf of his client was anxious that the trial should be delayed until the next year, when the presiding Praetor would be more favourably disposed to the defendant. Cicero frustrated this attempt by getting his evidence ready in half the time allowed, and by opening his case very briefly and proceeding at once to the examination of his witnesses. The result of Cicero's onslaught was that Verres departed at once into exile without even attempting a defence.

In politics Cicero was a fairly consistent member of the Senatorial party, or party of the Nobles (*Optimātes*); the opposition was the Democratic party, or party of the People, and there were numbers of disappointed men of all ranks of society ready for revolution in any form if they could find a leader. Cicero was Curule Aedile 69 B.C., Praetor 66 B.C. —in this year he advocated the *Lex Manilia*, giving to Pompeius the conduct of the war against Mithradātes—and Consul 63 B.C. The revolutionary movement had by this time taken the form of a widespread conspiracy; its members were of every class, even senators and consulars; it had branches in many Italian towns; its object was to overthrow the government of the Senate by violence and substitute a Democratic government; and from the name of its leader, it was known as the Catilinarian conspiracy. Its first step was to be the assassination of Cicero; but the

latter by means of spies kept himself informed of all its movements, and at the close of 63 B.C. suddenly arrested the leading conspirators. A few days later he had them executed (although as Roman citizens they were exempt from such punishment), and the remainder, attempting to carry out their plans by force of arms, were defeated at Pistoria, in Northern Etruria, where Catilina fell. The surviving conspirators fled to the provinces, and in particular to Greece. For his services on this occasion Cicero received extraordinary marks of honour, including the title of *Pater Patriae.*

In 60 B.C. the Democratic party found leaders in Caesar, Pompeius (recently returned triumphant from the war in Asia), and Crassus; these formed the coalition known as the First Triumvirate. They determined to get rid of Cicero, who was too good an Optimate to please them; and they employed for the purpose P. Clodius, an unprincipled Democrat, and a Tribune of the year 58 B.C. Clodius drew attention to the illegality of the execution of the Catilinarians, overawed both Senate and Consuls by the violence of his attitude and the presence of his armed partisans, and ultimately compelled Cicero to go into banishment. In the next year Pompeius quarrelled with Clodius, and to spite him procured the recall of Cicero (57 B.C.), who, his political activity being crippled by the Triumvirate, devoted his eloquence to the defence of his friends. In 56 B.C. he delivered his speech *Pro Sestio,* in 54 B.C. the *Pro Plancio,* and in 52 B.C. the *Pro Milone.* In 55 B.C. he was admitted to the College of Augurs; and in 51 B.C. he acted as Governor of the province of Cilicia, where he conducted with success some small military operations.

About this time Pompeius came over from the side of Caesar to that of the Senate; and accordingly, when Caesar marched upon Rome, 49 B.C., Cicero, after some hesitation, joined Pompeius; but subsequently, after the battle of Pharsalia in 48 B.C., he was reconciled to Caesar. After the death of Caesar, 44 B.C., an open rupture ensued between him and Antonius, and Cicero gave vent to his anger and indignation in the famous *Philippic Orations,* fourteen speeches, the finest and most renowned of which is

the second. From the beginning of 43 B.C. until the end of April, Cicero was in the height of his glory, but before the end of that year, in the proscription that followed upon the formation of the Second Triumvirate, Cicero's name was, on the suggestion of Antonius, put in the list of those doomed to summary destruction. Soldiers were immediately sent in pursuit, and although his attendants wished to offer resistance, Cicero forbade them, and surrendered to his pursuers, by whom he was killed.

In the foregoing sketch no mention has been made of Cicero's numerous and important works on rhetoric and philosophy. His activity in this direction begins from his exile in 57 B.C.; in 55 B.C. he produced the *De Oratore,* in 54-51 B.C. the *De Re Publica,* and in 52 B.C. the *De Legibus.* This period of activity was followed by five years (51 to 46 B.C.) of comparative rest, but in 46 B.C. he wrote the *Hortensius* or *De Philosophia,* a treatise now lost, in addition to the *Partitiones Oratoriae,* the *Brutus* or *De Claris Oratoribus,* and the *Orator.* During the years 45 and 44 B.C. he wrote the *De Consolatione,* on the occasion of the death of his daughter Tullia; the *Academica,* an account of the new Academic Philosophy, which maintained that there was no such thing as certainty—we must be content with probability; the *Disputationes Tusculanae,* treating of happiness and morality; the *De Natura Deorum,* the *De Divinatione* (on the subject whether gods communicate with men by means of augury, etc.), the *Cato Maior* or *De Senectute,* the *De Amicitia,* the *De Fato* (an account of Fate and Freewill), the *Paradoxa* (an account of certain paradoxical opinions of the Stoics), the *De Officiis,* a treatise on duty, and the *De Finibus,* on the Highest Good.

So far we have dealt with Cicero's speeches and his rhetorical and philosophical works. We must also mention (1) his *Letters,* of which he wrote a vast number, and of which nearly 800 are preserved; (2) his *Poetical Works,* which were very poor in quality though not small in quantity—his chief poem was written on the subject of his consulship; and (3) his *Historical and Miscellaneous Works,* *e.g.* a prose account of his consulship, an account of his policy immediately previous to his consulship, etc.

§ 2. **Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus** (surnamed **Minor** to distinguish him from his adoptive grandfather, and generally spoken of as Scipio Minor throughout this volume) was the son of Lucius Aemilius Paulus Macedonicus, but being adopted by the invalid and childless son of Scipio Major, he passed from the *Gens Aemilia* into the *Gens Cornelia*, taking the *agnomen* of Aemilianus to show the fact. (For his relationship to the various other Scipios of this period, and to other families, see INDEX, p. 109, and the note on xix. 23.) As the person whose character, policy, and achievements are the groundwork of this treatise, and as one of the central figures in Roman history during the years 150—129 B.C., it is necessary to speak of him at some length.

He was by birth the son of L. Aemilius Paulus, one of those Romans who knew how to combine philosophy and wide culture with the old Roman character for manliness, independence, and frugality, and one who made the education of his sons one of his first concerns. At that date the Romans had suddenly found themselves masters of whatever they chose to demand : they had overrun Macedonia and Greece, and had been there met by the degraded remains of Grecian civilization, of which the better part had been already almost lost in the worse, and of which the leading features were pleasure-seeking and disbelief in any creed. The consequence was that the chief families in Rome, while professedly studying to live up to the old and better Greek ideals, made this an excuse for indulging in all the vices of the Greeks of the time. Only a very few opposed the change : some of them resisted everything that was new in the most narrow-minded way, as did Cato (see INDEX); others tried to choose out what was good in the new way and to reject what was bad, and at the head of these was Scipio Minor.

He was born about 185 B.C., and served his first campaign under his father Paulus when the latter ended the Third Macedonian war by the overthrow of Perseus at Pydna (168 B.C.); but his tastes were less for military than for political activity, and he spent all his energies in studying the writings of the Greek philosophers and in

conversing with men of genius, with a view to discovering the best means for guiding the State. However, he distinguished himself as a military tribune in Spain in 151 B.C., and a few years later (148 B.C.), while still under the proper age, was made consul without seeking it, in order to end the Third Carthaginian War. He was soon successful, and rased Carthage (146 B.C), thereby acquiring the *agnomen* of Africanus. To distinguish him from his (adoptive) grandfather he was called also Minor or Aemilianus.

In 142 B.C. he was censor, and tried hard, but with little success, to reform some of the worst vices of the time; and in 134 B.C. he was again created consul without seeking it (iii. 14, 15, *petivit numquam, factus est consul bis*), to bring to an end a disgraceful war in Spain, where for nine years the Romans had tried in vain to reduce the petty town of Numantia on the upper waters of the Douro. He completed this task in a year (133 B.C.), and received another *agnomen* of *Numantinus* on his return.

Meantime the evils for which he had been seeking a remedy in philosophy had come to a head. The population of Rome were mostly starving paupers, while the Italians had no share in the advantages which they won for Rome by fighting in her armies. The increase of the number of slaves had driven the Italian farmers to beggary: all the land of Italy, and all the wealth and profits of Rome, were monopolized by a few high-born nobles. These were some of the most crying evils. While Scipio pondered, his cousin (see Genealogical Table in INDEX, p. 109) Tiberius Gracchus was acting. He had got himself made tribune for 133 B.C. on purpose to remedy the pauperization of Rome and Italy, and he carried his famous Agrarian Law by which there was appointed a commission of three to recover the lands which lawfully belonged to the State, and distribute them amongst the poorer Romans. But the measure so angered the wealthy landowners and the Italian allies that a riot arose, and Gracchus was slain. At this point Scipio came home. He disapproved of his cousin's violence and became the champion of the Italian allies, while the poorer Roman populace hated him for it. Carbo (see INDEX) especially

inflamed them by declaring that Scipio meant to make the allies full citizens, a measure which the Romans were too jealous to allow. Upon the morning after a great speech against those who followed Gracchus' methods, Scipio was found dead in bed. How he died was never known, but perhaps he was assassinated out of revenge (129 B.C.).

It is quite possible that Scipio approved of Gracchus' objects, but not of his methods, which were violent [see INDEX, *s. v.* Gracchus (2)]. His death was unfortunate for his country, and matters went from bad to worse until Gaius Gracchus, six years later, renewed his brother's policy, and became for a time virtual monarch of Rome.

The literary and philosophical friends of Scipio constituted the Scipionic circle, a sort of private club meeting in each other's houses to discuss questions of literature and politics. Chief of them was C. Laelius, the principal speaker in this treatise; while others were Fannius and Scaevola (see § 3, below), Lucilius the satirist, Philus, Mummius, Rupilius, Rutilus, Tubero, Sulpicius and Terentius (for whom see INDEX).

§ 3. The **Persons of the Dialogue** are three: Laelius, the principal speaker, Fannius and Scaevola, his auditors and interrogators.

(i) **Gaius Laelius**, of about the same age as his friend Scipio Minor, was the son of another C. Laelius who had been the friend of Scipio Major. He was the type of the best Roman gentleman of the time—of spotless character, witty, deeply read in all accessible literature, by principle a Stoic, and in active life an honourable statesman and a competent soldier. He occupied all the usual magistracies, was tribune 151 B.C., praetor 145 B.C., and consul in 140 B.C., although he failed to secure that office in 141 B.C. in spite of the help of Scipio in his canvass. He distinguished himself in the Third Punic War and in the war in Spain; and for the later years of his life busied himself, like his friend, with literature and philosophy, himself gaining credit as a writer and orator. He was for many years one of the College of Augurs (ii. 22, 23).

(ii) **Gaius Fannius**, born about 160 B.C., married the daughter of Laelius. He served under Scipio in Africa

and Spain, and he and Tiberius Gracchus were the first to mount the walls of Carthage at its capture, 146 B.C. He was a person of great literary attainments, and among other things wrote a history of his own times.

(iii) **Quintus Mucius Scaevola**, another son-in-law of Laelius, was born about 157 B.C., and was pro-praetor of Asia in 121 B.C. On his return to Rome he was prosecuted unsuccessfully for extortion in his province. He lived to a great age—was certainly alive in 88 B.C. His family had produced a series of great lawyers, among whom he himself was not the least renowned. When Cicero assumed the *toga virilis*, his father took him to Scaevola, from whose side the future orator never willingly departed. This Scaevola is generally spoken of as Augur, to distinguish him from his namesake, the Pontifex, as to whom see INDEX.

§ 4. **The Dialogue.** The scene of the Dialogue is laid at Rome in the days immediately following the sudden death of Scipio Minor (see i. 22, 23), when Laelius was about 57 years of age. His sons-in-law are calling upon him, and he makes his own friendship for Scipio the basis of a general discourse on the subject of Friends and Friendship.

A full analysis of the Dialogue will be found printed in italic type in the notes. The main divisions are :—

A. Dedication, ch. 1.

B. Introductory dialogue, ch. 2—4.

C. General remarks on the nature and value of Friendship, ch. 5—7.

D. Of the origin and aim of Friendship, ch. 8, 9.

E. Of the causes of the breach of Friendship and its limits, ch. 10—13.

F. Further remarks on the origin of Friendship and its limits and demands, ch. 14—17.

G. Of how to choose a friend and the attributes of Friendship, ch. 18—20.

H. Further remarks on the severance of Friendships, ch. 21, 22.

I. Of the duties of friends and the value of truth, ch. 23—26.

K. Conclusion.

There is probably very little original thought in the *De Amicitia.* Cicero has for the most part merely put into the mouths of Roman speakers ideas which he has adapted from Greek writers. In the treatise *Concerning Friendship* of Theophrastus, in the *Lysis* and also in the *Theaetetus* of Plato, in Bk. viii. of the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, in the *Memorabilia of Socrates* by Xenophon, and in some fragments of a philosopher named Chrysippus (fl. third century B.C.), many similarities of thought and expression can be found, and there can be but little doubt that Cicero was acquainted with all these books, and, with them as a foundation, built up the edifice of his arguments in the *De Amicitia.* In Cicero's time a Roman writer was ashamed to show too close an acquaintance with Greek literature, and this, perhaps, is the reason why he does not mention his authorities as much as we should otherwise expect.

*** The text is in the main that of C. F. W. Müller in the *Bibliotheca Teubneriana.*

ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR PRAENOMINA.

A free-born Roman had three names: *praenomen, nomen,* and *cognomen:* the *praenomen* was the personal name, the *nomen* that of the *gens* ("clan"), the *cognomen* that of the *familia* ("family"); *e.g., Marcus Tullius Cicero* is the individual *Marcus* belonging to the *familia Ciceronum* of the *gens Tullia.*

The following abbreviations are used in the text of the *De Amicitia:*—

A. Aulus.	M'. Manius.
C. Gaius.	P. Publius.
D. Decimus	Q. Quintus.
L. Lucius.	Sp. Spurius.
M. Marcus.	Ti. or Tib. Tiberius.

M. TULLI CICERONIS

LAELIUS DE AMICITIA LIBER.

I.—1. Q. Mucius augur multa narrare de C. Laelio socero suo memoriter et iucunde solebat nec dubitare illum in omni sermone appellare sapientem; ego autem a patre ita eram deductus ad Scaevolam sumpta virili toga, ut, quoad possem et liceret, a senis latere numquam discederem; itaque multa ab eo prudenter disputata, multa etiam breviter et commode dicta memoriae mandabam fierique studebam eius prudentia doctior. Quo mortuo me ad pontificem Scaevolam contuli, quem unum nostrae civitatis et ingenio et iustitia praestantissimum audeo dicere. Sed de hoc alias; nunc redeo ad augurem.

2. Cum saepe multa, tum memini domi in hemicyclio sedentem, ut solebat, cum et ego essem una et pauci admodum familiares, in eum sermonem illum incidere, qui tum forte multis erat in ore. Meministi enim profecto, Attice, et eo magis, quod P. Sulpicio utebare multum, cum is tribunus pl. capitali odio a Q. Pompeio, qui tum erat consul, dissideret, quocum coniunctissime et amantissime vixerat, quanta esset hominum vel admiratio vel querela. 3. Itaque tum Scaevola cum in eam ipsam mentionem incidisset, exposuit nobis sermonem Laeli de amicitia habitum ab illo secum et cum altero genero, C. Fannio M. f., paucis diebus post mortem Africani. Eius disputationis sententias me-

moriae mandavi, quas hoc libro exposui arbitratu meo; quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne "inquam" et "inquit" saepius interponeretur, atque ut tamquam a praesentibus coram haberi sermo videretur.

4. Cum enim saepe mecum ageres, ut de amicitia scriberem aliquid, digna mihi res cum omnium cognitione, tum nostra familiaritate visa est. Itaque feci non invitus, ut prodessem multis rogatu tuo. Sed ut in Catone Maiore, qui est scriptus ad te de senectute, Catonem induxi senem disputantem, quia nulla videbatur aptior persona, quae de illa aetate loqueretur, quam eius, qui et diutissime senex fuisset et in ipsa senectute praeter ceteros floruisset, sic, cum accepissemus a patribus maxime memorabilem C. Laeli et P. Scipionis familiaritatem fuisse, idonea mihi Laeli persona visa est, quae de amicitia ea ipsa dissereret, quae disputata ab eo meminisset Scaevola. Genus autem hoc sermonum positum in hominum veterum auctoritate, et eorum inlustrium, plus nescio quo pacto videtur habere gravitatis; itaque ipse mea legens sic adficior interdum, ut Catonem, non me loqui existimem. 5. Sed ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus scripsi de amicitia. Tum est Cato locutus, quo erat nemo fere senior temporibus illis, nemo prudentior; nunc Laelius et sapiens (sic enim est habitus) et amicitiae gloria excellens de amicitia loquetur. Tu velim a me animum parumper avertas, Laelium loqui ipsum putes. C. Fannius et Q. Mucius ad socerum veniunt post mortem Africani; ab his sermo oritur, respondet Laelius, cuius tota disputatio est de amicitia, quam legens te ipse cognosces.

II.—6. *Fannius.* Sunt ista, Laeli; nec enim melior vir fuit Africano quisquam nec clarior. Sed existimare debes omnium oculos in te esse coniectos unum; te sapientem et appellant et existimant. Tribuebatur hoc modo M. Catoni, scimus L. Acilium apud patres nostros appellatum esse sapientem, sed uterque alio quodam modo, Acilius, quia

prudens esse in iure civili putabatur, Cato, quia multarum rerum usum habebat; multa eius et in senatu et in foro vel provisa prudenter vel acta constanter vel responsa acute ferebantur; propterea quasi cognomen iam habebat in senectute sapientis. 7. Te autem alio quodam modo non solum natura et moribus, verum etiam studio et doctrina esse sapientem, nec sicut vulgus, sed ut eruditi solent appellare sapientem, qualem in reliqua Graecia neminem (nam qui septem appellantur, eos, qui ista subtilius quaerunt, in numero sapientium non habent), Athenis unum accepimus, et eum quidem etiam Apollinis oraculo sapientissimum iudicatum; hanc esse in te sapientiam existumant, ut omnia tua in te posita esse ducas humanosque casus virtute inferiores putes. Itaque ex me quaerunt, credo ex hoc item Scaevola, quonam pacto mortem Africani feras, eoque magis, quod proximis Nonis cum in hortos D. Bruti auguris commentandi causa, ut adsolet, venissemus, tu non adfuisti, qui diligentissime semper illum diem et illud munus solitus esses obire.

8. *Scaevola.* Quaerunt quidem, C. Laeli, multi, ut est a Fannio dictum, sed ego id respondeo, quod animum adverti, te dolorem, quem acceperis cum summi viri, tum amicissumi morte, ferre moderate nec potuisse non commoveri nec fuisse id humanitatis tuae; quod autem Nonis in conlegio nostro non adfuisses, valetudinem respondeo causam, non maestitiam fuisse.

Laelius. Recte tu quidem, Scaevola, et vere; nec enim ab isto officio, quod semper usurpavi, cum valerem, abduci incommodo meo debui, nec ullo casu arbitror hoc constanti homini posse contingere, ut ulla intermissio fiat officii. 9. Tu autem, Fanni, quod mihi tantum tribui dicis, quantum ego nec adgnosco nec postulo, facis amice; sed, ut mihi videris, non recte iudicas de Catone; aut enim nemo, quod quidem magis credo, aut, si quisquam, ille sapiens fuit. Quo modo, ut alia omittam, mortem filii tulit! memineram

Paulum, videram Galum, sed hi in pueris, Cato in perfecto et spectato viro. 10. Quam ob rem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais, sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur. De me autem, ut iam cum utroque loquar, sic habetote:

III. Ego si Scipionis desiderio me moveri negem, quam id recte faciam, viderint sapientes; sed certe mentiar. Moveor enim tali amico orbatus, qualis, ut arbitror, nemo umquam erit, ut confirmare possum, nemo certe fuit; sed non egeo medicina, me ipse consolor, et maxime illo solacio, quod eo errore careo, quo amicorum decessu plerique angi solent. Nihil mali accidisse Scipioni puto, mihi accidit, si quid accidit; suis autem incommodis graviter angi non amicum sed se ipsum amantis est. 11. Cum illo vero quis neget actum esse praeclare? Nisi enim, quod ille minime putabat, inmortalitatem optare vellet, quid non adeptus est, quod homini fas esset optare? qui summam spem civium, quam de eo iam puero habuerant, continuo adulescens incredibili virtute superavit, qui consulatum petivit numquam, factus consul est bis, primum ante tempus, iterum sibi suo tempore, rei publicae paene sero, qui duabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic imperio non modo praesentia, verum etiam futura bella delevit. Quid dicam de moribus facillimis, de pietate in matrem, liberalitate in sorores, bonitate in suos, iustitia in omnes? nota sunt vobis. Quam autem civitati carus fuerit, maerore funeris indicatum est. Quid igitur hunc paucorum annorum accessio iuvare potuisset? Senectus enim quamvis non sit gravis, ut memini Catonem anno ante, quam est mortuus, mecum et cum Scipione disserere, tamen aufert eam viriditatem, in qua etiam nunc erat Scipio. 12. Quam ob rem vita quidem talis fuit vel fortuna vel gloria, ut nihil posset accedere, moriendi autem sensum celeritas abstulit; quo de genere mortis difficile dictu est, quid homines suspicentur, videtis; hoc vere tamen licet dicere, P. Scipioni ex multis

diebus, quos in vita celeberrimos laetissimosque viderit, illum diem clarissimum fuisse, quom senatu dimisso domum reductus ad vesperum est a patribus conscriptis, populo Romano, sociis et Latinis, pridie quam excessit e vita, ut ex tam alto dignitatis gradu ad superos videatur deos potius quam ad inferos pervenisse.

IV.—13. Neque enim adsentior iis, qui haec nuper disserere coeperunt, cum corporibus simul animos interire atque omnia morte deleri; plus apud me antiquorum auctoritas valet, vel nostrorum maiorum, qui mortuis tam religiosa iura tribuerunt, quod non fecissent profecto, si nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur, vel eorum, qui in hac terra fuerunt magnamque Graeciam, quae nunc quidem deleta est, tum florebat, institutis et praeceptis suis erudierunt, vel eius, qui Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est iudicatus, qui non tum hoc, tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem semper, animos hominum esse divinos, iisque, cum ex corpore excessissent, reditum in caelum patere, optimoque et iustissimo cuique expeditissimum. 14. Quod idem Scipioni videbatur, qui quidem, quasi praesagiret, perpaucis ante mortem diebus, cum et Philus et Manilius adesset et alii plures, tuque etiam, Scaevola, mecum venisses, triduum disseruit de re publica; cuius disputationis fuit extremum fere de inmortalitate animorum, quae se in quiete per visum ex Africano audisse dicebat. Id si ita est, ut optumi cuiusque animus in morte facillime evolet tamquam e custodia vinclisque corporis, cui censemus cursum ad deos faciliorem fuisse quam Scipioni? Quocirca maerere hoc eius eventu vereor ne invidi magis quam amici sit. Sin autem illa veriora, ut idem interitus sit animorum et corporum nec ullus sensus maneat, ut nihil boni est in morte, sic certe nihil mali; sensu enim amisso fit idem, quasi natus non esset omnino, quem tamen esse natum et nos gaudemus et haec civitas, dum erit, laetabitur. 15. Quam ob rem cum illo quidem, ut supra dixi, actum optime est, mecum incommodius, quem

fuerat aequius, ut prius introieram, sic prius exire de vita. Sed tamen recordatione nostrae amicitiae sic fruor, ut beate vixisse videar, quia cum Scipione vixerim, quocum mihi coniuncta cura de publica re et de privata fuit, quocum et domus fuit et militia communis et, id in quo est omnis vis amicitiae, voluntatum, studiorum, sententiarum summa consensio. Itaque non tam ista me sapientiae, quam modo Fannius commemoravit, fama delectat, falsa praesertim, quam quod amicitiae nostrae memoriam spero sempiternam fore, idque eo mihi magis est cordi, quod ex omnibus saeculis vix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum; quo in genere sperare videor Scipionis et Laeli amicitiam notam posteritati fore.

16. *Fannius.* Istuc quidem, Laeli, ita necesse est. Sed quoniam amicitiae mentionem fecisti et sumus otiosi, pergratum mihi feceris, spero item Scaevolae, si, quem ad modum soles de ceteris rebus, quom ex te quaeruntur, sic de amicitia disputaris quid sentias, qualem existumes, quae praecepta des.

Scaevola. Mihi vero erit gratum; atque id ipsum cum tecum agere conarer, Fannius antevortit. Quam ob rem utrique nostrum gratum admodum feceris.

V.—17. *Laelius.* Ego vero non gravarer, si mihi ipse confiderem; nam et praeclara res est et sumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi. Sed quis ego sum? aut quae est in me facultas? doctorum est ista consuetudo, eaque Graecorum, ut iis ponatur, de quo disputent quamvis subito; magnum opus est egetque exercitatione non parva. Quam ob rem, quae disputari de amicitia possunt, ab eis censeo petatis, qui ista profitentur; ego vos hortari tantum possum, ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tam naturae aptum, tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel adversas. 18. Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse; neque id ad vivum reseco, ut illi, qui haec subtilius disserunt, fortasse vere, sed ad com-

munem utilitatem parum; negant enim quemquam esse virum bonum nisi sapientem. Sit ita sane; sed eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus, nos autem ea, quae sunt in usu vitaque communi, non ea, quae finguntur aut optantur, spectare debemus. Numquam ego dicam C. Fabricium, M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium, quos sapientes nostri maiores iudicabant, ad istorum normam fuisse sapientes. Quare sibi habeant sapientiae nomen et invidiosum et obscurum, concedant, ut viri boni fuerint. Ne id quidem facient, negabunt id nisi sapienti posse concedi. 19. Agamus igitur pingui, ut aiunt, Minerva. Qui ita se gerunt, ita vivunt, ut eorum probetur fides, integritas, aequitas, liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas, libido, audacia, sintque magna constantia, ut ii fuerunt, modo quos nominavi, hos viros bonos, ut habiti sunt, sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia sequantur, quantum homines possunt, naturam optimam bene vivendi ducem. Sic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos esse nos, ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam, maior autem, ut quisque proxume accederet. Itaque cives potiores quam peregrini, propinqui quam alieni; cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit; sed ea non satis habet firmitatis. Namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati, quod ex propinquitate benevolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest; sublata enim benevolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet. 20. Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc intellegi maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est et adducta in angustum, ut omnis caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur.

VI. Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio; qua quidem haud scio an excepta sapientia nihil melius homini sit a dis inmortalibus datum. Divitias alii praeponunt, bonam alii valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii

honores, multi etiam voluptates. Beluarum hoc quidem extremum, illa autem superiora caduca et incerta, posita non tam in consiliis nostris quam in fortunae temeritate. Qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, praeclare illi quidem, sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet, nec sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest. 21. Iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentia metiamur virosque bonos eos, qui habentur, numeremus, Paulos, Catones, Galos, Scipiones, Philos; his communis vita contenta est; eos autem omittamus, qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur. 22. Talis igitur inter viros amicitia tantas opportunitates habet, quantas vix queo dicere. Principio qui potest esse vita "vitalis," ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescat? Quid dulcius quam habere, quicum omnia audeas sic loqui ut tecum? Qui esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes, qui illis aeque ac tu ipse gauderet? adversas vero ferre difficile esset sine eo, qui illas gravius etiam quam tu ferret. Denique ceterae res, quae expetuntur, opportunae sunt singulae rebus fere singulis, divitiae, ut utare, opes, ut colare, honores, ut laudere, voluptates, ut gaudeas, valetudo, ut dolore careas et muneribus fungare corporis; amicitia res plurimas continet; quoquo te verteris, praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, numquam intempestiva, numquam molesta est; itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, locis pluribus utimur quam amicitia. Neque ego nunc de vulgari aut de mediocri, quae tamen ipsa et delectat et prodest, sed de vera et perfecta loquor, qualis eorum, qui pauci nominantur, fuit. Nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia et adversas partiens communicansque leviores.

VII.—23. Quomque plurimas et maximas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum praestat omnibus, quod bonam spem praelucet in posterum nec debilitari animos aut cadere patitur. Verum enim amicum qui intue-

tur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui. Quocirca et absentes adsunt et egentes abundant et inbecilli valent et, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui vivunt; tantus eos honos, memoria, desiderium prosequitur amicorum. Ex quo illorum beata mors videtur, horum vita laudabilis. Quodsi exemeris ex rerum natura benevolentiae coniunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit, ne agri quidem cultus permanebit. Id si minus intellegitur, quanta vis amicitiae concordiaeque sit, ex dissensionibus atque ex discordiis perspici potest. Quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma civitas est, quae non odiis et discidiis funditus possit everti? Ex quo, quantum boni sit in amicitia, iudicari potest. 24. Agrigentinum quidem doctum quendam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent, quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam. Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et intellegunt et re probant. Itaque, si quando aliquod officium extitit amici in periculis aut adeundis aut communicandis, quis est, qui id non maximis ecferat laudibus? Qui clamores tota cavea nuper in hospitis et amici mei M. Pacuvi nova fabula! cum ignorante rege, uter Orestes esset, Pylades Orestem se esse diceret, ut pro illo necaretur, Orestes autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseveraret. Stantes plaudebant in re ficta; quid arbitramur in vera facturos fuisse? Facile indicabat ipsa natura vim suam, cum homines, quod facere ipsi non possent, id recte fieri in altero iudicarent.

Hactenus mihi videor de amicitia quid sentirem potuisse dicere; si quae praeterea sunt (credo autem esse multa), ab iis, si videbitur, qui ista disputant, quaeritote.

Fannius. 25. Nos autem a te potius; quamquam etiam ab istis saepe quaesivi et audivi non invitus equidem; sed aliud quoddam filum orationis tuae.

Scaevola. Tum magis id diceres, Fanni, si nuper in hortis Scipionis, cum est de re publica disputatum, adfuisses.

Qualis tum patronus iustitiae fuit contra accuratam orationem Phili!

Fannius. Facile id quidem fuit, iustitiam iustissimo viro defendere.

Scaevola. Quid? amicitiam nonne facile ei, qui ob eam summa fide constantia iustitiaque servatam maxumam gloriam ceperit?

VIII.—26. *Laelius.* Vim hoc quidem est adferre. Quid enim refert, qua me ratione cogatis? cogitis certe. Studiis enim generorum, praesertim in re bona, cum difficile est, tum ne aequum quidem obsistere.

Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet, utrum propter inbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa. Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benevolentiam coniungendam. Nam utilitates quidem etiam ab iis percipiuntur saepe, qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur et observantur temporis causa, in amicitia autem nihil fictum est, nihil simulatum et, quidquid est, id est verum et voluntarium. 27. Quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia, adplicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi quam cogitatione, quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura. Quod quidem quale sit, etiam in bestiis quibusdam animadverti potest, quae ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus et ab eis ita amantur, ut facile earum sensus appareat. Quod in homine multo est evidentius, primum ex ea caritate, quae est inter natos et parentes, quae dirimi nisi detestabili scelere non potest; deinde cum similis sensus extitit amoris, si aliquem nacti sumus, cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus, quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et virtutis perspicere videamur. 28. Nihil

est enim virtute amabilius, nihil, quod magis adliciat ad diligendum, quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem etiam eos, quos numquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus. Quis est, qui C. Fabrici, M'. Curi non cum caritate aliqua benevola memoriam usurpet, quos numquam viderit? quis autem est, qui Tarquinium Superbum, qui Sp. Cassium, Sp. Maelium non oderit? Cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et Hannibale; ab altero propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos animos habemus, alterum propter crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit.

IX.—29. Quodsi tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel in eis, quos numquam vidimus, vel, quod maius est, in hoste etiam diligamus, quid mirum est, si animi hominum moveantur, cum eorum, quibuscum usu coniuncti esse possunt, virtutem et bonitatem perspicere videantur? Quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto et studio perspecto et consuetudine adiuncta, quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris adhibitis admirabilis quaedam exardescit benevolentiae magnitudo. Quam si qui putant ab inbecillitate proficisci, ut sit, per quem adsequatur, quod quisque desideret, humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indigentia natam volunt. Quod si ita esset, ut quisque minimum esse in se arbitraretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus; quod longe secus est. 30. Ut enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit, et ut quisque maxime virtute et sapientia sic munitus est, ut nullo egeat suaque omnia in se ipso posita iudicet, ita in amicitiis expetendis colendisque maxime excellit. Quid enim? Africanus indigens mei? Minime hercule! ac ne ego quidem illius; sed ego admiratione quadam virtutis eius, ille vicissim opinione fortasse non nulla, quam de meis moribus habebat, me dilexit; auxit benevolentiam consuetudo. Sed quamquam utilitates multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causae diligendi profectae. 31.

Ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam (neque enim beneficium faeneramur, sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus), sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus. 32. Ab his, qui pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omnia referunt, longe dissentiunt, nec mirum; nihil enim altum, nihil magnificum ac divinum suspicere possunt, qui suas omnes cogitationes abiecerunt in rem tam humilem tamque contemptam. Quam ob rem hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus, ipsi autem intellegamus natura gigni sensum diligendi et benevolentiae caritatem facta significatione probitatis. Quam qui adpetiverunt, adplicant se et propius admovent, ut et usu eius, quem diligere coeperunt, fruantur et moribus sintque pares in amore et aequales propensioresque ad bene merendum quam ad reposcendum, atque haec inter eos sit honesta certatio. Sic et utilitates ex amicitia maximae capientur, et erit eius ortus a natura quam ab inbecillitate gravior et verior. Nam si utilitas amicitias conglutinaret, eadem commutata dissolveret; sed quia natura mutari non potest, idcirco verae amicitiae sempiternae sunt. Ortum quidem amicitiae videtis, nisi quid ad haec forte vultis.

Fannius. Tu vero perge, Laeli; pro hoc enim, qui minor est natu, meo iure respondeo.

33. *Scaevola.* Recte tu quidem. Quam ob rem audiamus.

X. *Laelius.* Audite vero, optumi viri, ea, quae saepissime inter me et Scipionem de amicitia disserebantur. Quamquam ille quidem nihil difficilius esse dicebat, quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae diem permanere. Nam, vel ut non idem expediret, incidere saepe, vel ut de re publica non idem sentiretur; mutari etiam mores hominum saepe dicebat, alias adversis rebus, alias aetate ingravescente. Atque earum rerum exemplum ex similitudine capiebat ineuntis aetatis, quod summi puerorum amores saepe una cum praetexta toga ponerentur; 34. sin autem ad

adulescentiam perduxissent, dirimi tamen interdum contentione vel uxoriae condicionis vel commodi alicuius, quod idem adipisci uterque non posset. Quodsi qui longius in amicitia provecti essent, tamen saepe labefactari, si in honoris contentionem incidissent; pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitiis quam in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae; ex quo inimicitias maximas saepe inter amicissimos exstitisse. 35. Magna etiam discidia et plerumque iusta nasci, cum aliquid ab amicis, quod rectum non esset, postularetur, ut aut libidinis ministri aut adiutores essent ad iniuriam; quod qui recusarent, quamvis honeste id facerent, ius tamen amicitiae deserere arguerentur ab iis, quibus obsequi nollent. Illos autem, qui quidvis ab amico auderent postulare, postulatione ipsa profiteri omnia se amici causa esse facturos. Eorum querela inveterata non modo familiaritates exstingui solere, sed odia etiam gigni sempiterna Haec ita multa quasi fata inpendere amicitiis, ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiae, sed etiam felicitatis diceret sibi videri.

XI.—36. Quam ob rem id primum videamus, si placet, quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat. Numne, si Coriolanus habuit amicos, ferre contra patriam arma illi cum Coriolano debuerunt? num Vecellinum amici regnum adpetentem, num Maelium debuerunt iuvare? 37. Tib. quidem Gracchum rem publicam vexantem a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum videbamus. At C. Blossius Cumanus, hospes familiae vestrae, Scaevola, quom ad me, quod aderam Laenati et Rupilio consulibus in consilio, deprecatum venisset, hanc, ut sibi ignoscerem, causam adferebat, quod tanti Tib. Gracchum fecisset, ut, quidquid ille vellet, sibi faciendum putaret. Tum ego: "Etiamne, si te in Capitolium faces ferre vellet?" "Numquam," inquit, "voluisset id quidem; sed si voluisset, paruissem." Videtis, quam nefaria vox! Et hercule ita fecit vel plus etiam,

quam dixit; non enim paruit ille Ti. Gracchi temeritati, sed praefuit, nec se comitem illius furoris, sed ducem praebuit. Itaque hac amentia quaestione nova perterritus in Asiam profugit, ad hostes se contulit, poenas rei publicae graves iustasque persolvit. Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris; nam cum conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere, si a virtute defeceris. 38. Quodsi rectum statuerimus vel concedere amicis, quidquid velint, vel inpetrare ab iis, quidquid velimus, perfecta quidem sapientia si simus, nihil habeat res vitii; sed loquimur de iis amicis, qui ante oculos sunt, quos vidimus aut de quibus memoria accepimus, quos novit vita communis. Ex hoc numero nobis exempla sumenda sunt, et eorum quidem maxime, qui ad sapientiam proxume accedunt. 39. Videmus Papum Aemilium Luscino familiarem fuisse (sic a patribus accepimus), bis una consules, collegas in censura; tum et cum iis et inter se coniunctissimos fuisse M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium memoriae proditum est. Igitur ne suspicari quidem possumus quemquam horum ab amico quippiam contendisse, quod contra fidem, contra ius iurandum, contra rem publicam esset. Nam hoc quidem in talibus viris quid adtinet dicere, si contendisset, impetraturum non fuisse? cum illi sanctissimi viri fuerint, aeque autem nefas sit tale aliquid et facere rogatum et rogare. At vero Tib. Gracchum sequebantur C. Carbo, C. Cato, et minime tum quidem C. frater nunc idem acerrimus.

XII.—40. Haec igitur lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpes nec faciamus rogati. Turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda cum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur. Etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scaevola, locati sumus, ut nos longe prospicere oporteat futuros casus rei publicae. Deflexit iam aliquantum de spatio curriculoque consuetudo maiorum. 41. Tib. Gracchus regnum occupare conatus est,

vel regnavit is quidem paucos menses. Num quid simile populus Romanus audierat aut viderat? Hunc etiam post mortem secuti amici et propinqui quid in P. Scipione effecerint, sine lacrimis non queo dicere. Nam Carbonem, quocumque modo potuimus, propter recentem poenam Tib. Gracchi sustinuimus; de C. Gracchi autem tribunatu quid expectem, non lubet augurari. Serpit deinde res, quae proclivis ad perniciem, cum semel coepit, labitur. Videtis, in tabella iam ante quanta sit facta labes, primo Gabinia lege, biennio autem post Cassia. Videre iam videor populum a senatu disiunctum, multitudinis arbitrio res maximas agi. Plures enim discent, quem ad modum haec fiant, quam quem ad modum iis resistatur. 42. Quorsum haec? Quia sine sociis nemo quicquam tale conatur. Praecipiendum est igitur bonis, ut, si in eius modi amicitias ignari casu aliquo inciderint, ne existiment ita se alligatos, ut ab amicis in magna aliqua re publica peccantibus non discedant; inprobis autem poena statuenda est, nec vero minor iis, qui secuti erunt alterum, quam iis, qui ipsi fuerint impietatis duces. Quis clarior in Graecia Themistocle, quis potentior? qui cum imperator bello Persico servitute Graeciam liberavisset propterque invidiam in exilium expulsus esset, ingratae patriae iniuriam non tulit, quam ferre debuit, fecit idem, quod xx annis ante apud nos fecerat Coriolanus. His adiutor contra patriam inventus est nemo; itaque mortem sibi uterque conscivit. 43. Quare talis inproborum consensio non modo excusatione amicitiae tegenda non est, sed potius supplicio omni vindicanda est, ut ne quis concessum putet amicum vel bellum patriae inferentem sequi; quod quidem, ut res ire coepit, haud scio an aliquando futurum sit. Mihi autem non minori curae est, qualis res publica post mortem meam futura, quam qualis hodie sit.

XIII.—44. Haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur, ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne exspectemus quidem, dum rogemur; studium semper

adsit, cunctatio absit; consilium vero dare audeamus libere. Plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur. 45. Nam quibusdam, quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia, placuisse opinor mirabilia quaedam (sed nihil est, quod illi non persequantur argutiis): partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus; satis superque esse sibi suarum cuique rerum, alienis nimis implicari molestum esse; commodissimum esse quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae, quas vel adducas, cum velis, vel remittas; caput enim esse ad beate vivendum securitatem, qua frui non possit animus, si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus. 46. Alios autem dicere aiunt multo etiam inhumanius (quem locum breviter paulo ante perstrinxi) praesidii adiumentique causa, non benevolentiae neque caritatis amicitias esse expetendas; itaque, ut quisque minimum firmitatis haberet minimumque virium, ita amicitias adpetere maxime; ex eo fieri, ut mulierculae magis amicitiarum praesidia quaerant quam viri et inopes quam opulenti et calamitosi quam ii, qui putentur beati. 47. O praeclaram sapientiam! Solem enim e mundo tollere videntur, qui amicitiam e vita tollunt, qua nihil a dis inmortalibus melius habemus, nihil iucundius. Quae est enim ista securitas? Specie quidem blanda, sed reapse multis locis repudianda. Neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemve, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere. Quodsi curam fugimus, virtus fugienda est, quae necesse est cum aliqua cura res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit, ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia lubidinem, ignaviam fortitudo; itaque videas rebus iniustis iustos maxime dolere, inbellibus fortes, flagitiosis modestos. Ergo hoc proprium est animi bene constituti, et laetari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis. 48. Quam ob rem, si cadit in sapientem animi dolor, qui profecto cadit

nisi ex eius animo extirpatam humanitatem arbitramur, quae causa est, cur amicitiam funditus tollamus e vita, ne aliquas propter eam suscipiamus molestias? Quid enim interest motu animi sublato non dico inter pecudem et hominem, sed inter hominem et truncum aut saxum aut quidvis generis eiusdem? Neque enim sunt isti audiendi, qui virtutem duram et quasi ferream esse quandam volunt; quae quidem est cum multis in rebus, tum in amicitia tenera atque tractabilis, ut et bonis amici quasi diffundatur et incommodis contrahatur. Quam ob rem angor iste, qui pro amico saepe capiendus est, non tantum valet, ut tollat e vita amicitiam, non plus quam ut virtutes, quia non nullas curas et molestias adferunt, repudientur.

XIV. Cum autem contrahat amicitiam, ut supra dixi, si qua significatio virtutis eluceat, ad quam se similis animus adplicet et adiungat, id cum contigit, amor exoriatur necesse est. 49. Quid enim tam absurdum quam delectari multis inanibus rebus, ut honore, ut gloria, ut aedificio, ut vestitu cultuque corporis, animante virtute praedito, eo qui vel amare vel, ut ita dicam, redamare possit, non admodum delectari? Nihil est enim remuneratione benevolentiae, nihil vicissitudine studiorum officiorumque iucundius. 50. Quid, si illud etiam addimus, quod recte addi potest, nihil esse, quod ad se rem ullam tam alliciat et attrahat quam ad amicitiam similitudo? concedetur profecto verum esse, ut bonos boni diligant adsciscantque sibi quasi propinquitate coniunctos atque natura. Nihil est enim appetentius similium sui nec rapacius quam natura. Quam ob rem hoc quidem, Fanni et Scaevola, constet, ut opinor, bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam benevolentiam, qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus. Sed eadem bonitas etiam ad multitudinem pertinet. Non enim est inhumana virtus neque inmunis neque superba, quae etiam populos universos tueri eisque optume consulere soleat; quod non faceret profecto, si a caritate vulgi abhorreret. 51. Atque

etiam mihi quidem videntur, qui utilitatum causa fingunt amicitias, amabilissimum nodum amicitiae tollere. Non enim tam utilitas parta per amicum quam amici amor ipse delectat, tumque illud fit, quod ab amico est profectum, iucundum, si cum studio est profectum; tantumque abest, ut amicitiae propter indigentiam colantur, ut ii, qui opibus et copiis maximeque virtute, in qua plurimum est praesidii, minime alterius indigeant, liberalissimi sint et beneficentissimi. Atque haud sciam an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis. Ubi enim studia nostra viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset? Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est.

XV.—52. Non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffluentes audiendi, si quando de amicitia, quam nec usu nec ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt. Nam quis est, pro deorum fidem atque hominum! qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere? Haec enim est tyrannorum vita nimirum, in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benevolentiae potest esse fiducia, omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita, nullus locus amicitiae. 53. Quis enim aut eum diligat, quem metuat, aut eum, a quo se metui putet? Coluntur tamen simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus. Quodsi forte, ut fit plerumque, ceciderunt, tum intellegitur, quam fuerint inopes amicorum. Quod Tarquinium dixisse ferunt exulantem, tum se intellexisse, quos fidos amicos habuisset, quos infidos, cum iam neutris gratiam referre posset. 54. Quamquam miror, illa superbia et inportunitate si quemquam amicum habere potuit. Atque ut huius, quem dixi, mores veros amicos parare non potuerunt, sic multorum opes praepotentium excludunt amicitias fideles. Non enim solum ipsa Fortuna caeca est, sed eos etiam plerumque efficit caecos, quos conplexa est; itaque efferuntur fere fastidio et contumacia, nec quicquam insi-

piente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest. Atque hoc quidem videre licet, eos, qui antea commodis fuerint moribus, imperio, potestate, prosperis rebus inmutari, sperni ab iis veteres amicitias, indulgeri novis. 55. Quid autem stultius quam, cum plurimum copiis, facultatibus, opibus possint, cetera parare, quae parantur pecunia, equos, famulos, vestem egregiam, vasa pretiosa, amicos non parare, optumam et pulcherrimam vitae, ut ita dicam, supellectilem? etenim cetera cum parant, cui parent, nesciunt, nec cuius causa laborent (eius enim est istorum quidque, qui vicit viribus), amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio; ut, etiamsi illa maneant, quae sunt quasi dona Fortunae, tamen vita inculta et deserta ab amicis non possit esse iucunda. Sed haec hactenus.

XVI.—56. Constituendi autem sunt, qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini diligendi. De quibus tres video sententias ferri, quarum nullam probo, unam, ut eodem modo erga amicum adfecti simus, quo erga nosmet ipsos, alteram, ut nostra in amicos benevolentia illorum erga nos benevolentiae pariter aequaliterque respondeat, tertiam, ut, quanti quisque se ipse facit, tanti fiat ab amicis. 57. Harum trium sententiarum nulli prorsus adsentior. Nec enim illa prima vera est, ut, quem ad modum in se quisque sit, sic in amicum sit animatus. Quam multa enim, quae nostra causa numquam faceremus, facimus causa amicorum! precari ab indigno, supplicare, tum acerbius in aliquem invehi insectarique vehementius, quae in nostris rebus non satis honeste, in amicorum fiunt honestissime; multaeque res sunt, in quibus de suis commodis viri boni multa detrahunt detrahique patiuntur, ut iis amici potius quam ipsi fruantur. 58. Altera sententia est, quae definit amicitiam paribus officiis ac voluntatibus. Hoc quidem est nimis exigue et exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum. Divitior mihi et affluentior videtur esse vera amicitia nec observare restricte, ne plus reddat quam acce-

perit; neque enim verendum est, ne quid excidat, aut ne quid in terram defluat, aut ne plus aequo quid in amicitiam congeratur. 59. Tertius vero ille finis deterrumus, ut, quanti quisque se ipse faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis. Saepe enim in quibusdam aut animus abiectior est aut spes amplificandae fortunae fractior. Non est igitur amici talem esse in eum, qualis ille in se est, sed potius eniti et efficere, ut amici iacentem animum excitet inducatque in spem cogitationemque meliorem. Alius igitur finis verae amicitiae constituendus est, si prius, quid maxume reprehendere Scipio solitus sit, dixero. Negabat ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri quam eius, qui dixisset ita amare oportere, ut si aliquando esset osurus; nec vero se adduci posse, ut hoc, quem ad modum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus e septem; impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam. Quonam enim modo quisquam amicus esse poterit ei, cui se putabit inimicum esse posse? quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare, ut quam saepissime peccet amicus, quo plures det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum; rursum autem recte factis commodisque amicorum necesse erit angi, dolere, invidere. 60. Quare hoc quidem praeceptum, cuiuscumque est, ad tollendam amicitiam valet; illud potius praecipiendum fuit, ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiis comparandis, ut ne quando amare inciperemus eum, quem aliquando odisse possemus. Quin etiam, si minus felices in diligendo fuissemus, ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat.

XVII.—61. His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas, ut, etiam si qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne

summa turpitudo sequatur; est enim, quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit. Nec vero neglegenda est fama, nec mediocre telum ad res gerendas existimare oportet benevolentiam civium; quam blanditiis et adsentando colligere turpe est; virtus, quam sequitur caritas, minime repudianda est. 62. Sed (saepe enim redeo ad Scipionem, cuius omnis sermo erat de amicitia) querebatur, quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent; capras et oves quot quisque haberet, dicere posse, amicos quot haberet, non posse dicere, et in illis quidem parandis adhibere curam, in amicis eligendis neglegentis esse nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas, quibus eos, qui ad amicitias essent idonei, iudicarent. Sunt igitur firmi et stabiles et constantes eligendi; cuius generis est magna penuria. Et iudicare difficile est sane nisi expertum; experiendum autem est in ipsa amicitia. Ita praecurrit amicitia iudicium tollitque experiendi potestatem. 63. Est igitur prudentis sustinere ut cursum, sic impetum benevolentiae, quo utamur quasi equis temptatis, sic amicitia ex aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum. Quidam saepe in parva pecunia perspiciuntur quam sint leves, quidam autem, quos parva movere non potuit, cognoscuntur in magna. Sin erunt aliqui reperti, qui pecuniam praeferre amicitiae sordidum existiment, ubi eos inveniemus, qui honores, magistratus, imperia, potestates, opes amicitiae non anteponant, ut, cum ex altera parte proposita haec sint, ex altera ius amicitiae, non multo illa malint? Inbecilla enim est natura ad contemnendam potentiam; quam etiamsi neglecta amicitia consecuti sint, obscuratum iri arbitrantur, quia non sine magna causa sit neglecta amicitia. 64. Itaque verae amicitiae difficillime reperiuntur in iis, qui in honoribus reque publica versantur; ubi enim istum invenias, qui honorem amici anteponat suo? Quid? haec ut omittam, quam graves, quam difficiles plerisque videntur calamitatum societates! ad quas non est facile inventu qui descendant. Quamquam Ennius recte:

Amícus certus ín re incerta cérnitur,

tamen haec duo levitatis et infirmitatis plerosque convincunt, aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt aut in malis deserunt. Qui igitur utraque in re gravem, constantem, stabilem se in amicitia praestiterit, hunc ex maxime raro genere hominum iudicare debemus et paene divino.

XVIII.—65. Firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque est eius, quem in amicitia quaerimus, fides; nihil est enim stabile, quod infidum est. Simplicem praeterea et communem et consentientem, id est qui rebus isdem moveatur, eligi par est, quae omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem; neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuosum, neque vero, qui non isdem rebus movetur naturaque consentit, aut fidus aut stabilis potest esse. Addendum eodem est, ut ne criminibus aut inferendis delectetur aut credat oblatis, quae pertinent omnia ad eam, quam iam dudum tracto, constantiam. Ita fit verum illud, quod initio dixi, amicitiam nisi inter bonos esse non posse. Est enim boni viri, quem eundem sapientem licet dicere, haec duo tenere in amicitia: primum ne quid fictum sit neve simulatum; aperte enim vel odisse magis ingenui est quam fronte occultare sententiam; deinde non solum ab aliquo allatas criminationes repellere, sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum semper aliquid existimantem ab amico esse violatum. 66. Accedat huc suavitas quaedam oportet sermonum atque morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiae. Tristitia autem et in omni re severitas habet illa quidem gravitatem, sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque proclivior.

XIX.—67. Existit autem hoc loco quaedam quaestio subdifficilis, num quando amici novi, digni amicitia, veteribus sint anteponendi, ut equis vetulis teneros anteponere solemus. Indigna homine dubitatio! Non enim debent esse amicitiarum sicut aliarum rerum satietates; veterrima

quaeque, ut ea vina, quae vetustatem ferunt, esse debet suavissima; verumque illud est, quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus expletum sit. 68. Novitates autem si spem adferunt, ut tamquam in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiandae, vetustas tamen suo loco conservanda; maxima est enim vis vetustatis et consuetudinis. Quin ipso equo, cuius modo feci mentionem, si nulla res impediat, nemo est, quin eo, quo consuevit, libentius utatur quam intractato et novo. Nec vero in hoc, quod est animal, sed in iis etiam, quae sunt inanima, consuetudo valet, quom locis ipsis delectemur, montuosis etiam et silvestribus, in quibus diutius commorati sumus.

69. Sed maximum est in amicitia superiorem parem esse inferiori. Saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. Numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis, Q. vero Maximum fratrem, egregium virum omnino, sibi nequaquam parem, quod is anteibat aetate, tamquam superiorem colebat suosque omnes per se posse esse ampliores volebat. 70. Quod faciendum imitandumque est omnibus, ut, si quam praestantiam virtutis, ingenii, fortunae consecuti sint, inpertiant ea suis communicentque cum proximis, ut, si parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant inbecilliore vel animo vel fortuna, eorum augeant opes eisque honori sint et dignitati. Ut in fabulis, qui aliquamdiu propter ignorationem stirpis et generis in famulatu fuerunt, cum cogniti sunt et aut deorum aut regum filii inventi, retinent tamen caritatem in pastores, quos patres multos annos esse duxerunt. Quod est multo profecto magis in veris patribus certisque faciendum. Fructus enim ingenii et virtutis omnisque praestantiae tum maxumus capitur, cum in proxumum quemque confertur.

XX.—71. Ut igitur ii, qui sunt in amicitiae coniunctio-

nisque necessitudine superiores, exaequare se cum inferioribus debent, sic inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari. Quorum plerique aut queruntur semper aliquid aut etiam exprobrant, eoque magis, si habere se putant, quod officiose et amice et cum labore aliquo suo factum queant dicere. Odiosum sane genus hominum officia exprobrantium; quae meminisse debet is, in quem conlata sunt, non commemorare, qui contulit. 72. Quam ob rem, ut ii, qui superiores sunt, summittere se debent in amicitia, sic quodam modo inferiores extollere. Sunt enim quidam, qui molestas amicitias faciunt, cum ipsi se contemni putant; quod non fere contingit nisi iis, qui etiam contemnendos se arbitrantur; qui hac opinione non modo verbis, sed etiam opere levandi sunt. 73. Tantum autem cuique tribuendum, primum quantum ipse efficere possis, deinde etiam quantum ille, quem diligas atque adiuves, sustinere. Non enim neque tu possis, quamvis excellas, omnes tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere, ut Scipio P Rupilium potuit consulem efficere, fratrem eius L. non potuit. Quodsi etiam possis quidvis deferre ad alterum, videndum est tamen, quid ille possit sustinere.

74. Omnino amicitiae conroboratis iam confirmatisque et ingeniis et aetatibus iudicandae sunt, nec, si qui ineunte aetate venandi aut pilae studiosi fuerunt, eos habere necessarios, quos tum eodem studio praeditos dilexerunt. Isto enim modo nutrices et paedagogi iure vetustatis plurimum benevolentiae postulabunt; qui neglegendi quidem non sunt, sed alio quodam modo aestimandi. Aliter amicitiae stabiles permanere non possunt. Dispares enim mores disparia studia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias; nec ob aliam causam ullam boni improbis, improbi bonis amici esse non possunt, nisi quod tanta est inter eos, quanta maxima potest esse, morum studiorumque distantia. 75. Recte etiam praecipi potest in amicitiis, ne

intemperata quaedam benevolentia, quod persaepe fit, impediat magnas utilitates amicorum. Nec enim, ut ad fabulas redeam, Troiam Neoptolemus capere potuisset, si Lycomedem, apud quem erat educatus, multis cum lacrimis iter suum impedientem audire voluisset. Et saepe incidunt magnae res, ut discedendum sit ab amicis; quas qui impedire vult, quod desiderium non facile ferat, is et infirmus est mollisque natura et ob eam ipsam causam in amicitia parum iustus. 76. Atque in omni re considerandum est, et quid postules ab amico et quid patiare a te impetrari.

XXI. Est etiam quaedam calamitas in amicitiis dimittendis non numquam necessaria; iam enim a sapientium familiaritatibus ad vulgares amicitias oratio nostra delabitur. Erumpunt saepe vitia amicorum tum in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos, quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. Tales igitur amicitiae sunt remissione usūs eluendae et, ut Catonem dicere audivi, dissuendae magis quam discindendae, nisi quaedam admodum intolerabilis iniuria exarserit, ut neque rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit, ut non statim alienatio disiunctioque faciunda sit. 77. Sin autem aut morum aut studiorum commutatio quaedam, ut fieri solet, facta erit aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit (loquor enim iam, ut paulo ante dixi, non de sapientium, sed de communibus amicitiis), cavendum erit, ne non solum amicitiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae videantur. Nihil est enim turpius quam cum eo bellum gerere, quocum familiariter vixeris. Ab amicitia Q. Pompei meo nomine se removerat, ut scitis, Scipio; propter dissensionem autem, quae erat in re publica, alienatus est a collega nostro Metello; utrumque egit graviter, auctoritate et offensione animi non acerba. 78. Quam ob rem primum danda opera est, ne qua amicorum discidia fiant; sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut extinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae videantur. Cavendum vero, ne etiam in graves inimicitias convertant se amicitiae; ex quibus iurgia, maledicta, contumeliae

gignuntur. Quae tamen si tolerabiles erunt, ferendae sunt, et hic honos veteri amicitiae tribuendus, ut is in culpa sit, qui faciat, non, qui patiatur iniuriam.

Omnino omnium horum vitiorum atque incommodorum una cautio est atque una provisio, ut ne nimis cito diligere incipiant neve non dignos. 79. Digni autem sunt amicitia, quibus in ipsis inest causa, cur diligantur. Rarum genus. Et quidem omnia praeclara rara, nec quicquam difficilius quam reperire, quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum. Sed plerique neque in rebus humanis quicquam bonum norunt, nisi quod fructuosum sit, et amicos tamquam pecudes eos potissimum diligunt, ex quibus sperant se maxumum fructum esse capturos. 80. Ita pulcherrima illa et maxume naturali carent amicitia per se et propter se expetita nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt, haec vis amicitiae et qualis et quanta sit. Ipse enim se quisque diligit, non ut aliquam a se ipse mercedem exigat caritatis suae, sed quod per se sibi quisque carus est. Quod nisi idem in amicitiam transferetur, verus amicus numquam reperietur; est enim is, qui est tamquam alter idem. 81. Quodsi hoc apparet in bestiis, volucribus, nantibus, agrestibus, cicuribus, feris, primum ut se ipsae diligant (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur), deinde ut requirant atque adpetant, ad quas se adplicent eiusdem generis animantis, idque faciunt cum desiderio et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani, quanto id magis in homine fit natura! qui et se ipse diligit et alterum anquirit, cuius animum ita cum suo misceat, ut efficiat paene unum ex duobus.

XXII.—82. Sed plerique perverse, ne dicam inpudenter, habere talem amicum volunt, quales ipsi esse non possunt, quaeque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, haec ab iis desiderant. Par est autem primum ipsum esse virum bonum, tum alterum similem sui quaerere. In talibus ea, quam iam dudum tractamus, stabilitas amicitiae confirmari potest, cum homines benevolentia coniuncti primum cupiditatibus iis,

quibus ceteri serviunt, imperabunt, deinde aequitate iustitiaque gaudebunt, omniaque alter pro altero suscipiet, neque quicquam umquam nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit, neque solum colent inter se ac diligent, sed etiam verebuntur. Nam maxumum ornamentum amicitiae tollit, qui ex ea tollit verecundiam. 83. Itaque in iis perniciosus est error, qui existumant lubidinum peccatorumque omnium patere in amicitia licentiam; virtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum comes, ut, quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea, quae summa sunt, pervenire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera perveniret. Quae si quos inter societas aut est aut fuit aut futura est, eorum est habendus ad summum naturae bonum optumus beatissimusque comitatus. 84. Haec est, inquam, societas, in qua omnia insunt, quae putant homines expetenda, honestas, gloria, tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas, ut et, cum haec adsint, beata vita sit et sine his esse non possit. Quod cum optumum maxumumque sit, si id volumus adipisci, virtuti opera danda est, sine qua nec amicitiam neque ullam rem expetendam consequi possumus; ea vero neglecta qui se amicos habere arbitrantur, tum se denique errasse sentiunt, cum eos gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit. 85. Quocirca (dicendum est enim saepius), cum iudicaris, diligere oportet, non, cum dilexeris, iudicare. Sed cum multis in rebus neglegentia plectimur, tum maxime in amicis et diligendis et colendis; praeposteris enim utimur consiliis et acta agimus, quod vetamur vetere proverbio. Nam implicati ultro et citro vel usu diuturno vel etiam officiis repente in medio cursu amicitias exorta aliqua offensione disrumpimus.

XXIII.—86. Quo etiam magis vituperanda est rei maxime necessariae tanta incuria. Una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis, de cuius utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt. Quamquam a multis virtus ipsa contemnitur et venditatio quaedam atque ostentatio esse dicitur; multi

divitias despiciunt, quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat; honores vero, quorum cupiditate quidam inflammantur, quam multi ita contemnunt, ut nihil inanius, nihil esse levius existiment! itemque cetera, quae quibusdam admirabilia videntur, permulti sunt qui pro nihilo putent; de amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt, et ii, qui ad rem publicam se contulerunt, et ii, qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur, et ii, qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi, postremo ii, qui se totos tradiderunt voluptatibus, sine amicitia vitam esse nullam, si modo velint aliqua ex parte liberaliter vivere. 87. Serpit enim nescio quo modo per omnium vitas amicitia nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui. Quin etiam si quis asperitate ea est et inmanitate naturae, congressus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit, qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem accepimus, tamen is pati non possit, ut non anquirat aliquem, apud quem evomat virus acerbitatis suae. Atque hoc maxime iudicaretur, si quid tale posset contingere, ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleret et in solitudine uspiam collocaret atque ibi suppeditans omnium rerum, quas natura desiderat, abundantiam et copiam hominis omnino aspiciendi potestatem eriperet. Quis tam esset ferreus, qui eam vitam ferre posset, cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo? 88. Verum ergo illud est, quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audivi ab aliis senibus auditum: 'si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore; quae iucundissima fuisset, si aliquem, cui narraret, habuisset.' Sic natura solitarium nihil amat semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum adnititur; quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est.

XXIV. Sed cum tot signis eadem natura declaret, quid velit, anquirat, desideret, tamen obsurdescimus nescio quo

modo nec ea, quae ab ea monemur, audimus. Est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae, multaeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur, quas tum evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est; una illa subeunda offensio est, ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur: nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt. 89. Sed nescio quo modo verum est, quod in Andria familiaris meus dicit:

Obséquium amicos, véritas odiúm parit.

Molesta veritas, siquidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est venenum amicitiae, sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit; maxuma autem culpa in eo, qui et veritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio inpellitur. Omni igitur hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est, primum ut monitio acerbitate, deinde ut obiurgatio contumelia careat; in obsequio autem, quoniam Terentiano verbo lubenter utimur, comitas adsit, adsentatio, vitiorum adiutrix, procul amoveatur, quae non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est; aliter enim cum tyranno, aliter cum amico vivitur. 90. Cuius autem aures clausae veritati sunt, ut ab amico verum audire nequeat, huius salus desperanda est. Scitum est enim illud Catonis ut multa: "melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri quam eos amicos, qui dulces videantur; illos verum saepe dicere, hos numquam." Atque illud absurdum, quod ii, qui monentur, eam molestiam, quam debent capere, non capiunt, eam capiunt, qua debent vacare; peccasse enim se non anguntur, obiurgari moleste ferunt; quod contra oportebat delicto dolere, correctione gaudere.

XXV.—91. Ut igitur et monere et moneri proprium est verae amicitiae et alterum libere facere, non aspere, alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter, sic habendum est nullam in amicitiis pestem esse maiorem quam adulationem, blanditiam, adsentationem; quamvis enim multis nomini-

bus est hoc vitium notandum levium hominum atque fallacium ad voluntatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem. 92. Cum autem omnium rerum simulatio vitiosa est (tollit enim iudicium veri idque adulterat), tum amicitiae repugnat maxime; delet enim veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest. Nam cum amicitiae vis sit in eo, ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus, qui id fieri poterit, si ne in uno quidem quoque unus animus erit idemque semper, sed varius, commutabilis, multiplex? 93. Quid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam devium quam animus eius, qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam vultum atque nutum convertitur?

Négat quis, nego; ait, áio; postremo ímperavi egomét mihi
Omnia adsentári,

ut ait idem Terentius, sed ille in Gnathonis persona, quod amici genus adhibere omnino levitatis est. 94. Multi autem Gnathonum similes cum sint loco, fortuna, fama superiores, horum est adsentatio molesta, cum ad vanitatem accessit auctoritas. 95. Secerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci tam potest adhibita diligentia quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris. Contio, quae ex imperitissimis constat, tamen iudicare solet, quid intersit inter popularem, id est adsentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem, severum et gravem. 96. Quibus blanditiis C. Papirius nuper influebat in auris contionis, cum ferret legem de tribunis plebis reficiendis! Dissuasimus nos; sed nihil de me, de Scipione dicam lubentius. Quanta illa, di inmortales, fuit gravitas, quanta in oratione maiestas! ut facile ducem populi Romani, non comitem diceres. Sed adfuistis, et est in manibus oratio. Itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est. Atque, ut ad me redeam, meministis, Q. Maxumo, fratre Scipionis, et L. Mancino consulibus quam popularis lex de sacerdotiis C. Licini Crassi videbatur! cooptatio enim collegiorum ad populi beneficium

transferebatur; atque is primus instituit in forum versus agere cum populo. Tamen illius vendibilem orationem religio deorum inmortalium nobis defendentibus facile vincebat. Atque id actum est praetore me quinquennio ante, quam consul sum factus; ita re magis quam summa auctoritate causa illa defensa est.

XXVI.—97. Quodsi in scaena, id est in contione, in qua rebus fictis et adumbratis loci plurimum est, tamen verum valet, si modo id patefactum et inlustratum est, quid in amicitia fieri oportet, quae tota veritate perpenditur? in qua nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus videas tuumque ostendas, nihil fidum, nihil exploratum habeas, ne amare quidem aut amari, cum, id quam vere fiat, ignores. Quamquam ista adsentatio, quamvis perniciosa sit, nocere tamen nemini potest nisi ei, qui eam recipit atque ea delectatur. Ita fit, ut is adsentatoribus patefaciat aures suas maxime, qui ipse sibi adsentetur et se maxime ipse delectet. 98. Omnino est amans sui virtus; optume enim se ipsa novit, quamque amabilis sit, intellegit. Ego autem non de virtute nunc loquor, sed de virtutis opinione. Virtute enim ipsa non tam multi praediti esse quam videri volunt. Hos delectat adsentatio, his fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem sermo cum adhibetur, orationem illam vanam testimonium esse laudum suarum putant. Nulla est igitur haec amicitia, cum alter verum audire non vult, alter ad mentiendum paratus est. Nec parasitorum in comoediis adsentatio faceta nobis videretur, nisi essent milites gloriosi.

Magnás vero agere grátias Thaís mihi?

Satis erat respondere: "magnas"; "ingentes," inquit. Semper auget adsentator id, quod is, cuius ad voluntatem dicitur, vult esse magnum. 99. Quam ob rem, quamquam blanda ista vanitas apud eos valet, qui ipsi illam adlectant et invitant, tamen etiam graviores constantioresque admonendi sunt, ut animadvertant, ne callida adsentatione capi-

antur. Aperte enim adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui admodum est excors; callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet, studiose cavendum est; nec enim facillime adgnoscitur, quippe qui etiam adversando saepe adsentetur et litigare se simulans blandiatur atque ad extremum det manus vincique se patiatur, ut is, qui inlusus sit, plus vidisse videatur. Quid autem turpius quam inludi? Quod ut ne accidat, magis cavendum est.

Ut me hódie ante omnes cómicos stultós senes
Versáris atque inlússeris lautíssume.

100. Haec enim etiam in fabulis stultissima persona est inprovidorum et credulorum senum. Sed nescio quo pacto ab amicitiis perfectorum hominum, id est sapientium (de hac dico sapientia, quae videtur in hominem cadere posse), ad leves amicitias defluxit oratio. Quam ob rem ad illa prima redeamus eaque ipsa concludamus aliquando.

XXVII. Virtus, virtus, inquam, C. Fanni, et tu, Q. Muci, et conciliat amicitias et conservat. In ea est enim convenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia; quae cum se extulit et ostendit suum lumen et idem aspexit adgnovitque in alio, ad id se admovet vicissimque accipit illud, quod in altero est; ex quo exardescit sive amor sive amicitia; utrumque enim dictum est ab amando; amare autem nihil est aliud nisi eum ipsum diligere, quem ames, nulla indigentia, nulla utilitate quaesita; quae tamen ipsa ecflorescit ex amicitia, etiamsi tu eam minus secutus sis. 101. Hac nos adulescentes benevolentia senes illos, L. Paulum, M. Catonem, C. Galum, P. Nasicam, Ti. Gracchum, Scipionis nostri socerum, dileximus, haec etiam magis elucet inter aequales, ut inter me et Scipionem, L. Furium, P. Rupilium, Sp. Mummium. Vicissim autem senes in adulescentium caritate adquiescimus, ut in vestra, ut in Q. Tuberonis; equidem etiam admodum adulescentis P. Rutili, A. Vergini familiaritate delector. Quoniamque ita ratio

comparata est vitae naturaeque nostrae, ut alia ex alia aetas oriatur, maxume quidem optandum est, ut cum aequalibus possis, quibuscum tamquam e carceribus emissus sis, cum isdem ad calcem, ut dicitur, pervenire. 102. Sed quoniam res humanae fragiles caducaeque sunt, semper aliqui anquirendi sunt, quos diligamus et a quibus diligamur; caritate enim benevolentiaque sublata omnis est e vita sublata iucunditas. Mihi quidem Scipio, quamquam est subito ereptus, vivit tamen semperque vivet; virtutem enim amavi illius viri, quae extincta non est; nec mihi soli versatur ante oculos, qui illam semper in manibus habui, sed etiam posteris erit clara et insignis. Nemo umquam animo aut spe maiora suscipiet, qui sibi non illius memoriam atque imaginem proponendam putet. 103. Equidem ex omnibus rebus, quas mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit, nihil habeo, quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim comparare. In hac mihi de re publica consensus, in hac rerum privatarum consilium, in eadem requies plena oblectationis fuit. Numquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi, quod quidem senserim, nihil audivi ex eo ipse, quod nollem; una domus erat, idem victus, isque communis, neque solum militia, sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque communes. 104. Nam quid ego de studiis dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid atque discendi? in quibus remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum tempus contrivimus. Quarum rerum recordatio et memoria si una cum illo occidisset, desiderium coniunctissimi atque amantissimi viri ferre nullo modo possem. Sed nec illa extincta sunt alunturque potius et augentur cogitatione et memoria mea, et, si illis plane orbatus essem, magnum tamen adfert mihi aetas ipsa solacium. Diutius enim iam in hoc desiderio esse non possum. Omnia autem brevia tolerabilia esse debent, etiamsi magna sunt.

Haec habui de amicitia quae dicerem. Vos autem hortor, ut ita virtutem locetis, sine qua amicitia esse non potest ut ea excepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis.

NOTES.

The references in the Notes are to chapters and lines. Proper names of any importance, when not mentioned in the Notes, will be found in the Index.

An obelus (†) prefixed to a word denotes that the reading is doubtful.

I. §§ 1-5. DEDICATION.—*Forty years ago I was a pupil of Quintus Mucius Scaevŏla, the son-in-law of Gaius Laelius. I had many opportunities of hearing him speak of the past, and in particular I recall a discourse of his on the subject of Friendship. You will remember it, Atticus, from the fact that it occurred immediately after the notable quarrel of your friend Publius Sulpicius Rufus with his old comrade Quintus Pompeius* (88 B.C.). *It was indeed à propos of this quarrel that Scaevola related a conversation held more than forty years before* (129 B.C.) *between C. Laelius, C. Fannius, and himself, on the same topic. As I made mental note of what was said at the time, I can reproduce it here in the form of a dialogue between the three speakers; and I do so the more willingly because I hope at one and the same time to gratify your oft expressed wish and to produce something which may be of general value. In writing my book on "Old Age," Cato was the natural spokesman to select, and equally naturally I choose Laelius for my exponent of Friendship. Apart from the fact of his proverbial friendship with Scipio, his name lends to my book the dignity of a bygone time and something of his reputation for wisdom. Suppose then that you are listening to him. It is a few days after Scipio's death: Scaevola and Fannius have come to see Laelius. They begin the conversation.*

[Refer to the INDEX for the names of **Atticus, Sulpicius,** and **Cato**; and to the INTRODUCTION, § 2, for **Scipio Africanus, Laelius, Mucius Scaevola,** and **Fannius.**]

Ch. I. 1. **Quintus Mucius**: identical with the Scaevola named in i. 4. Every Roman of birth had three names at least, viz., (1) the *nomen*, indicating the *gens* or clan to which he belonged; (2) the *cognomen*, indicating the one family (out of many in the same *gens*) of which he was a member; and (3) the *praenomen*, distinguishing him personally from other members of the same family. Thus *Quintus Mucius Scaevola* signifies Quintus of the Scaevola family of the *gens Mucia*. One or more *agnomina* might be added, signifying personal peculiarities or distinctions or other accidents, as in the case of Publius

Cornelius Scipio (l. 23), who bore the *agnomina* of *Africanus* for his conquest of Carthage, *Aemilianus* because adopted from the *gens Aemilia*, and *Minor* to distinguish him from his grandfather who was also called Africanus. **augur**: the Augurs were originally four patricians, but after 300 B.C. the number was increased by the addition of five plebeians. Sulla further increased their number to fifteen (81 B.C.). They formed a college of respected citizens who judged from the flight of birds, the manner in which the sacred birds ate their food, etc., whether any public undertaking was approved by the gods. This process, called "taking the auspices," had to be gone through before a battle was fought or an election decided in the Centuriate Assembly.

2. **memoriter**: "with perfect memory," the adverb of *memor*. **dubitare**: the infinitive is dependent on *solebat*. *Dubito*, meaning "I hesitate," is generally followed by an infinitive: thus *non dubitat ire*, "he does not hesitate to go," but *non dubitat quin eat*, "he does not doubt that he is going." **in omni sermone**: "in all his conversation," "at every opportunity."

4. **ita eram deductus . . . ut**: "had been introduced to Scaevola, with the idea that I should never leave." The subjunctive *discederem* is consecutive. *Deduco* means to "escort" a great man to his business or a pupil to his teacher, as *reduco* (iii. 33) means to escort them home again. **ad Scaevolam**: the same person as the Q. Mucius of l. 1, his name in full being Q. Mucius Scaevola. **sumpta virili toga**: "after assuming the dress of manhood," *i. e.* "on obtaining my majority." Up to 15-16 years of age, the young Roman was *puer*, and wore the *toga praetexta*, the gown bordered with purple. After that age he was *adulescens*, and assumed the simple white gown which marked full citizenship and manhood. Cp. x. 10, and note. The ablative absolute often does duty for a subordinate clause expressing time when.

5. **possem et liceret**: subjunctive by assimilation, because the clause is dependent on the subjunctive *discederem*.

6. **multa . . . prudenter disputata**: *lit.* "many things . . . ably argued," *i. e.* "many able arguments." So *multa breviter et commode dicta*, "many terse and pointed sayings."

8. **prudentia**: ablative of the means, "by help of his knowledge of the law." **quo mortuo**: "*and when he* was dead." Notice the manner of turning the Latin relative by an English personal pronoun and conjunction.

9. **pontificem**: the pontiffs, originally five, increased to nine (300 B.C.) and afterwards to fifteen or more, formed a sacred College, whose duty it was to keep the *fasti*, or calendar, and to regulate all the religious matters of the State. They were under the control of one of their number, the *Pontifex Maximus*, who also had charge of the conduct of the Vestal Virgins. The Scaevola here mentioned was Pontifex Maximus from 90 B.C. onwards, and a cousin of the less distinguished Augur mentioned in i. 1, *n*. See Index. **unum**: the addition of *unum* intensifies the superlative *praestantissimum*, "decidedly the most distinguished man."

10. **ingenio**: ablative of respect, indicating that in point of which the epithet *praestantissimus* applies. So *iustitia.*

11. **de hoc alias**: sc. *dicam.* We have exactly the same ellipse in English, "but of this hereafter." *Alias* is the adverb, "at another time." Distinguish from *alibi,* the adverb of place, "elsewhere." **redeo ad augurem**: "I return to (*i. e.* resume my remarks about) the Augur," the Q. Mucius Scaevola of i. 1.

12. **cum . . . tum**: standing in this order, *cum . . . tum . . .* are merely equivalent to *et . . . et . . .* or *non solum . . . sed etiam . . .* The verb *memini* (a perfect form with present meaning, "I remember") governs both *multa* (to complete which *eum colloqui* or *eum dixisse* may be supplied) and the accus. and infin. clause *sedentem . . . illum incidere,* &c. *Memini* is used with both the present and the perfect infinitive: either tense can be used if the person was present as a witness, but only the latter if he was not: *e. g.* (*a*) *memini eum dicere,* "I remember him saying," *i. e.* I was there and heard him; (*b*) *memini eum dixisse,* same as (*a*), but also "I call to mind (from what I have heard or read) that he said." **domi**: the locative of *domus,* "at his home." See further, note on *tanti,* xi. 11. **hemicyclio**: from the Greek *hemi* (=half) + *cyclos* (=circle), an open-air seat in the shape of a semi-circle, capable of seating a number of persons, so that each could see all the others. It was also called *exedra.*

13. **cum . . . familiares**: "myself and a very few other intimate friends being with him." Joined with *cum,* the imperfect subjunctive does duty for a present participle, the pluperfect subjunctive for a perfect participle, active or passive according to the verb employed. *Unā* is an adverb, "together"; *esse una* = "to be together." *Admodum,* literally "up to the measure (*modus*)," means "quite," "exceedingly." It is to be joined to *pauci,* not to *familiares. Familiaris* means a personal friend, an *intime,* while *necessarius* (or *propinquus*) is a relation by blood, *affinis* a relation by marriage.

15. †**multis erat in ore**: "was on the lips of many." The dative *multis* is one of the possessor (=*multorum*). The reading *tum fere* instead of *tum forte* means "just about that time."

16. **eo magis, quod**: "all the more, because." *Eo* is really an ablative of measure ("by this much the more"). **utebare multum.** *utor,* joined with a personal object, often means "to have dealings with," "have to do with," "to be familiar with," a man, as here. So the noun *usus* means "acquaintance," "intimacy." **multum**: the accusative neuter of many adjectives is used as an adverb; so *multum* = "much"; *plurimum* = "very much," &c.

17. **tribunus plebis**: the Tribunes of the Plebs were first appointed, 494 B.C., to protect the lives, persons, and privileges of the plebeians against the patrician consuls. This right of protection (*auxilium*) was coupled with the right of veto (*intercessio*) which enabled them to forbid the action of any magistrate whatever (excepting a Dictator); and subsequently *plebiscita, i. e.* their motions put to the plebeian assembly, were invested with the same authority over the whole

people as the laws made by the Comitia Centuriata. Thus the Tribunes rapidly came to be the most absolute of Roman magistrates during their one year of office. They were always themselves of plebeian status, and their original number, two, was ultimately increased to ten (457 B.C.). **capitali odio**: "with deadly hatred." *Capitalis* means "what concerns the *caput*"; and *caput*, in the language of Roman law, means a man's status as a free citizen, his rights, privileges, &c. Hence *capitalis* comes to mean "dangerous to a man's position *or* life," "deadly."

17. **qui tum erat consul**: this gives the date as 88 B.C. See Index, *s. v.* POMPEIUS.

18. **quocum**: joined with personal, reflexive, or relative pronouns, the preposition *cum* becomes enclitic, *i. e.* is attached as a suffix to the pronoun in question. So *secum*, in i. 22. Another form for *quocum* is *quicum*, where *qui* is the old ablative case found in the adverbial *qui*, "how?"

19. **quanta esset, &c.**: this clause is the object of *meministi* above, and requires the invariable mood of an indirect question, the subjunctive. The words *cum . . . vixerat* give the reason for the *admiratio vel querela*, and should be translated last; "you remember how great was men's surprise . . . when he, being tribune of the plebs . . ." **admiratio**: not "admiration," but "astonishment." *Querela* means "complaint," "disgust."

20. **in eam ipsam mentionem**: *i. e. in eius ipsius rei mentionem*, "the mention of that very thing," viz. the quarrel between Sulpicius and Pompeius.

21. **Laeli**: in Cicero, nouns having nominative in *-ius* or *-ium* make the genitive singular in *-i* not *-ii*. **habitum**: *sermonem* (*contionem, orationem*) *habere* is the Latin for "to make remarks (an address, a speech)."

22. **secum**: the reflexive regularly refers to the subject of the *principal* verb, *e. g.* in this case, to *Scaevola*. **M. f.**: *i. e. Marci filio*, the ablative *filio* being in apposition with *genero*, as is also *Fannio*. Mucius Scaevola the Augur had married the elder daughter of Laelius, and C. Fannius had married the younger. **paucis diebus**: the ablative is used to express the time *within which* an event occurs; the accusative to express the *duration* of the occurrence. The death of Scipio Africanus the younger occurred in 129 B.C. See INTROD. § 2.

24. **quas**: translate by demonstrative pronoun and conjunction, "and these." **arbitratu meo**: ablative of manner, "on my own judgment," "at my own discretion," *i. e.* Cicero, while giving the substance of the arguments used by Laelius and his friends, rearranges them and expresses them in his own words.

25. **quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes**: "for I have introduced them speaking in person, so to say." *Quasi* often modifies a word used in a metaphorical sense, as *ipsos* here; cp. viii. 27, *quasi lumen*, "a light, so to speak." **ne inquam, &c.**: "that (the words) 'I say' and 'he says' might not be interjected too often." By making the characters speak in dialogue, Cicero avoids the ugly necessity of

repeating the phrases "so-and-so said," "said I," &c. *Saepius* is an example of the absolute use of the comparative to express excess, "too often."

27. **coram**: here an adverb, "face to face with one another." For *haberi*, see above on i. 21.

28. **mecum ageres**: *ago* is constantly used of negotiating or arguing with a person, implying *verbal* debate; cp. *agere cum populo*, xxv. 41.

29. **cum . . tum**: "both . . . . and," as above, i. 12, *n*. *Cognitione* and *familiaritate* are the usual ablatives found with *dignus*.

30. **non invitus**: "not unwillingly," *i. e.* "gladly." Latin commonly uses an attributive adjective in lieu of the adverb of English idiom, when speaking of states of mind.

31. **in Catone Maiore**: the companion treatise of Cicero *De Senectute* was in his own day commonly called *Cato Maior*, after the principal speaker in the dialogue. See Index, *s. v.* CATO.

32. **scriptus ad te**: "dedicated to you." **Catonem . . . senem**: "Cato when an old man," "Cato in his old age." **induxi**: *inducere* is the regular word for bringing a character upon the stage.

33. **nulla videbatur aptior**: "it seemed that no character was more fitted than his." Observe that Latin uses *videor* as a *personal* verb, in contrast with the English idiom. Similarly "It is said that Caesar was killed" becomes *dicitur Caesar interfectus esse* (not *Caesarem interfectum*). **persona**: the word originally means (1) "an actor's mask"; then (2) the "actor" or "character" in the play himself; and finally, in law, (3) "a person." The second meaning is that required here, the "persons" in a dialogue being as it were "actors" or "characters" therein. **quae . . . loqueretur**: "fit *to* speak." The final subjunctive with *qui* is the normal way of expressing "fit to," "worthy to," &c., and the infinitive is not allowable after *dignus, indignus, aptus, idoneus.*

35. **fuisset . . . floruisset**: the subjunctives are due to the consecutive force of the relative, "than the character of one who (*lit.* such a one as) had been so very long an old man," &c.

36. **cum . . . accepissemus**: *cum* is causal, "since." Hence the mood, the whole clause doing duty for the non-existent perfect participle active of *accipio*—"as we had heard" or "having heard." *Accipio* is common in the sense of "hearing by tradition." The following accus. and infin. clause expresses what was heard, the adjective *memorabilem* being predicative.

37. **idonea . . . quae dissereret**: a final subjunctive like *aptior quae loqueretur*, above, i. 33, *n*.

39. **quae . . . meminisset**: subjunctive, because dependent on *dissereret*. With *disputata* sc. *esse*, which is constantly omitted. *Scaevola* is nominative, "which Scaevola remembered to have been maintained by him."

39. **genus hoc sermonum**: *i. e.* dialogues.

40. **positum**: this is equivalent to a conditional clause, "if they are given on the authority." *Veteres* are not "old men" but "men of olden times."

41. **nescio quo pacto videtur**: "seems somehow or other (*lit.* by I don't know what means)"; but *nescio quo pacto videatur* (subj. of indirect question) = "I don't know how it seems." With the indicative, *nescio quis* is to be regarded as merely an emphatic indefinite pronoun.

42. **gravitatis**: dependent on *plus*. Any neuter adjective or adverb expressing quantity may be followed by a partitive genitive.

43. **ad senem senex**: when Cicero wrote his *De Senectute* he was sixty-two years of age, and Atticus, to whom he dedicated his book, was three years older.

47. **sic est habitus**: "such (so) he was accounted." The passive *habeor* is common as a copulative verb.

48. **velim avertas**: "I should like you to avert," or "please avert." The subjunctive *velim* is potential, *i. e.* it is the apodosis (result-clause) to a hypothetical sentence of which the protasis (*e. g.* "if you don't mind") is suppressed. *Avertas* is jussive subjunctive in semi-dependence on *velim.* So (*velim*) *putes*, "please think." In meaning there is no difference between *velim avertas* and *velim ut avertas*, but the former is more common in Cicero.

52. **est**: the predicate is *cuius*, not *de amicitia*, "to whom belongs the whole of the discourse concerning friendship." **te ipse cognosces**: "you will recognize yourself," *i. e.* see a picture of your own character, the sentiments of the imaginary Laelius being just such as Atticus (hints Cicero) would have expressed.

II. §§ 6-10. INTRODUCTORY.—Fannius: "*Yes, Laelius. Never was there one better or wiser than Scipio, but now that he is no more, all men look upon you as his successor. They called him The Wise, as they did Cato and Acilius, and they so call you now, but for a different reason—the reason for which Socrates was named The Wise; and they wish to know how you take Scipio's death, the more as you failed to make your usual appearance at the last meeting of our circle.*" Scaevola: "*Yes. I tell them that it is ill-health keeps you away, not unphilosophic grief for your dead friend.*" Laelius: "*Quite right. No other cause than ill-health ought to keep one from one's duty, and that is why I was absent. I thank you, Fannius, for the compliment you have paid me, but I think you rather misjudge Cato's wisdom. Personally, I would not say that even Socrates was a wiser man than he.*"

[Refer to the INDEX for **Socrates** and **Paulus.**]

Ch. II. 1. **sunt ista**: "what you say is true." The demonstrative *iste* refers, as usual, to the person addressed.

2. **quisquam**: speaking generally, this word may be used only in a negative clause or its equivalent (*e. g.* in a clause containing *vix*, or in a question expecting the answer "no").

4. **hoc**: nominative to *tribuebatur;* it means "the reputation of wisdom." *Mŏdŏ* is an adverb of time, "recently." Cato the Censor died in 149 B.C., twenty years before the supposed date of this dialogue.

5. † **L. Acilium**: (*L.=Lucium*) an unknown person. There was a writer on law of this name in Cato's day. Some editions read *Atilium*.

6. **uterque . . . modo**: *sc. appellatus est sapiens. Modō* is here the ablative of *modus*, "manner." Distinguish the adverb *modŏ*.

7. **in iure civili**: *ius* signifies (1) a man's "rights," and also (2) "law" in the sense of the *science* which deals with those rights. *Lex* means "a law," in the sense of the enactment which defines a man's "rights," &c. *Ius civile* is such law as is concerned with man as a citizen, "civil law."

8. **usum habebat**: "had experience in," a common meaning of *usus*. **multa eius, &c.**: the combination of adverb and perfect participle is best rendered in English by adjective and noun. Thus *provisa prudenter* = "wise foresight"; *acta constanter* = "resolute action"; *responsa acute*, "shrewd answers." The *responsa*, our "Counsel's opinion," were the answers given by Roman lawyers to their clients. **in foro**: Roman lawyers practised in the Forum Romanum, where Cato built for them the first Basilica or Court of Justice. Hence *in foro* = "in the law-courts." The Forum was the small valley between the Esquiline Hill (N.), the Palatine (S.), and the Capitol (W.), in which were crowded most of the public buildings of ancient Rome.

10. **ferebantur**: "were related," a sufficiently common meaning of *fero* in either voice. **quasi cognomen**: "the title, so to say, of The Wise." *Quasi* is used to modify or excuse an unusual or exaggerated expression; cp. on i. 25.

11. **te autem**: the construction is accus. and infin., and should depend on some such verb as *scimus* or *existimamus;* but the long parenthesis *nec sicut vulgus . . . iudicatum* causes Cicero to leave the *construction* unfinished, resuming the *sense* of it with another accus. and infin., *hanc . . . existimant*. Such a change of construction is known as *anacoluthon* (Greek, "not consequent").

12. **studio, doctrina**: *studium* is "industry in learning," while *doctrina* is the knowledge acquired by such industry.

13. **sicut vulgus**: sc. *solet appellare.*

14. **qualem neminem**: like *unum*, is object of *accepimus*.

15. **qui septem appellantur**: sc. *sapientes*, "who are styled the Seven Sages." The relative clause is made to precede its grammatical antecedent (*eos*) by a common idiom. The order is *nam (ei), qui ista subtilius quaerunt, in numero sapientium non habent eos qui septem appellantur.* The so-called "Seven Wise Men" of Greece always included Solon the Lawgiver of Athens, Thales the first Physical Philosopher, Pittacus of Mitylene, and Bias of Priene. The other three are variously given—Cleobūlus of Rhodes, Chilon of Sparta, Periander the Tyrant of Corinth, complete the usual list.

16. **Athenis**: "at Athens (*Athēnae*)." See the note on *tanti*, xi. 11. **unum**: "one only," *i. e.* Socrates, who declared that in his search for wisdom he asked of Apollo's Oracle at Delphi, where he should find the wisest of men, and received the answer that it was himself. See Index, *s. v.* SOCRATES.

18. **hanc esse . . . ut**: when followed by a consecutive subjunctive

clause with *qui* or *ut*, the demonstratives *hic*, *ille*, *is*, may often be translated by "such as," "such that."

19. **omnia tua in te posita esse**: "that all your happiness is stored within yourself." The Stoic doctrine was that the perfectly wise and virtuous man was unaffected by any calamity which might assail him from without. **ducas**: "consider."

20. **virtute**: abl. of comparison with *inferiores*, "no match for virtue."

22. **Nonis**: ablative of "time when," a variety of the ablative of place. The Nones (*Nonae*) of each month fell upon the ninth day (counting inclusively) before the Ides (*Idus*). In March, May, July, and October, the Nones came on the 7th; in other months on the 5th. *Proximus* may mean either "nearest in the past" or "nearest in the future." Here of course it has the former meaning. **D. Bruti**: (*D.* = *Decimus*) surnamed Gallaecus for his conquest of the Gallaeci in N.W. Spain, 136 B.C.

23. **commentandi**: "of discussing questions" connected with the art of augury.

25. **solitus esses**: the subjunctive is due to the concessive force of the relative, "*though* you were wont."

27. **quod animum adverti**: the relative refers to the whole matter of the reply which is expressed by the oblique clauses *te . . . tuae*. *Animum adverto*, "I turn my mind to," *i. e.* "I notice," is often spelt in one word, *animadverto*.

28. **acceperis**: subjunctive as a subordinate verb to an accus. and infin. phrase. *Morte* is ablative of the cause.

30. **humanitatis tuae**: the genitive does duty for a predicate, "it was not like your refined character." *Humanitas* comprises the qualities which make "a gentleman"; *humanus* means "gentlemanly," "refined." **quod . . . non adfuisses**: "*as to the fact that* you were not present." In this usage *quod* is really the relative pronoun used as an accusative of extent. For the mood of *adfuisses*, cp. *acceperis*. **conlegio**: *i. e.* the College of Augurs.

31. **valetudinem**: "health" simply, good or ill according to the context.

33. **recte tu**: sc. *dicis*.

34. **officio**: the derivation of the word is from *opem*, "help," and *facio*, and its meaning is (1) "a kind act," or (2) usually "duty."

35. **incommodo**: here a substantive, "inconvenience." **constanti**: a *constans homo* is "a man of strong character" or "principle."

36. **contingere**: here used of *ill*-fortune. More usually *contingit* = "it is my (your, &c.) good luck"; *accidit* = "it is my (your, &c.) bad luck."

38. **ut mihi videris**: "as you appear to me," "in my opinion."

39. **quod quidem**: the relative refers to the whole clause *nemo sapiens fuit*.

40. **quomodo . . . tulit**: exclamatory, "How he bore up under . . !" **si quisquam**: for *quisquam*, see on ii. 2. Its use here is apparently an exception to the rule there given.

41. **ut alia omittam**: the subjunctive is a variety of that expressing purpose (final), "to pass by other points."

42. **in pueris**: "*in the case of* young boys." So *in . . . viro*, "in the case of a full-grown and proven man." The grief of Aemilius Paulus was aroused by the death of two sons who were but boys, whereas Cato's son had reached the highest rank in the State. *Spectatus* (*lit.* "viewed") is a metaphor from the language of the amphitheatre, where a gladiator who had been "exhibited" sufficiently often, and had thereby earned his discharge, was called *spectatus*, "proven."

43. **cave anteponas**: "take care *not* to prefer even him." For the semi-dependent jussive see on *avertas*, i. 48.

45. **huius . . . illius**: "of the former . . . of the latter." When thus conjoined, *hic* usually refers to the nearer, *ille* to the further, of the two antecedents; but the rule is often reversed, as in this passage.

46. **sic habetote**: "consider as follows," *i. e.* "believe the following to be true."

III., IV. §§ 11-16. ARGUMENT.—Laelius: "*Of course I am sorrowful over Scipio's death, yet I have my consolation in the conviction that death is not an evil, and that Scipio's life was one of unbroken success and honour; and that by dying now he has escaped the inevitable failings of old age. What a glorious last day was his, with all Rome assembled to do him honour! I am convinced that the soul is immortal, and passes hence to heaven: and surely never was soul more fitted for such passage than was Scipio's. Yet were it not so, in any case I could rest content: our world will remember Scipio so long as Rome exists, and I can ponder with pleasure the hours which I spent in his society and friendship—a friendship which is far dearer to me than any reputation for wisdom, and which will, I hope, never be forgotten.*" Fannius: "*Pray tell us what are your views on friendship.*"

Ch. III. 1. **Scipionis desiderio**: "regret for Scipio." The genitive is objective, because the phrase involves the same idea as *Scipionem desiderare*, where *Scipionem* is accusative of the object. **negem . . . viderint**: *viderint* is future perfect, "they will have seen," *i. e.* "it must be theirs to see." The verb is not to be taken as perfect subjunctive. **quam id recte faciam**: indirect question depending on *viderint*, "how far I should be right in so doing."

3. **amico**: verbs of robbing may be constructed with an ablative (of respect) of the thing taken, and an accusative of the person robbed.

4. **ut confirmare possum**: "and such as never was before, as I can (safely) maintain." The clauses *nemo . . . erit* and *nemo . . . fuit* are co-ordinate, and must be joined by "and" in translating. *Qualis* belongs to each clause.

5. **medicina**: *egeo* and *careo* (cp. next line) take the ablative; *egeo* also takes the genitive. Carefully distinguish the following: (1) *egeo*, "I lack *or* need" something which is necessary; (2) *careo*, "I am without," "I am free from" something undesirable; (3)

desīdĕro, "I miss *or* regret," "I feel the want of" something which I once had (especially a dead friend or relative).

6. **decessu:** ablative of time, "on the death of their friends." With *quo* supply *errore.*

8. **non amicum, sed se ipsum amantis est:** "is the mark *or* way of one who loves himself rather than his friend." For the genitive, cp. *humanitatis,* ii. 30.

9. **cum illo . . . actum esse:** (*lit.* "it has been dealt with him," *i. e.* by fate or fortune) "that he has done (fared) gloriously." Contrast *mecum ageres,* i. 28, note. In another idiom *actum est de aliquo* = "it is all up with a man." **quis neget:** "who would deny?" potential subjunctive. Cp. *velim,* i. 48, note.

10. **quod . . . putabat:** *quod* refers to the idea in the following clause *inmortalitatem optare.* Note the distinction between *opto,* "I long for" the impossible, and *spero,* "I hope for" the possible.

12. **fas esset:** the subjunctive is due to the consecutive force of *quod* (= "such as").

14. **petivit:** emphatic, "was never a candidate for." This is the technical meaning of *peto,* just as *petitor* = "a candidate."

15. **ante tempus:** sc. *factus est consul.* This was in 147 B.C. The legal age for the first tenure of the consulate was fixed at 43 years by the *Lex Villia Annalis* of 180 B.C.; whereas Scipio was less than 40 at the date in question; and only a candidate for the aedileship, for which the legal age was 36.

16. **iterum sibi suo tempore:** "and a second time (was he made consul) at the proper (*i. e.* lawful) age indeed so far as concerned himself, but well-nigh too late for the state." Both *sibi* and *reipublicae* are datives of advantage or interest, and the ablative *tempore* is one of date corresponding to the adverb *sero.* The allusion is to the Numantine War and Scipio's consulate of 134 B.C. See INTROD. § 2.

16. **duabus urbibus:** Carthage and Numantia, the former of which was taken by Scipio in 146 B.C., and the latter in 133 B.C. Compared with Carthage, however, Numantia was of slight importance, and it was a disgrace to Rome that it should have been so long defied by a petty Spanish town.

18. **futura bella delevit:** a bold expression; we might render "stamped out the possibility of future wars."

19. **facillimis:** "easy to get on with," "gracious." **pietate:** *pietas* includes the "duty" of (1) child to parent, (2) man to god, (3) man to his country. *In* with the accusative is the usual way of indicating the object of words expressing abstract mental or moral attitudes. **liberalitate in sorores:** *i. e.* in giving them dowers.

23. **potuisset:** potential subjunctive, "could have helped him (if he had attained it)." Cp. *velim,* i. 48, note. **quamvis non sit gravis:** "for all that it be not burdensome." In Ciceronian Latin *quamvis* when used with a verb regularly requires the subjunctive mood, as *quamquam* the indicative.

27. **vel fortuna vel gloria:** ablatives of respect, "in point of fortune and fame."

28. **moriendi**: to be joined in sense with both *sensum* and *celeritas*: "the quickness of his death robbed it of its sting." Scipio was found murdered in his bed, and men attributed the deed to Carbo; see INTROD. § 2.

29. **dictu**: the supine in *-u* (really an ablative of the fourth declension, used as an ablative of respect).

30. **P. Scipioni**: dative of advantage with *clarissimum fuisse.*

31. **celeberrimos laetissimosque viderit**: the superlatives are placed in the *relative* clause, but they belong in sense as epithets to the antecedent (*diebus*), "out of the many days of the highest popularity and joy which he saw." The original meaning of *celeber* is "thronged," "attended by crowds," and so "popular"; the sense of "celebrated" is secondary and unusual. *Viderit* is in the subjunctive as being a verb dependent on the accus. and infin. *dicere.*

32. **quom**: a variant form of the conjunction *cum.* The Romans did not like the combination of *u* or *v* followed by *u;* hence they wrote *cum* or *quom* in preference to *quum.* **domum**: "to his home," the accusative without a preposition being used to express the goal of motion in the case of names of towns and the words *domus, rus.*

33. **ad vesperum**: "towards evening." **patribus conscriptis**: "the Senators," often called *patres* simply, perhaps because the original Senate was made up of only heads of families. According to tradition these were enrolled (*conscribere*) to fill vacancies caused by death; these were known as *conscripti.* The whole were then *patres et conscripti;* but the *et* was dropped out and left the simple words *patres conscripti.* It is however quite as probable that *patres conscripti* means simply "heads of families enrolled" (to form the Senate). **populo Romano**: "the people of Rome," over and above the Senators.

34. **sociis et Latinis**: "the allies and the Latins." The *socii* were communities of Italians which had formed a treaty (*foedus*) with Rome. The Latins were the members of the Latin colonies (like Beneventum and Ariminum), so called because they were in the first place sent out by the thirty cities of the Latin League in conjunction with Rome. These colonies possessed the *ius Latii,* which conferred upon the holder most of the privileges of a born Roman, excepting the rights of voting and holding a magistracy in Rome. **ut ex tam alto**: the *ut* is consecutive—"in such fashion that."

Ch. IV. 1. qui . . . coeperunt: *i. e.* the Epicureans, or followers of the philosopher Epicurus of Athens (341—270 B.C.), whose chief articles of belief were (1) that there were gods indeed, but that they took no thought of human affairs; (2) that the soul perished with the body. Scipio and Laelius, and the Scipionic circle generally, were followers of the Stoic school of philosophy, which denied both these Epicurean tenets. **nuper**: the philosophy of the Epicureans and Stoics, as of the other schools of Greek philosophy, only began to make way in Rome some fifty years before Scipio's death.

3. **plus . . . valet**: "has more weight with me." *Plus* is an accusative of limitation used as an adverb. Cp. note on *multum,* i. 16.

4. **maiorum**: *maiores* is "ancestors," as *minores* is "descendants," when these words are used as substantives. **religiosa iura**: every clan (*gens*) at Rome, as was usual amongst ancient communities, had its special ritual ceremonies for the worship of departed ancestors, the *gentilicia sacra*.

5. **fecissent . . . arbitrarentur**: this hypothetical sentence expresses what is known not to have been the case. Note the difference of tense in the protasis ("if they had been wont to think"), and the apodosis ("would have done once and for all"). **nihil ad eos pertinere**: *nihil* is the subject of the infinitive, "that nothing affected them (the dead")."

6. **vel eorum**: co-ordinate with *maiorum;* sc. *plus valet auctoritas.* The reference is to the Pythagorean philosophy.

7. **magnamque Graeciam**: *Magna Graecia* was the name for the coast-lands of Southern Italy from Tarentum (*Taranto*) to Cumae in Campania during the 8th—3rd centuries B.C., when they were so thickly colonized by Greek settlers as to be virtually Greek entirely. Here, at Elea (or Velia) in Lucania, at Tarentum (*Taranto*) and Crotona, flourished the philosophic school founded by Pythăgŏras of Samos, about 520 B.C., which maintained the divine nature of the world, its unity with God, and the immortality of the soul, which migrated at the death of a person from his body to that of another. *Magna Graecia* suffered much from the Italian tribes (Samnites, Lucanians, &c.) in the 4th century B.C., and was finally annexed to the Roman dominions upon the fall of Tarentum in 272 B.C.

8. **institutis et praeceptis**: *instituta* are the "principles" upon which a doctrine is *built up* (*instituo*); *praecepta*, the "maxims" or "propositions" in which it is *taught* (*praecipio*) to others.

10. **tum hoc, tum illud**: sc. *dixit*, "did not say one thing (*hoc*) at one time, anon another (*illud*)." *Dixit* must be understood also as governing *idem*. **ut in plerisque**: "as (he did) in most of the subjects he treated."

11. **animos**: the construction is oratio obliqua; hence the mood of *esse* and *patere* (principal verbs), and of *excessissent* (subordinate).

12. **optimo et iustissimo cuique**: "to all the best and most righteous." *Quisque* with a superlative (sing.) is the usual substitute for *omnes* and a superlative plural.

14. **perpaucis diebus**: ablative of the amount of difference, *lit.* "before his death by a few days."

15. **Philus et Manilius**: both these men were *consulares* (*i. e.* had held the consulship, the former in 136 B.C. and the latter in 149 B.C.), eminent for their learning, and members of the Scipionic circle; and both are used by Cicero as characters in other Dialogues. L. Furius Philus is mentioned again in vi. 15, vii. 41, and xix. 22.

16. **triduum**: "for three days." The accusative without a preposition is the correct way to express the extent of any action whether in place or in time.

17. **de re publica**: this refers to Cicero's treatise *De Republica*, written about 54 B.C., in which Scipio is the chief speaker. At the end

of the discourse comes the *Somnium Scipionis*, or Dream of Scipio, in which he relates how his adoptive grandfather, Africanus Major, appeared to him in a vision and instructed him about *the immortality of the soul.*

18. **quae . . . dicebat**: "a matter which he said, &c." The relative (plural neut.) refers to the whole clause *disputationis . . . animorum.* **in quiete**: "while asleep." *Quies* is common in the sense of "sleep." *Visum* is accusative of the neuter singular of the perfect participle passive of *video* used substantivally.

19. **id si ita est**: the *id* is explained by the following *ut*-clause, as frequently.

21. **censemus**: the present indicative is not uncommonly found (in the 1st person of both numbers) in a *dubitative* sense, "whom are we to deem?" Cp. *cui dono libellum?* "to whom am I to give my little book?"

22. **hoc . . . eventu**: "at this his end." Verbs expressing emotion (grief, pleasure, &c.) may take a causal ablative of that which excites the feeling. **vereor ne invidi, &c.**: "is, I fear, rather the mark of one who envies than of one who loves." For the predicative genitive, cp. ii. 30, *humanitatis*, note. *Vereor ne sit*, "I fear it *is*"; *vereor ut sit*, "I fear it is *not*." So with all verbs of fearing.

25. **ut nihil . . . sic certe**: "death has no sting, *as surely as* it has no joy."

26. **fit idem**: "the same thing happens," "it is with a man as though . . ." *Quem* refers to Scipio.

28. **dum erit laetabitur**: whenever the main verb in a complex sentence refers in any way to future time (*i. e.* when it is a future or future-perfect tense, an imperative, a gerundive with *sum*, or expresses a wish), all dependent *indicatives* expressing condition (*si*), time (*cum*, *dum*, &c.), or mere attribution (*qui*, &c.), also stand in a future tense. Hence *erit* after *dum*, "as long as." *Erit* is here used as a verb of complete predication, "to exist," "to endure."

29. **actum est**: see iii. 9, note. The words must be repeated with *mecum*. **quem fuerat aequius**: "and it had been fairer that I should depart this life before him, even as I had so entered upon it." *Quem* is the subject of the infinitive *exire*, and refers to *me* in *mecum*. Notice the use of the indicative mood instead of the subjunctive *fuisset*, an idiom regularly found in the apodosis of a conditional sentence or in a potential sentence with a verb (or phrase formed with *sum*) expressing duty, necessity, etc.; cp. *si unum diem morati essetis, moriendum omnibus fuit*, "had you tarried a single day, you must all have been put to death."

32. **quia . . . vixerim**: "because (as I say to myself) I have lived." The subjunctive shows that the verb is intended to state the fact *as it appeared to Laelius; i. e.* it is in virtual oblique oration.

36. **quam modo . . . quam quod**: the first *quam* is the relative pronoun and refers to *fama;* the second is the correlative answering to *tam* above.

39. **cordi**: generally regarded as a predicative dative, but more

naturally taken as a locative, "at the heart," *i. e.* "to one's liking," "dear"; and hence used as an indeclinable adjective. Cp. *frugi*, "frugal" (originally dative of *frux*). *Eo* is ablative of the amount of difference.

40. **paria**: neuter plural of the adjective *par* used as a substantive, "couples." The famous friendships of classical mythology are: (1) that of Achilles for Patroclus, whose death he avenged by slaying Hector; (2) that of Theseus King of Athens, for Peirithous King of the Lapithae, who dared together the extremest perils; and (3) that of Pylades for Orestes, son of Agamemnon, whose efforts to die in each other's stead formed the theme of several ancient dramas from Euripides onwards. Besides these, there was another pair in Damon and Pythias.

43. **istuc**, etc.: "your hope will certainly come to pass."

47. **disputaris**: the future perfect is used because the verb of the principal sentence (*feceris*) is future; see the note on *dum erit*, iv. 28. **sentias**: indirect question. So *existimes* and *des*.

51. **nostrum**: genitive plural of *nos*. This form (like the form *vestrum* from *vos*) is used as a *partitive* genitive only, the forms *nostri* and *vestri* being *objective*.

V.-VIII. §§ 17-28. ARGUMENT.—Laelius: "*Well, I am no clever Greek controversialist, so you must make allowances for me. My belief is that Friendship is the greatest thing in life, and that it is found only between good men: good not in the superfine Stoic sense, but in commonplace language—such men as Fabricius and his fellows. Nature has made us all kin, that is, friends; and the closer the kinship, the closer is the tie. But this is not true Friendship, which is rarely found. Friendship is loving unanimity on all matters of life and thought, and it is heaven's greatest gift to us mortals. There may be other objects in life—honours, fame, or virtue: but the best of these, virtue, is but the root of Friendship, and Friendship is that which makes life worth living. It is the one thing which is always in place, always needed. And not the least of its advantages is the comfort which it brings—a comfort which can rob even death of its terrors. A house divided against itself shall fall: even so, Friendship is unity, and unity is strength. Empedocles believed that the world cohered by virtue of love, that is, Friendship; and you know how we all admire the tale of Orestes and Pylades.*" Fannius and Scaevola: "*Pray go on.*" Laelius: "*I think it is rather love than utility which begets friendship: we see in our friend the reflexion of ourselves and our good qualities. Even beasts love one another, and man's love is very like the dumb brute's instinct. But goodness is the root of it: for we love a Curius and hate a Tarquin, without ever having seen either.*

[See INDEX for **Fabricius, Curius, Coruncanius, Ennius, Orestes, Tarquinius, Cassius, Maelius, Pyrrhus,** and **Hannibal.**]

Ch. V. 4. **eaque Graecorum**: we have the same idiom in English,

"the habit of the learned, and that too of the Greek learned." What the *consuetudo* is, is explained by the following clauses *ut iis* . . *subito*.

5. **disputent**: the subjunctive mood is due to the final force of the relative, "something about which *to* dispute." **quamvis subito**: "on notice as short as you please," *i. e.* extempore. This is the natural force of *quamvis* (*vis* is from *volo*), "how . . . you please," especially when not used as a conjunction. As a conjunction it always (in Cicero) requires the subjunctive, whereas *quamquam* requires the indicative.

7. **censeo petatis**: lit. "I advise you, seek," *i. e.* "I advise you to seek"; for the semi-dependent jussive, see the note on *velim avertas*, i. 48.

8. **qui ista profitentur**: "who make a profession of such matters," *i. e.* who claim to argue (*disputare*) at short notice on philosophical points.

10. **res secundas vel adversas**: *res secundae* = "good fortune"; *res adversae* = "misfortune." *Secundus* (originally a gerundive of *sequor*, "following") is only used as an adjective, and retains its primary meaning in such phrases as *secundo flumine*, "down stream" (*lit.* "with following stream"), *secunda aura*, "with following gale." Usually it bears the derived meaning of (1) "favourable," or (2) "second" (*i. e.* "following" in order of time).

11. **in bonis**: "in the case of good men"; the preposition bears the same meaning in *in pueris*, ii. 42.

12. **ad vivum reseco**: "cut down to the quick," *i. e.* "insist too severely upon." The English word "quick" here exactly reproduces the Latin *vivum*; cp. "the quick (living) and the dead." The metaphor is from trimming the nails of the fingers. The pronoun *id* refers to the clause *nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse*, "that friendship can exist only in the case of good men." The Stoics said that he alone was *bonus* who was *sapiens* in their sense of the term—a very strained sense: Laelius says he is not using the epithet *bonus* in that way, but in the natural and ordinary sense of the word.

15. **sit ita sane**: the subjunctive is jussive, "let us grant by all means the truth of that assertion," as far as regards the *Stoic* ideal of *bonus*, who is too good to be a reality.

19. **M'.**: *M'.* = *Manius*; but *M.* = *Marcus*.

20. **istorum**: referring to the words above, *illi, qui haec subtilius disserunt*; *i. e.* the Stoics.

21. **normam**: lit. a carpenter's "square" used for making right angles; hence "standard." **habeant**: jussive subjunctive. So *concedant* below. **sapientiae nomen**: as the Latin for "the city of Rome" is *urbs Roma* (not *Romae*), we might expect the "name of wisdom" to be by analogy *nomen sapientia*; but the genitive is always used; so *amicitiae nomen*, "the name of friendship."

23. **negabunt**: *nego* is "to say no"; *nego hoc ita esse* = "*I say* this is *not* so." Avoid the translation "deny."

24. **agamus**: jussive subjunctive, "let us act," "let us do the best

we can." **pingui Minerva**: Minerva (connected with *mens*, "mind") was the Roman goddess of intelligence and wit, whence the name frequently stands in the sense of "intelligence" itself. (Cp. the poetical use of *Bacchus* for "wine," *Ceres* for "corn," &c.) *Pinguis Minerva* or *crassa Minerva* signifies a dull, ponderous intellect, "homespun wit," and the expression was proverbial (*ut aiunt*, "as the saying is").

27. **audacia**: "effrontery," "rudeness." **magna constantia**: "men of high principle," ablative of quality, admissible only when the substantive is qualified by an epithet.

28. **modo quos nominavi**: *i. e.* Fabricius, Curius, and Coruncanius. **bonos, ut habiti sunt**: "let us deem these men worthy to be called good, as they have been held to be." *Bonos* is the complementary accusative with the factitive verb *appellandos* (*esse*). For the meaning of *habiti*, cp. *habitus*, i. 47, note.

29. **quantum possunt**: sc. *sequi*, "so far as mortals can follow." The antecedent to *quantum* is suppressed, as frequently happens. It would be *tantum*, "to so far an extent." **ducem**: in apposition to *naturam*.

31. **ita natos . . . societas quaedam**: "were born under this condition, that there should be a kind of fellowship among us all." The sequence (imperfect subjunctive) shows that *natos* is a past indefinite, not a present-perfect ("have been formed").

32. **ut quisque proxime accederet**: "the nearer each is related (to another)."

33. **potiores**: predicative; supply *sunt*, "are of greater account."

34. **alieni**: primarily "belonging to another (*alius*)," and so "foreign," "strange," or as here, opposed to *propinqui*, "those who are not related." **cum his**: *i. e.* "with relations," referring to *propinqui*.

35. **hoc praestat**: "friendship excels mere kinship in this, viz. that, &c." *Hoc* is an ablative of the measure of difference, "by this amount." As a transitive verb with accusative, *praesto* = "I provide"; as intransitive with dative, "I surpass."

37. **sublata benevolentia**: "*if* goodwill be taken away." The ablative absolute does duty for a conditional clause.

39. **quanta . . . sit**: the indirect question depends upon *intellegi*.

41. **res**: "the matter" or "the question" of friendship. *Res* is a colourless word which may mean almost anything according to the context. **contracta et adducta in angustum**: "shrunk and reduced to narrow limits." Instead of the universal brotherhood which nature intended to exist among men, friendship is only found between two or among a few persons. The use of adjectives of three terminations in the neuter as substantives is especially common with prepositions. So *per tacitum*, "in quietude"; *ex consulto*, "on purpose."

Ch. VI. 1. omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum: dependent on *consensio*, "perfect agreement on all divine and human things."

3. **haud scio an**: "I rather think that, &c." This is in Cicero the constant force of *haud scio an* and *nescio an*; *i. e.* they introduce a

statement which the speaker believes to be true. **excepta sapientia:** ablative absolute, "with the exception of wisdom."

6. **honores:** *honos* is the proper term for magisterial office, such as that of consul, praetor, censor, &c. **beluarum:** predicative genitive. *Hoc extremum,* "the last of these," refers to the words *multi voluptates praeponunt:* to live for pleasure only is a bestial ideal.

7. **superiora:** *superior* means "what comes first," whether in abstract value, in time ("earlier"), or in place as here, "the things mentioned before (pleasure)," *i. e.* the preference of riches, health, &c. *Caducus* (lit. "falling," from *cado*) here means "fleeting."

9. **praeclare illi quidem:** sc. *faciunt.*

12. **interpretemur:** jussive subjunctive, "let us explain," so *metiamur* and *numeremus.*

13. **nec eam . . . virosque:** "*and* let us not . . . *but* let us." *Nec* and *-que,* thus conjoined, should always be thus rendered. **magnificentia:** contrasted with *ex consuetudine vitae sermonisque nostri* as "high-flown grandiloquence" with "the speech of everyday life." *Ex* is common in the sense of "according to": so *ex sententia mea,* "in accord with my views."

15. **Paulos:** the generic plural, "men like L. Aemilius Paulus," the conqueror of King Perseus.

16. **qui nusquam reperiuntur:** "men who are not to be found anywhere," *i. e.* "have no existence," such men as the ideally wise man of the Stoics.

17. **talis:** masculine and feminine substantives and adjectives with genitive plural in *-ium* may end in *-īs* or *-es* in the accusative plural.

18. **opportunitates habet:** "has opportuneness," *i. e.* "is the right thing in the right place." The plural of abstract words is rare, except when (as here) there is stress upon the *repeated manifestations* of the quality named.

19. **principio:** "in the first place," ablative of time when. **qui:** an old ablative case of the interrogative *quis* or *qui,* meaning "by what means?" "how?" In old editions it used to be written with a circumflex, *quî.* **vita "vitalis":** *lit.* "a living life," "a life worthy of the name." Ennius was translating a Greek phrase *βίος βιωτός.*

20. † **quae non . . . conquiescat:** "*if* it do not rest." To this *conditional* force of the relative the subjunctive mood is due. There is a v. l. *conquiescit,* indicative.

21. **quicum:** the antecedent (*aliquem*) must be supplied in translation, "to have some one with whom, &c." The mood of *audeas* is due to the consecutive force of *qui,* "of such sort that." The form *quicum* consists of the old ablative *qui,* followed by the preposition *cum.* Another form of the ablative is *quocum.*

23. **aeque ac tu ipse:** "equally with yourself." In full the phrase would run *aeque gauderet ac tu ipse gauderes,* "he would rejoice equally, and you would rejoice equally." **adversas:** sc. *res.*

24. **sine eo, qui . . . ferret:** "without one *to* bear them, &c." The antecedent is quite indefinite; hence the generic subjunctive, *ferret.*

26. **singulae . . . singulis:** "each for some particular object, so to

say." The distributive adjective is to be rendered in the English idiom by the one word, "each." **ut utare**: final subjunctive, "that you may use them."

29. **quoquo**: "whithersoever," the indefinite adverb corresponding to the simple *quo*, "whither." *Verteris* is future perfect, because the words *praesto est*, though present in form, are really future in their application.

30. **loco**: ablative of separation. The preposition may be omitted after verbs compounded with *ab*, *de*, or *ex*. **intempestiva**: "out of season" (*in* = "not"; *tempus* = "season").

31. **aqua . . . igni**: ablatives of the object with *utimur*. *Sitis*, *tussis*, *ignis*, *canalis*, *sodalis*, *securis*, form the ablative in *i* only. *Pluribus locis* is an ablative of place, "in more places," "on more frequent occasions." Fire and water were, with Romans, the symbols of the barest necessaries of life in constant requisition. Hence to "banish" a man is in Latin *aqua et igni interdicere*.

33. **mediocri**: sc. *amicitia*.

34. **qui pauci nominantur**: "*of whom* few are recorded," referring to the three or four pairs of friends mentioned in iv. 40.

35. **splendidiores**: predicative. So *leviores*.

Ch. VII. 2. **illa**: ablative, sc. *commoditate*, "in the following advantage." What it is, is explained by the clauses *quod . . . patitur*.

3. **praelucet**: an unusual use of the verb as transitive, "casts the light of hope before us." With *in posterum*, "for the future," cp. *in angustum*, v. 42, note.

5. **sui**: objective genitive of *se*, with *exemplar*, "an image of himself."

7. **honos**: here in its non-technical sense of "reverence." Contrast *honores* above, vi. 6.

8. **amicorum**: subjective genitive, "regret (for them) *felt by* their friends." Contrast *Scipionis desiderio*, iii. 1.

9. **exemeris**: future-perfect, as subordinate to the main verbs *poterit* and *permanebit*. See the note on *dum erit*, iv. 28.

10. **ex rerum natura**: "from the world." **benevolentiae coniunctionem**: "the bond (lit. joining together) of kindly feeling."

12. **quanta . . . sit**: the indirect question depends on *perspici*, not on *intellegitur*.

15. **quae non . . . possit**: "(such) that it cannot," consecutive subjunctive.

16. **quantum boni sit**: indirect question. *Boni* is used as a substantive; for the partitive genitive *boni*, cp. *gravitatis*, i. 42, note. *Quantum bonum* would be good Latin, but inelegant.

17. **Agrigentinum**: a native of Agrigentum or Acragas (*Girgenti*) on the Southern coast of Sicily. The allusion is to Empĕdŏcles, a famous poet-philosopher, who flourished about 444 B.C., and who endeavoured to explain the formation of matter by a kind of Atomic Theory in which "love" and "hate" represented the principles of Attraction and Repulsion. He explained his system in Greek hexameter verses (*graecis carminibus vaticinatum*).

18. **quae . . . constarent**: the subjunctive is due to the clause being dependent on the accus. and infin. construction. So *moverentur.* The infinitives are *contrahere* and *dissipare*, dependent upon *vaticinatum (esse)*.

21. **re**: "in fact," "in reality."

22. **in periculis aut adeundis aut communicandis**: gerundival construction corresponding to the inadmissible gerund construction *in pericula adeundo aut communicando.*

23. **qui . . . non . . . ecferat**: cp. on *ferret*, vi. 25. *Ecferre laudibus* is "to extol."

24. **cavea**: a Roman theatre, like those of to-day, was in the shape of a horseshoe, and each tier of seats was a *cavea.* The *prima* (or *ima*) *cavea* was that nearest the floor and the stage; the *ultima* (or *summa*) was the highest and farthest off, corresponding to the "gallery" of to-day. **in . . . fabula**: for the meaning of *in*, cp. ii. 42, note. *Fabula* here means "a play." Pacuvius (b. 219, d. 129 B.C.) was a native of Brundusium; hence *hospitis.* At Rome he devoted himself to painting and the writing of tragedies. The Romans regarded him as one of the greatest of their dramatists. Fragments only of his plays are extant. For the story of Orestes, see INDEX.

27. **ita ut erat**: "as was indeed the case."

28. **stantes plaudebant**: "rose to their feet and cheered," an anachronism, seeing that the first theatre in which the audience could sit was built by Pompeius many years later.

30. **possent**: a relative clause subordinate to another clause in the subjunctive, is commonly attracted to the same mood. In this case *quod . . . possent* is subordinate to *id . . . iudicarent.*

33. **si quae**: the indefinite pronoun or adjective *quis* (*qua*, *quid* or *quod*; pl. *qui*, *quae*, *quae* or *qua*) is used as a rule only after *si*, *nisi*, *ne*, *num*, and *quando.*

34. **si videbitur**: the imperative *quaeritote* is concerned with future times: hence the tense of the subordinate verb. See on *dum erit*, iv. 28. **qui ista disputant**: *i. e.* professional philosophers and rhetoricians.

35. **a te potius**: sc. *quaeremus.* **quamquam**: a resumptive particle "and yet."

36. **equidem**: "indeed," a stronger form of *quidem.* The word has nothing to do with *ego*, and is used alike with verbs of all persons and both numbers.

37. **filum**: we may render "thread" or "texture" of a discourse.

39. **est . . . disputatum**: *disputo* being intransitive can be used in the passive as an impersonal verb only, "there was a discussion." **de re publica**: this refers to Cicero's treatise *De Republica*, "On the State."

40. **patronus**: "advocate." The metaphor is from the relationship of the old Roman patricians to their clients, whom they were bound to protect as advocates in any law-suit, the client originally having in his own right no claim for consideration in a Roman law-court, because he did not possess citizen rights. **accuratam**: "prepared with care," "skilful."

42. **iustissimo viro**: dative of the indirect object with *facile fuit.*

44. **amicitiam nonne facile**: sc. *est defendere. Ei* refers of course to Laelius.

45. **fide**: this and the other ablatives are joined as ablatives of manner with *servatam.*

46. **ceperit**: causal subjunctive, "inasmuch as he has won the greatest renown."

Ch. VIII. 1. vim . . . adferre: "this is to employ force," *i. e.* to compel Laelius to do as requested.

2. **refert**: the impersonal verb (*rēfert*, "it concerns"), to be distinguished from the personal (*rĕfert*, "brings back"). A personal pronoun which is the object of "it concerns" is with *rēfert* rendered by the ablative singular feminine of the corresponding Latin possessive adjective (*e.g. meā, tuā*, etc.). In this case there is no object expressed, and the matter of concern is explained by the indirect question *qua . . . cogatis.* **studiis**: dative of the indirect object with *obsistere.* Note that *studium* regularly means "zeal," "eagerness."

6. **considerandum**: gerundive and predicative; sc. *esse. Illud* is explained by the following double indirect question *utrum desiderata sit, an esset*, &c.

7. **ut dandis**: the gerundival construction stands here as an ablative of manner, "that in the matter of giving and receiving back benefits." *Ut* belongs to *acciperet* and *redderet*, and the clause *quod . . . posset* refers to *id*, the object of *acciperet* and *redderet.*

8. **posset**: here used as a verb of complete predication, "to have power," with which the accusative *quod* stands as one of respect or limitation (*lit.* "in respect of which").

10. **antiquior**: *antiquus*, "old," has the secondary meaning of "venerable," "worthy of respect," because that is a frequent result of antiquity.

13. **ab iis percipiuntur**: the preposition marks the origin, "are reaped from those" (not "by those," agent).

14. **simulatione**: a "pretence" of what has no existence; distinguish from *dissimulatio*, the "concealment" of what does exist.

15. **temporis causa**: "for the sake of the moment," *i. e.* by time-servers.

18. **orta**: sc. *esse.* **adplicatione animi**: "from a certain bent of the mind."

19. **quantum . . . habitura**: the indirect question depends on the idea of enquiry in *cogitatione.* With the genitive *utilitatis* depending on *quantum*, cp. *boni*, vii. 16.

20. **quod quidem quale sit**: the relative should be rendered by a demonstrative, "and of what kind this is."

22. **ad quoddam tempus**: "up to a certain time."

26. **similis sensus amoris**: short for "sense of love similar to that between parent and child."

27. **congruamus**: the relative *cuius* is generic, hence the mood. **quod in eo**: the temporal clause *cum . . . extitit* is parallel to *ex ea*

caritate, each giving a reason for the words *quod in homine multo est evidentius.* The mood of *videamur* is due to dependence of the clause on the subjunctive *congruamus,* the verb of a clause dependent on a subjunctive being itself subjunctive.

29. **adliciat**: consecutive subjunctive (*quod = tale ut*).

30. **quippe cum**: *quippe* merely makes more emphatic the causal force of *cum.*

33. **quos numquam viderit**: "*though* he has never seen them." See on *solitus esses,* ii. 25. The mood of *usurpet,* as of *oderit,* is due to the consecutive or generic force of *qui,* "who is of such a character that he does not cherish."

36. **est decertatum**: "there was a deadly (*de-*) struggle." Cp. on *disputatum est,* vii. 39, and observe the force of the compound verb. **ab altero**: to be joined with *alienos,* "estranged." The reference is to Pyrrhus, who returned prisoners without ransom as a requital for the way in which he was warned against his treacherous physician.

38. **alterum**: Hannibal. The charges of revolting cruelty and absolute lack of honour (*perfidia plus quam Punica*) which the Romans constantly brought against Hannibal have no ground beyond their own chagrin at his success. **haec civitas oderit**: *oderit* is here future-perfect, to be translated of course as a simple future.

IX.-XIII. §§ 29-48. ARGUMENT.—Laelius: *To say that we seek friends because of the help which we need is to take a very wrong view; for it is just the most affluent who are the best friends. Advantages follow of course, but they are results, not causes; and the proof is, that friendship lasts when the time of need is ended.*

Scipio maintained that a lasting friendship was a rare thing, for there are so many causes for jealousy and rivalry, both base and noble; and many a friend is lost because we expect of him what is not just. Indeed, it is hard to say how far one should go to oblige a friend; certainly not so far as Blossius went for Gracchus. One thing is clear: since friendship's foundation is goodness, it is not right for a friend's sake to do what is base. There would be no need to say this if we were all men of perfect wisdom, but I am speaking only of and for the men we meet every day. We have examples of lasting friendships even amid the rivalry of political life.

Never ask a favour which is unlawful—this is friendship's first law. You may see its reasonableness by glancing at the politics of to-day, where there are examples of friends so-called daring any villainy for each other; and I fear lest the tendency may cause the State's ruin. No: friendship demands correction as much as concession, and he is no true friend who hesitates either to give or take unpleasant advice. Believe not the doctrine that friendship is folly because it brings with it new cares and anxieties, or that it is a sign of weakness. Peace of mind is desirable of course, but not such as is confounded with mere selfishness—such carelessness as belongs to the beasts, or such insensateness as marks a log or stone. To suffer somewhat for the sake of those we love is right, nay needful.

[See INDEX for **Coriolanus, Gracchus (Tib. and C.), Blossius, Carbo, Themistocles.**]

Ch. IX. 2. **quod maius est:** the relative refers to the clause *in hoste etiam diligamus* (*probitatem*).

4. **cum . . . videantur:** the subjunctive is due to the mood of *moveantur*, to which *videantur* is subordinate. See above, note on vii. 30. **usu:** "by familiar intercourse"; cp. the similar expression *aliquo uti*, "to be on friendly terms with a man."

6. **accepto beneficio:** "by (one's) receiving kind treatment." A Latin past participle may often be rendered best by the corresponding abstract noun in English; *e.g. ademptus Hector*, "the loss of Hector." So below, *studio perspecto*, "by a perception of the liking (of others) for us"; *consuetudine adiuncta*, "by the addition of close intercourse."

10. **si qui:** for the use of *qui* indefinite, see on *si quae*, vii. 33. **ut sit:** the clause is final, and the order is: *ut sit* (*aliquis*) *per quem quisque adsequatur id quod desideret. Adsequatur* may be either final or consecutive according as we translate the relative.

11. **humilem:** to be taken with *ortum relinquunt. Humilis* is "mean," "base," the opposite of *generosus*, "well born."

13. **natam:** sc. *esse*, "which they claim to be sprung from neediness, &c." *Volo* is common in the sense of "mean" or "claim."

14. **si ita esset:** "if it were really so." The tense (imperf. subj.) implies that it is *not* the case. The following *ita* is correlative to *ut*, "just so far as."

15. **quod longe secus est:** "but this is far from being the case." *Quod* refers in sense to the idea that the poor man is the readiest to form friendships. *Secus* is an adverb, "otherwise."

16. **ut . . . quisque . . . ut . . . ut:** the last *ut* is the consecutive correlative of *sic* (*munitus est*); the others are comparative ("as"), and are answered by the correlative *ita* (*excellit*), "each excels just so far as he has most confidence, &c."

19. **quid enim?** sc. *dicam* or a similar verb.

20. **mei:** verbs and adjectives implying need commonly take an objective genitive. **minime hercule:** sc. *erat indigens mei*, "in no wise forsooth." *Hercule* is an interjection, "by Hercules." It is sometimes written *mehercle*, and (*ita*) *me Hercules iuvet!* "So may Hercules help me!" which is the original form of the expression. **ne ego quidem:** *indigens eram.* Hence the genitive *illius*, coordinate with *mei* above.

21. **admiratione . . . opinione:** ablatives of cause. *Opinio* means "high opinion," "respect."

23. **consuetudo:** like *usus*, "intimacy."

26. **ut enim:** answered by *sic . . . putamus* below, the intervening clause *ut . . . gratiam* being final. *Gratia* in the singular means usually "influence," less often "thanks" as here, for which the common word is *gratiae*, plural.

27. **faeneramur**: *faenus* is "interest"; *faeneror* (or *faenero*), "to lend at interest," *i. e.* with a view to a fixed return.

30. **expetendam**: predicative. **ritu**: "in the fashion of," "like." This word is one of the few words which is used as an ablative of manner without a preposition (*cum*) or an epithet. Others are *natura*, "naturally," *dolo* and *fraude*, "deceitfully," *casu*, "by chance." The words *qui . . . referunt* stand as the subject to *dissentiunt*. By "those who refer everything to pleasure," *i. e.* "make pleasure their universal standard," Cicero means the followers of Epicurus. *His* is neuter.

35. **removeamus**: jussive subjunctive. So *intellegamus*. **natura**: ablative of origin, with *gigni*.

38. **usu . . . et moribus**: objects of *fruor*. The verbs *sint* and *sit* are co-ordinate with *fruantur*, depending upon *ut*.

39. **aequales**: "on the same footing," an unusual meaning of *aequalis*, which commonly has the sense of "equal in age."

44. **commutata**: "*when* changed," or "*if* changed."

47. **ad haec . . . vultis**: sc. *respondere*, "wish to say anything in reply to my statements."

48. **pro hoc**: *i. e.* Scaevola.

49. **minor natu**: "less by birth," *i. e.* "younger." So *maior natu*, "older." **meo iure**: "according to my right" as the elder.

50. **recte tu quidem**: sc. *facis*, "you do quite right." **audiamus**: jussive, "let us go on listening."

Ch. X. 5. **nam, vel ut**: the construction is that of the accus. and infin. construction depending on *dicebat* in line 7. The original sentence would run: *nam, vel . . . expediat, incidit . . . sentiatur: mutantur etiam*, etc. *Ut . . . expediret* depends on *incidere*, "it often happened that the same thing was not advantageous to two friends."

7. **alias . . . alias**: adverb, "sometimes . . . anon."

9. **quod . . . ponerentur**: the subjunctive shows that the reason is given as Scipio's own, "because, *as he remarked*, the warmest affections of boys were often laid aside." *Unā* is the adverb, "together."

10. **cum praetexta toga**: see on i. 3, *virili toga*. **sin perduxissent** from this point to the end of the chapter the construction is that of oratio obliqua, after a past tense of some verb of saying to be understood from *exemplum capiebat*. Scipio said: *sin . . . perduxerunt, dirimuntur . . . potest*. In *perduxissent* and also below in *provecti essent* and *incidissent* the pluperfect subjunctive represents the perfect indicative of oratio recta.

12. **condicionis . . . commodi**: the genitives are objective and depend on *contentione*, "a rivalry *about* a marriage-alliance or some matter of convenience." So *honoris contentio*, below. Cp. *dissensio rei publicae*, "a disagreement about politics." *Condicio* is a general word for a "contract" or "bond"; and the term *uxoria condicio* would include anything connected with a wife's dowry (*dos*) and the regulation of its reversion, &c.

17. **optimis quibusque**: for the idiom *optimus quisque* equivalent to

omnes optimi, see note on iv. 12. Its use in the masc. or fem. plural is exceedingly rare, though it is not infrequently found in the neuter plural. **honoris certamen et gloriae**: "rivalry *for* office and fame." The genitives are parallel to *condicionis*, above, l. 12. **ex quo . . . exstitisse**: as the clause is relative, and therefore grammatically dependent, we should have expected the subjunctive mood (*exstitissent*) in lieu of the infinitive; the latter being, according to rule, the equivalent in oratio obliqua only of *principal* verbs in oratio recta. Occasional exceptions occur, however, particularly in brief detached relative clauses like the present.

19. **nasci . . . esset, postularetur**: Scipio said *nascuntur . . . est, postulatur, ut sint*, &c. The clause *ut . . . iniuriam* explains what is meant by *aliquid quod rectum non esset.*

21. **quod qui recusarent**: *quod* refers to the whole preceding clause *ut . . . iniuriam.* Observe the use of the two relatives in Latin. It can be rendered in English only by changing one or other into the corresponding demonstrative with a conjunction ("and" or "but"). In its original form Scipio's sentence ran: *et ii qui id recusant, quamvis honeste id* (or *hoc*) *faciant, tamen arguuntur ab iis, quibus obsequi nolunt, deserere ius amicitiae. Faciant* owes its mood to *quamvis.*

29. **sapientiae . . . felicitatis**: predicative genitives, "as much a mark of good luck as of wisdom." The copula *esse* is omitted, and the subject to it is the infinitive phrase *subterfugere omnia.*

Ch. XI. 1. **videamus**: jussive, "let us enquire." The meaning of *id* is explained by the indirect question *quatenus . . . debeat.*

2. **numne**: the particle *-nĕ* is enclitic (*i. e.* cannot stand alone) and marks an interrogation; *num* further marks an interrogation to which the answer is "no." The two are rarely conjoined as here, since such a combination is redundant, *num* alone being all that is required, as in the next sentence.

4. **Vecellinum**: the cognomen of the Cassius mentioned in viii. 34. See Index, *s. v.* CASSIUS.

5. **Tib.**: *i. e. Tiberium;* but T. = Titus.

6. **Tuberone**: see the note on xxvii. 17. **aequalibus**: see on ix. 39, note.

8. **familiae**: usually "household of slaves," but here almost with the meaning of its English derivative.

9. **in consilio**: in the year 132 B.C. a commission was appointed to try the supporters of Tiberius Gracchus. The two consuls, P. Popilius Laenas and P. Rupilius Lupus, belonged to it, and so did Laelius.

10. **deprecatum**: the supine in *-um* is used to express purpose, but only with a verb of motion (*e. g.* here *venio*). It is really the accusative case of a fourth declension verbal noun, and in syntax is exactly parallel to such expressions as *Romam eo*, "I am going *to* Rome," *Lavinia venit litora*, "he came *to* Lavinian shores," in which the simple accusative, without a preposition, expresses the "goal of motion." Cp. xvii. 34, note on *obscuratum iri.*

11. **quod . . . fecisset:** subjunctive of virtual oblique oration, giving the reason as stated by Blossius. Cp. *poncrentur*, x. 9. **tanti:** the so-called genitive of price, "of such account." Originally it was a *locative* case, showing *at what position in the scale of values* a thing is rated. So *magni*, "at great value"; *maximi*, "at the highest value"; and the correlative *quanti*, "at such value as," or "at what value?" The sign of the locative case was *-i* (*e. g. domi*, "at home"), but it early became confounded with (*a*) the genitive singular of the first and second declension nouns; (*b*) the ablative singular of third declension nouns. Hence *Romae* (=*Romai*), "at Rome"; and *Carthagine* or *Carthagini*, "at Carthage." In the plural of all three declensions, the locative is replaced by the ablative. *Tanti facere* is "to rate at so-and-so"; cp. *hoc non flocci facio*, "I don't rate this at a straw."

12. **sibi:** the dative is the regular case for expressing the agent after a gerund or gerundive; it is common after a past participle or an adjective in *-bilis;* rare after other parts of the passive verb. Where the dative is not admissible, and where its use would cause ambiguity, the agent is expressed by the ablative with *a* or *ab*. **tum ego:** sc. *dixi*. **etiamne:** sc. *tibi faciendum esse putavisses*, "would you actually have thought that you must do it?"

13. **Capitolium:** the southern summit of the *Collis Capitolinus* (Capitoline Hill), which stood at the western end of the Forum, between that and the Tiber, was occupied by the most sacred of all Roman temples, that of Capitoline Jupiter. To "bring torches" (*i. e.* set fire) to it would, to an old Roman, have seemed an inconceivable crime; but a few years after Gracchus' time (83 B.C.), it was burnt down in the civil wars of Sulla and Carbo.

14. **si voluisset, paruissem:** the regular way of expressing an im possible condition in past time, "if he had wished it, I should have obeyed."

15. **quam nefaria vox** sc. *sit.* *Vox* is common in the sense of an "utterance."

17. **illius:** *i. e.* of Gracchus; the word does not agree with *furoris*. For the facts, see Index, *s. v.* GRACCHUS (2).

18. **hac amentia:** ablative of cause, "being in this frenzy. **quaestione nova:** after the riot in which Tib. Gracchus was slain, there was appointed a Special Commission to indict and punish his partisans. The name for such a court was *quaestio extraordinia*, and *quaestione nova* may be merely another name for the same thing; but probably there is an allusion also to the strange (*novus*) and violent nature of the whole proceeding.

19. **poenas . . . persolvit:** *solvere* is to "pay" a debt; *persolvere*, to "pay in full."

22. **virtutis opinio:** "the belief in a man's goodness

23. **defeceris:** perfect subjunctive, the possible event being viewed as already a reality, "supposing you to have fallen from virtue." **quodsi:** "but if," *lit.* "as to which, if," the relative *quod* being in reality an accusative of extent or respect. With *rectum*, sc. *esse;* this

is the predicate, and the subject is the double infinitive *concedere* and *inpetrare.* With *statuerimus,* cp. *defeceris,* last note.

24. **velint . . . velimus**: the subjunctive is used because the clause is dependent on an infinitive (*concedere*).

25. **perfecta . . . sapientia**: ablative of quality here used as a predicate, "if we were men of perfect wisdom."

26. **vitii**: partitive genitive with *nihil; nihil vitii* is slightly less definite than *nihil vitiosum.* Translate "there would be nothing unsound in the principle."

27. **memoria**: ablative of the instrument, "by tradition." *Accipio* is here used as an intransitive verb "to hear of."

28. **vita communis**: "ordinary life" (as in v. 17), distinguished from the ideal life of philosophers. *Novi,* "I have learnt," is the same thing as "I know," *i. e.* it is rendered by an English present tense. Hence *noveram* is equivalent to the simple past, "I knew."

29. **eorum quidem**: the genitive is one of material, *ex numero* being understood.

31. **consules . . . censura**: they were consuls together in 282 and 278 B.C.; censors in 275 B.C. The Censors were two, elected at intervals of five years; their duties were, to exercise a general control over public and private morals, to fill up vacancies in the Senate and to eject unworthy members, and to revise the list of qualified citizens. They usually resigned office at the expiration of eighteen months. Their office was the *Censura.* *Luscino* is dative.

33. **memoriae proditum est**: *lit.* "it is handed down to memory," *i. e.* "we learn by tradition."

35. **contendisse**: *contendo* is not rare in the sense of "to ask for."

36. **contra rem publicam esset**: against *the interests of* the state." The subjunctive is generic.

38. **impetraturum . . . fuisse**: the regular oblique form corresponding to the direct form *impetrasset,* "would have obtained his wish."

39. **fuerint . . . sit**: both depend upon *cum* causal ("since"). Note the difference of tense.

40. **rogatum**: masc. agreeing with the subject of *facere,* "to do when asked."

42. **idem**: "he too," a very frequent way of translating *idem* and its various inflexions. The adjective *acerrimus* is a difficulty: the adverb *acerrime,* co-ordinate with *minime,* would be the simplest, the verb *sequebatur* being understood with both. As it is, *acer* must be understood from *acerrimus* and joined with *minime*—"there followed him Carbo and Cato and his brother Gaius; in those days anything but zealous, but now-a-days he too exceedingly so." C. Gracchus resumed the agitation of Tiberius exactly ten years after his brother's death (see INDEX), but he held a prominent place in politics during the entire interval. He was a member of the commission appointed to carry out his brother's agrarian law.

Ch. XII. 1. sanciatur: jussive subjunctive. *Sancire legem* is "to make binding" a law, by attaching penalties (*sanctiones*) to its in-

fringement. A *lex sancta* is one which cannot be broken without incurring such penalties.

2. **rogati**: "if we are asked (to do them)."

3. **cum in ceteris peccatis tum**: "in the case of all other faults, but especially if." For *cum . . . tum*, see on i. 12.

5. **eo loco**: ablative of place, "in a position such that." Laelius is thinking of the recent attempt of Tib. Gracchus, which was the first step towards the overthrow of the Senate consummated by Julius Caesar. Cicero's ideal constitution was the Roman Republic as it existed during the wars with Pyrrhus and Hannibal.

7. **aliquantum**: the adverb is really an accusative of extent. *Aliquantus, aliquot*, &c., imply some *considerable* quantity. Some editions read *aliquantulum*, which has just the opposite implication, "some *small* degree." **de spatio curriculoque**: the metaphor is from a chariot-race, in which a team has "bolted" and left the track. *Spatium* is the usual word for a "lap," *i. e.* the circuit of a race-track, which was oval in shape. *Curriculum* may mean either (1) the "race" or (2) the "race-track" as here, virtually the same as *spatium*.

8. **maiorum**: the genitive may be joined either with *consuetudo* or with *spatio curriculoque;* the order of the words favours the former, "our traditional practice." **regnum occupare**: "to seize the kingship." *Occupo* may very rarely be translated by the English "occupy": it means "to take before" some one else, and so either (1) "to seize upon" or (2) "to forestall," *e.g. Cacum occupatum interemit*, "He forestalled and slew Cacus."

9. **menses**: accusative of extent of time. Tib. Gracchus was king of Rome for some six months, in so far that his tribunician power, combined with his hold upon the populace, enabled him to carry his measures in defiance of the Senate and the nobles. **num quid**: *quid* is the indefinite pronoun. See on vii. 33.

11. **quid in Scipione effecerint**: indirect question depending on *dicere*. The allusion is to the prevailing belief that Scipio was murdered in revenge by the friends of Gracchus. Some editors regard the passage as alluding to the fate of Scipio Nasica, who led the attack on Tiberius Gracchus. His action brought him into such unpopularity, that he was glad to accept a mission to Asia—virtually a sentence of banishment.

13. **potuimus**: sc. *sustinere*, which here means "tolerate," "put up with." Laelius means that Carbo (see INDEX) only escaped a punishment like that of Tib. Gracchus, because the Senate hoped Gracchus' example would be a sufficient warning to all future agitators, and was anxious to have no more bloodshed. Carbo was commonly spoken of as Scipio's assassin.

14. **quid expectem**: subjunctive of indirect question, "what I forebode." The tribunate of C. Gracchus came six years (123 B.C.) after the imaginary date of this Dialogue (129 B.C.).

15. **augurari**: "to prophesy"; properly "to divine by help of augury," *i. e.* by the omens given by the flight or note of birds. See

note on *augur*, i. 1. **serpit deinde res**: the word *deinde* is a difficulty, explicable in two ways: (1) it answers to *iam* in line 7, the intervening clauses being all treated as a parenthesis, *i. e.* beside the direct thread of the argument, which is—*First* the constitution received a shock when Tib. Gracchus made his attack; and *next* (*deinde*) there is creep ing on a matter which, &c. The *res* in question is supposed to refer to Carbo's efforts to follow in Gracchus' path by amending the laws as to ballot, &c. See the note on *tabella*, below, l. 16. (2) Dr. Reid, however, translates, "Affairs *soon* (*deinde*) move on, for they glide readily down the path to ruin, when *once* they have taken a start," making *deinde* answer to *semel* (*cum semel coepit*). † **proclivis**: to be translated as an adverb. Many editors actually print the adverb here, *proclivi* or *proclive*.

16. **in tabella**: "in the matter of voting." *Tabella* was the small wooden ticket or check, marked with the sign of assent or dissent, which the voter used in the public assembly (*comitia*) or the law-courts (*iudicia*); hence, "voting" generally. Up to 139 B.C. all voting at Rome was public, so that all knew how each man used his vote, and the rich and powerful were able to intimidate the voter by threatening vengeance unless they received his vote. This was prevented in the case of elections by the *Lex Gabinia Tabellaria* (139 B.C.), in the case of *iudicia* by the *Lex Cassia Tabellaria* (137 B.C), and in the case of laws by the *Lex Papiria* (131 B.C.).

18. **populum a senatu**: *populus* = the mass of poor voters, *senatus* = the handful of wealthy nobles who ruled the whole empire, but depended upon the *populus* for their votes.

20. **fiant . . . resistatur**: indirect question and indirect delibera tive respectively, "how these things come to pass than how they are to be resisted." Observe the impersonal use of the intransitive passive verb.

21. **quorsum haec**: sc. *dico*, "what is my object in (saying) this?"

22. **praecipiendum**: *lit.* "there is (for us) a teaching the honest," *i. e.* "we *have to* teach the honest." In such phrases the part of speech used is the gerund (not gerundive), which may have as object a noun or nouns in the case (other than accusative) required by the simple verb. So here *bonis*, dative, as in *praecipio bonis*.

23. **ut . . . ne existiment**: in final clauses *ut ne* has the same force as *ne* alone, but is not so commonly used.

25. **inprobis**: dative of disadvantage, "against the wicked," so below, *iis . . . iis* (sc. *statuenda est* in each case).

27. **secuti erunt**: the gerundive of the principal sentence (*statuenda*) is concerned with future action; hence the use of this tense in the dependent relative clause. So *fuerint*.

28. **quis clarior**: sc. *erat*, as also with *potentior*.

29. **imperator**: he was one of the ten generals (*stratēgi*) of the Athenians, who formed nearly half the fleet at Salamis; and by his energy he forced the other Greeks to support him in giving battle there rather than retreating. See INDEX. *Bello Persico* is an ablative

of time when. **servitute**: the usual case with verbs of "setting free from."

31. **patriae iniuriam non tulit**: "did not tolerate the wrong *done to him by* his ungrateful country." The genitive *patriae* is subjective, *i. e.* expresses the author of the wrong. **fecit idem**: supply a conjunction, "but did the same thing."

32. **quod xx annis ante**: 491 B.C.; see Index, *s. v.* CORIOLANUS. Themistocles fought at Salamis in 480 B.C., and was driven into exile in 471 B.C. *Ante* is an adverb, *annis viginti* an ablative of amount of difference.

33. **mortem . . . conscivit**: (*lit.* "adjudged death to himself"), "committed suicide."

36. **ut ne quis**: final, "in order that no one," cp. above, *ut ne existiment*, lines 23, note. The following infinitive *concessum* (sc. *esse*) is in accus. and infin. construction after *putet*, *sequi* being dependent on *concessum*.

37. **vel bellum**: *vel*, when standing by itself, is a particle of emphasis, "even."

38. **haud scio an**: "I am inclined to think," as in vi. 3.

39. **curae**: predicative dative. *Sit* is an indirect question depending upon the idea of enquiry in *cura*, and is to be understood also with *futura*.

Ch. XIII. 1. **prima**: to be translated predicatively, "let this be enacted as the first law of friendship." For *sanciatur*, see on xii. 1.

3. **dum rogemur**: "until we are asked." *Dum*, when meaning "until," usually takes (1) the indicative, when referring to a definite fact in past time; (2) the subjunctive, when purpose is implied, as here: *exspectemus dum rogemur*, "let us wait *to be* asked."

5. **valeat**: jussive. So *adhibeatur* and *pareatur*.

6. **non modo aperte, sed etiam acriter**: "not merely with frankness, but even with sternness."

7. **adhibitae**: dative, sc. *auctoritati*. Notice the use of the impersonal passive *pareatur*, "let obedience be shown."

8. **habitos**: sc. *esse*; and for the meaning, cp. i. 47. Cicero is thinking of some exponents of the Epicurean school of Philosophy, who taught that strong friendship is undesirable because it makes men anxious about others and therefore disturbs their peace of mind.

9. **placuisse**: *placet* is the Latin equivalent for the English "it is resolved." Translate, "some . . . are convinced of certain paradoxes . . . namely that, &c." **sed nihil est**: "indeed, there is nothing which they do not worry with their hair-splittings." *Quod* is generic, and hence the mood of *persequantur*.

10. **partim fugiendas esse**: the rest of § 45 is in oratio obliqua, analyzing the words *mirabilia quaedam*. *Partim* = *pars*, "some of them," and ought to be answered by a second *partim*, but *alios* is used instead.

12. **satis superque**: *lit.* "that there is to each for himself enough of his own matters, and more (than enough)," *i. e.* "a man's troubles

are enough and to spare." The genitive *rerum* is partitive, depending on *satis*; *super* is an adverb.

13. **alienis**: sc. *rebus*, "other people's business."

14. **quam laxissimas**: "as loose as you can"—the constant force of *quam* with a superlative, there being an ellipsis of some part of the verb *possum* (which is sometimes expressed); e. g. *abi, quam poteris celerrime* (or *quam celerrime*), "begone as speedily as you can." **adducas . . . remittas**: the subjunctives are final, "in order that you may tighten or relax them, &c."

15. **caput**: "main-point," "key-stone." Cp. Shakespeare's "*head and front* of mine offending."

16. **securitatem**: not "security" in the sense of "safety," but "freedom from care" (*sine cura*).

18. **locum**: from meaning a "passage" in a book, *locus* easily comes to signify the subject there discussed, a "topic," as here. The topic of selfish friendship was broached in ch. viii.

19. **causa**: to be joined with all four genitives.

21. **firmitatis . . . virium**: the genitives are partitive, depending on the adverbs. **haberet**: subjunctive, as being a dependent verb in oratio obliqua. Strictly speaking all such verbs should be primary (*i. e.* present or perfect subjunctive) if the introductory verb (here *aiunt*) is primary, but such irregularities as *haberet* are by no means uncommon.

22. **mulierculae**: "weak women." The diminutive form (*muliercula* from *mulier*) frequently has a contemptuous force.

23. **quaerant**: see above, note on *haberet;* the subjunctive is here consecutive.

24. **putentur**: in oratio recta, *putantur*.

25. **sapientiam**: the accusative is the customary case for nouns used in exclamations, some such phrase as "to think of," or "fancy," being easily understood.

28. **ista securitas**: "that freedom from care of which they speak." The Epicureans said that one who took thought for others could not himself be *securus*. **specie**: "in appearance," an ablative of manner without an epithet. **reapse**: "in reality," contracted from *reeapse*, where *re* is the ablative of *res* and *eapse*, a rare form of the ablative of *ipse* (properly *is-pse*). **multis locis**: "on many grounds." Contrast the meaning of *locus* in line 18.

29. **consentaneum**: "agreeable" to reason.

31. **quodsi**: "but if" (*lit.* "as to which, if"; *quod* being an accusative of limitation). Cp. ii. 30, note on *quod non adfuisti*.

33. **aspernetur . . . oderit**: *necesse est* is constantly constructed with a semi-dependent jussive subjunctive, "and it (*i. e.* Virtue) must needs despise." See on *avertas*, i. 48. The verbs must be understood (in present indicative, *aspernitur* and *odit*) with the following nominatives, "just as goodness spurns and hates wickedness, &c."

34. **videas**: potential subjunctive, "you would see (if you were to look)."

38. **qui profecto cadit**: "and fall of course it does." *Profecto* is here the adverb (from *pro* and *facto*).

40. **causa . . . cur . . . tollamus**: "what reason is there why we should banish?" or "what reason is there for banishing?"

41. **quid enim interest**: "what is the difference between . . ?"

42. **motu animi**: "movement of the mind," *i. e.* "emotion."

45. **volunt**: "are in favour of."

47. **bonis amici**: with *bonis* supply *rebus*, "by the prosperity of a friend." **diffundatur . . . contrahatur**: the verbs may be translated as reflexives, "expands itself or shrinks." For the metaphor, cp. *adducas . . . remittas*, ll. 14, 15.

50. **non plus quam ut**: there is an ellipsis. Cicero means to say: "the pain that goodness brings us is not so bitter that we prefer to disown all goodness; neither is the pain which friendship may bring us so great that we prefer to make no friends."

XIV.-XVIII. §§ 48-66. ARGUMENT.—*Goodness draws closer the bond of friendship, and this becomes dear for its own sake also, for it means sympathy in all things, and this is life's best gift. Like to like is Nature's law, most of all in the case of the noble and good. They go even further—they love all men; and often he who least needs a friend is he who makes the most. There are some who say that to neither love nor be loved is best. Trust them not: that is the despot's life, a life of constant fear. Remember Tarquin's words, and learn to value a friend more than riches or power, for he will endure when all else fails.*

As to how one should love one's friends, there are three views:—

(1) *Love your friend as yourself;*

(2) *Love your friend as he loves you;*

(3) *See that your friend loves you as you love yourself.*

These are all wrong, I think: the first, because we do for a friend's sake so much that we should be too proud to do for our own; the second is too mercenary and mathematical a view; the third is worst of all, for it is the duty of a friend to give, not to receive. Scipio said there was yet a worse view—the view which bids us so love as if we should one day hate. Impossible!—such a creed does away with all friendship at once, for it destroys all fellow-feeling. It were best rather to see that we make no friend of one whom we could ever come to hate.

Raise your friend to your own level, and love him to the last: stop short only at deep disgrace. And value your friends too, as most men do not: a friend is worth more than a sheep more or less. Try him often and gradually, until you can trust him as you can trust the steed that knows you, and do not let ambition blind you to friendship's call, for no blaze of glory will cover the shadow of a broken pledge. And shrink not at sharing your friend's griefs. "When fortune's false we find the friend that's true."

Frank, sociable, sympathetic, loyal, and doubting not, courteous in word and deed—a friend should be all these. It is better to show you hate than pretend you love, and doubt of your friend's loyalty is "the little rift within the lute."

[See INDEX for **Tarquinius** and **Ennius.**]

Ch. XIV. 1. **contrahat**: the subject is indefinite, "since a man enters into a friendship."

3. **exoriatur**: semi-dependent on *necesse est*, "must needs arise", cp. note on *avertas*, i. 49.

5. **aedificio**: the Romans were passionately fond of building, whether for private or public purposes.

6. **vestitu cultuque**: *cultus* includes every sort of attention to personal appearance, and is therefore wider than *vestitus*, "clothing." † **animante**: ablative of the instrument governed by *delectari*, "not to be delighted by a living creature." The ablative is resumed by *eo* for sake of emphasis. Observe the asyndeton; we might expect *sed animante* or *animante autem*, and English requires the addition of "but." Some editions read *animo autem*.

7. **possit**: the relative is generic. Notice the word *redamare*, "to requite love with love," "to reciprocate affection." There was no such word in ordinary use, and Cicero invented this; hence the use of the apologetic formula *ut ita dicam*.

10. **quid, si illud . . . addimus**: the demonstrative is explained by the words *nihil . . . similitudo*. *Quid* prefixed to a sentence in this way, points out that the coming statement is of importance. It need not be translated in English.

11. **alliciat et attrahat**: the relative is consecutive (=*tale ut*). Carefully distinguish *tam . . . quam* ("in the same way as") and *tantum . . . quantum* ("so much as"). *Homines allicit et attrahit* must be understood with *similitudo*.

13. **adsciscant**: the technical word for "adopting" as a child.

14. **appetentius similium sui**: both genitives are objective, "more greedy for what resembles itself, or more hungry for it"; *similium sui* belonging to both adjectives. Present participles govern the case proper to their verb when used with a true participial force; but when used as adjectives they invariably take the genitive: thus *vir appetens gloriae* means "a man (habitually) greedy of fame," but *vir appetens gloriam* means "a certain man who is (at the present moment) pursuing fame."

16. **constet**: jussive "let this point be established."

17. **necessariam**: sc. *esse*. The dative *bonis* is one of reference. **qui est . . fons**: the masculine *qui* is here used, although the antecedent *benevolentiam* is feminine. It is not unusual for the relative to be attracted to the gender of the predicative noun (here *fons*, m.).

20. **inmunis**: "idle," "useless" (from *in-* = "not" and *munus* = "a duty"; "what does not do its part"). **quae . . . . soleat**. "seeing that it is wont." The subjunctive is causal. Distinguish *consulere aliquem*, "to ask one's advice," and *consulere alicui*, "to take measures in one's interest."

22. **vulgi**: objective genitive, "kindness *towards* the common herd."

23. **fingunt amicitias**: supply *esse*, "conceive friendships to exist for the sake of."

25. **amici amor**: the genitive is subjective, "a friend's love for us."

27. **tantumque abest, ut**: "so far is it from being the case that." *abest* is impersonal, and *tantum* is an adverbial accusative of extent.

28. **opibus**: "by reason of their wealth," causal ablative. So *copiis* and *virtute.*

29. **praesidii**: partitive genitive with *plurimum.*

30. **alterius**: "any one else." The genitive is usual with a verb expressing want.

31. **haud sciam an**: see note on vi. 3. The mood is potential subjunctive, "I should rather fancy that it needs not that our friends should require nothing at all," *i. e.* it may be as well that they should sometimes require our services. *Amicis* is the usual dative with *deesse.*

32. **ubi**: "where?" *i. e.* "on what occasion?"

33. **opera**: ablative from *operă*, co-ordinate with *consilio. Opus* means "work *to be done*," or "work *done*," a "task" or "achievement"; *opera* means "the *doing* of work," "service," "help."

34. **nec domi nec militiae**: see on *tanti*, xi. 11, for the locative case.

Ch. 15. 1. **deliciis diffluentes**: "who waste themselves with indulgence." *Deliciae* is a word of contempt, and implies unmanly pleasures.

3. **disputabunt**: for the future subordinate to another future, cp. iv. 28, note. **pro deorum fidem**: the case (cp. *sapientiam*, xiii. 25) shows that *pro* (also written *proh!*) is an exclamation, "by all one's trust in gods and men"—not the preposition, which requires an ablative.

4. **qui velit**: "(such as) to wish," consecutive or generic subjunctive. The purport of the wish is expressed by the infinitive clauses *circumfluere . . vivere.* Note that "I wish to go" is to be translated by *volo ire;* "I wish you to go" by *volo te ire* or *volo eas* (indirect jussive subjunctive). *Volo ut eas* is also found occasionally. **ut neque diligat**: "on condition that he shall love none nor be loved by any." In this sense *ut* is really consecutive (cp. *ut nunquam discederem*, i. 5, note), *ita* being suppressed.

5. **circumfluere**: often transitive, here intransitive.

7. **nimirum**: "of course," "as we all know" (from *ne*=*non*, and *mirus*="wonderful"). **fides**: the "honour" or "good faith" which makes friendship possible.

8. **benevolentiae**: "trust in (others') good-will," objective genitive.

10. **diligat**: potential subjunctive. *Metuat* and *possit* may be due either to a consecutive force in the relatives, or to attraction to *diligat.*

11. **dumtaxat ad tempus**: "at any rate for a season."

13. **quod Tarquinium**: the relative is explained by the oblique clauses *tum . . . posset.*

15. **fidos . . . infidos**: both predicative—"which of the friends that he had were loyal, which faithless." His actual words were: *tum intellexi quos fidos amicos haberem* (indirect question), *quos infidos, cum iam neutris gratiam referre poteram. Gratiam referre* means "to repay a favour."

16. **illa superbia et inportunitate**: "being a man of such arrogance and perversity." The ablative is that of quality.

24. **commodis . . . moribus**: ablative of quality with the customary epithet.

26. **indulgeri**: since *indulgeo* takes a dative in the active, it can only be used impersonally in the passive, "indulgence is shown to."

27. **copiis, facultatibus, opibus**: ablatives of respect, *possint* being here a verb of complete predication, as in viii. 8.

28. **equos**: this and the following accusatives analyze the word *cetera*, to which they are in apposition.

29. **amicos**: "*but* not to make friends." For the asyndeton, cp. *animante*, xiv. 6, note. *Supellectilem* is in apposition with *amicos*.

31. **cui parent**: indirect question, "for whose benefit they are procuring them." So *laborent*. Note the indicative in *cum parant*, "at the very moment when they are procuring."

32. **eius enim**: the genitive is predicative, "each of the aforesaid things is his who has conquered, &c."

35. **ab amicis**: "*in respect of* friends" [*lit.* "from the direction of (*i. e.* on the part of) friends"]. So *dives ab amicis*, "rich in point of friends."

Ch. XVI. 1. **constituendi . . . sunt**: simpler syntax would write *constituendum est*, but the verb is attracted to agreement with *fines et termini*.

2. **termini diligendi**: "limits of love," to be used in respect of one's friends.

3. **ferri**: "three opinions are expressed;" *ferre sententiam* = "to give a vote." **unam**: sc. *sententiam*. The accusative is in apposition with *tres sententias*, as are also *alteram* and *tertiam*, while the corresponding *ut*-clauses explain what was the purport of each *sententia*.

6. **quanti . . . tanti**: see the note on *tanti*, xi. 11.

7. **fiat**: *fio* is used as the passive of *facio*, hence *ab amicis*, ablative of the agent.

8. **prorsus**: to be joined with *nulli*, "absolutely to none."

9. **quisque sit**: subjunctive by attraction to the mood of the main verb (*animatus sit*).

11. **precari**: the infinitive stands as an accusative in apposition with *multa*. So *supplicare*, *invehi*, and *insectari*.

13. **in nostris rebus**: "in regard to our own interests." So *in amicorum* (sc. *rebus*), "in regard to our friends." **non satis honeste**: "which would not be quite proper," a mild way of saying "which would be altogether improper."

17. **altera**: "second," used regularly as the ordinal number corresponding to *duo*. **definit**: "limits friendship to (*lit.* by) like services and sympathies."

19. **ad calculos vocare**: "to bring to a reckoning," because *calculi* (small pebbles) were used as counters for the purpose of calculating any complicated sums. **ratio acceptorum et datorum**: "that the account

of receipts and expenses may balance." The language is that of book-keeping.

22. **excidat . . . defluat . . . congeratur**: metaphors from a measure which is filled to overflowing, so that the purchaser gets more than his money's worth.

23. **aequo**: ablative of the standard of comparison, "more than is fair."

24. **deterrumus**: the older form of the superlative termination is *-umus* rather than *-imus*.

25. **quanti . . . tanti**: locatives of value; see xi. 11, note.

27. **non est . . . amici**: "it is not the duty of a friend," predicative genitive.

28. **in eum**: *i. e.* the person who has the *animus abiectior*, &c., mentioned in the preceding clause.

32. **vocem**: *vox* is common in the sense of an "utterance," "assertion."

34. **amare . . . esset osurus**: the subject of both verbs is indefinite, "one ought to love in such a way, as though, some time or other, he was destined to hate." The mood of *esset*, as of *dixisset*, is due to the oblique construction.

35. **adduci posse**: Scipio's words were: *non possum adduci, ut hoc credam a Biante dictum esse quem ad modum putatur . . . habitus est.*

36. **unus e septem**: for the Seven Wise Men, see on ii. 15.

37. **impuri cuiusdam**: the genitive is dependent on *esse sententiam*, which continues the acc. and infin. of oratio obliqua.

38. **revocantis**: this means that the framer of the maxim measured everything by the standard of his own interests.

39. **quisquam**: for the use of *quisquam*, see the note on ii. 2. It is admissible here because the question is one to which only a negative answer can be given; *i. e.* it does duty for a simple negative assertion.

40. **quin etiam**: "nay, even," *quin* here being an introductory particle. In direct *questions* and *commands* it expresses surprise (*e. g. quin imus?* "why ever do we not go?" *quin abi*, "come, begone!"); but its normal use is to introduce the object-subjunctive after (1) verbs of hindering, or (2) any *negative* verb.

41. **quo**: ablative of the relative used as a conjunction expressing purpose, "in order that." Hence the mood of *det*. *Quo* is rarely found otherwise than with a comparative, as here with *plures*. **sibi**: referring to the suppressed subject of the infinitives *cupere* and *optare*, upon which depends the clause *quo det*. The same subject has to be understood with the subsequent infinitives *angi*, &c.

46. **eam . . . ut ne**: "such care that we should never, &c." The demonstrative is explained by the final clause.

48. **possemus**: subjunctive as dependent on another verb in that mood (*inciperemus*). See above, note on vii. 30. **minus felices**: the comparative adverb has an absolute force, "something else than lucky," "rather unlucky."

50. **tempus**: "opportunity" (*i. e.* the right time).

Ch. XVII. 1. finibus: ablative governed by *utendum*, which here is a *gerund*. In ordinary usage *utor* is intransitive, and the gerund is therefore the only normal construction. In earlier Latin, however, this verb and *fruor*, *fungor*, *potior*, were transitive and governed an *accusative*, so that the *gerundive* usage (*fines utendi sunt*) was permissible; and in the case of these four verbs, the older usage was retained occasionally side by side with the later gerund usages. **ut . . . ut . . . ut**: all three conjunctions are consecutive ("so that").

4. **si qua fortuna**: "by any stroke of fortune." **acciderit**: future-perfect.

6. **caput agatur**: "their life is at stake." For the meaning of *caput*, see note on *capitali*, i. 17; for the sense of *agi*, see iii. 9, note.

7. **est enim quatenus**: the demonstrative antecedent of the correlative *quatenus* is omitted because indefinite, "there is a limit up to which, &c." The subjunctive *possit* is due to the consecutive force of the relative ("such that up to it, &c.").

12. **cuius omnis sermo erat**: the student must be careful how he renders this sentence; cp. i. 52, note.

14. **diligentiores**: sc. than they are in regard to friendship. **posse**: the subject is *quemque* understood, and *haberet* is in such case subjunctive of indirect question, "each could say how many, &c."

15. **illis**: sc. *capris et ovibus.*

16. **neglegentis**: accusative plural.

20. **nisi expertum**: "except by experience." *Expertum* agrees with the suppressed subject of *iudicare* (*lit.* "it is difficult indeed for a man, except by trial, to judge"). *Expertum* from the deponent *experior* is active in meaning, "having made a trial," "having gained experience."

21. **experiendum . . . est**: impersonal, "experience must be gained."

23. **prudentis**: predicative genitive, "it is a wise man's duty." **sustinere**: the verb has here the rather unusual sense of "to check," "restrain."

24. **quo**: see on xvi. 41, above; and observe that the word is here used without the addition of the usual comparative. **amicitia**: ablative dependent on *utamur*, "in order that we may make use of friendship only when our friends' characters have been in some degree tested, just as we do with tried steeds," *i. e.* with the perfect confidence born of previous trial.

25. **periclitatis**: deponent participle used passively, just as *meditatus* and *comitatus* mean "meditated" and "accompanied" as well as "meditating" and "accompanying."

26. **perspiciuntur quam sint leves**: the English idiom is "it is seen how false some men are." *In parva pecunia* means "in the matter of some small sum of money"; cp. *in magna*, below. It is almost proverbial that the greatest test of a friend is to ask him for a loan.

28. **qui . . . existiment**: "such as deem," consecutive or generic subjunctive.

31 **ex altera parte . . . ex altera**: "on the one side . . . on the other."

34. **obscuratum iri**: some such object as *neglectam amicitiam*, "their neglect of the calls of friendship," must be understood. *Obscuratum iri*, the so-called future infinitive passive, is made up of (1) the present infinitive passive of the intransitive *eo* (therefore impersonal), and (2) the supine in *-um*, used in the normal way to express the goal (see xi. 9, note on *deprecatum*) after a verb of motion, and taking the object proper to its verb. *Lit.* "they think that it is being gone about to obscure (it)," *i. e.* "that it is going to be obscured." Men think the greatness of the excuse will conceal the greatness of the sin.

36. **qui in . . . versantur**: Cicero means "politicians." *Honor* as usual means "public office."

37. **invenias**: potential, "would you find (if you were to seek)"; *Istum* means "the man of whom we are speaking." *Honorem* is "political advancement."

39. **calamitatum societates**: "partnership in misfortune," the genitive being objective (implying *sociare calamitates*).

40. **inventu**: the supine in *-u* is used as an ablative of respect with a few adjectives such as *mirus, facilis;* and is found only in a very few verbs. It is really the ablative of a fourth declension substantive. **descendant**: the metaphor is borrowed from the language of athletes, "go down into the arena against."

41. **Ennius recte**: sc. *dixit*, a constant ellipsis.

41*a*. **in re incerta**: "when one is in trouble." The English equivalent of the proverb is, "A friend in need is a friend indeed," which contains something of the jingle found in the Latin.

42. **levitatis et infirmitatis**: with words expressing to accuse or convict, the charge is regularly put in the genitive case. *Haec duo* is explained by the following alternative clauses *aut . . . deserunt.* *Si* must be joined with both *contemnunt* and *deserunt.*

45. **ex maxime raro**: a variation for the superlative *ex rarissimo.*

Ch. **XVIII. 4. communem**: "sociable." **consentientem**: "sympathetic." **qui . . . moveatur**: "such as to be stirred." Contrast below *qui non movetur*, "one who actually is not stirred."

7. **naturaque**: ablative of the instrument, "by nature," *i. e.* "naturally."

9. **eodem**: "to the same score" (*lit.* "to the same place"), *i. e.* to the list of essential qualities.

10. **oblatis**: sc. *criminibus*, dative after *credat*, "nor believe charges when they are made." *Crimen* in good Latin means "accusation," not "crime." **iam dudum tracto**: *iam dudum, iam pridem, iam diu*, when joined with a Latin present require to be rendered in English by a present-perfect (so here, "I have this long time been treating of"); when these adverbs are joined with a Latin imperfect, the English pluperfect is the equivalent.

11. **initio**: "at the beginning," an example of the ablative of place without a preposition.
13. **boni viri**: "it is the part of a good man." So below, *ingenui.*
15. **fronte occultare**: "to conceal by (a false) expression of face."
19. **accedat huc**: "to this ought to be added." The subjunctive is oblique jussive depending on *oportet.*
22. **remissior**: "less unbending" than he who is *severus.*
23. **facilitatem**: "easiness" of approach, hence "affability."

XIX.–XXIII. §§ 67-88. ARGUMENT.—*Ought one to prefer new friends to old? No; admit new ones by all means, but recollect that friends, like wine that is good, improve with keeping. And always treat your friend as your equal, and give him the benefit of anything that is good in yourself. The weaker friend should not fret at his inferiority: only those are despised who are despicable. To be always harping on good offices done to a friend is fatal to true friendship. On the other hand, one must not offer a weaker friend opportunities too great for his abilities.*

After all, similarity of tastes must be the practical test of friendship; and in spite of all goodwill, it must sometimes happen that friends must part at duty's call. However, if possible, let us dissolve our friendships slowly rather than violently, and let us avoid making a positive foe of him whom we once called a friend. Scipio is an example of what I mean. It is better to be wronged than to be the wrong-doer.

Most of all, be not hasty in your choice of friends. Worthy friends are hard to find, and few are those whose friendship is unselfish. Most men make demands of their friends quite beyond their own powers, which is manifestly unfair. True friendship demands consideration for the other, fairness, honour, and esteem; and it is a fatal error to suppose that a friend is a tool to be utilized for any purpose, however base; for the essence of friendship is goodness, and there is no true friendship where goodness is not. Make your choice, and then be friends, not vice versâ. Friends we must have, even the misanthropes amongst us; and as Archytas said, heaven itself would be a sadness to a man if he were there alone.

[See INDEX for **Troia, Cato, Rupilius.**]

Ch. XIX. 1. **quaestio**: here "an inquiry," "problem"; distinguish its use in xi. 18 for "a court of law commissioned to investigate a particular charge."
2. **subdifficilis**: "somewhat difficult." The preposition *sub* has the same modifying force as in *subdolus* "somewhat crafty," *subabsurdus* "rather absurd." **num quando**: the indirect question depends upon *quaestio.* In direct questions *num* expects a negative reply, but in indirect questions merely marks the interrogation.
5. **veterrima quaeque**: *lit.* "every oldest friendship ought to be

sweetest," *i. e.* "the older a friendship is, the sweeter it ought to be." Cp. *optimo cuique* iv. 12, note.

6. **vetustatem ferunt**: so we speak of a wine which will "bear" keeping.

8. **modios**: to eat salt with a man is still, amongst Eastern nations, a pledge of goodwill. The *modius*, as a dry measure, is about two gallons (¼ bushel) English, so that the point of the proverb is, that to get on terms of true friendship with a man, one must meet him very often.

9. **novitates**: "novelties," *i. e.* new friendships. So *vetustas* below is "an old friendship."

10. **in herbis non fallacibus**: "in blades of corn which do not disappoint their promise." Unfruitful corn is termed *fallax*, because it cheats him who sows it. The verb *apparere* is much stronger than "to appear"; it means "to be evident."

13. **quin . . . quini**: see note on xvi. 40, for the various uses of *quin.* The former *quin* here is the introductory particle, "Nay." *Ipso equo* is the object of *utatur*, but because of the many words intervening, it is resumed by *eo* below.

14. **quo consuevit**: in full *quo consuevit uti*, "which he is wont to use."

18. **diutius**: "for a considerable length of time," absolute use of the comparative.

19. **parem esse**: "that the better man should put himself on a level with his inferior," *i. e.* make no show of being anything but the equal of his friend.

20. **excellentiae**: "instances of superiority."

21. **grege**: often used of the disciples of a philosophic school. So Horace, punning on the two meanings of *grex*, calls himself *Epicuri de grege porcus*, "a grunter from Epicurus' herd."

22. **Philo**: see iv. 15, note. **Mummio**: Spurius Mummius (brother of the man who destroyed Corinth, 146 B.C.), one of the Scipionic circle and a famous wit.

23. **Q. . . . Maximum fratrem**: L. Aemilius Paulus had four sons. Two of these, whom he gave to be adopted by other Romans, took as usual the names (*praenomen, nomen, cognomen*; see note on i. 1) of the man by whom they were adopted, as well as *agnomina* showing the *gens* in which they were born (the *gens Aemilia*). Thus the elder became Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus; the younger was Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus (Africanus Minor). The two sons whom L. Aemilius Paulus kept to perpetuate his own name unfortunately both died about the time of his triumph over Perseus.

25. **aetate**: ablative of respect. **suos**: "his relatives," a constant substantival meaning of *sui* (masc.), just as *sua* (neut.) = "one's property."

27. **omnibus**: dative of the agent. **ut, si . . . ut, si**: the first *ut* is explanatory of *quod*, "all men must do *this*, *i. e.* they must share those things, &c." The second *ut* is final and goes with *augeant*, "so that . . . they may increase."

29. **parentibus**: ablative of origin, regularly found with *nascor.*
30. **inbecilliore animo**: ablative of quality.
31. **honori et dignitati**. predicative dative. As usual it is accompanied by a second dative of the indirect object, *eis.*
32. **fabulis**: here "myths" like that of Romulus and Remus, who were brought up by the shepherd Faustulus. *Fabula* also is used of a "play."
33. **famulatu**: the condition of a *famulus* or paid servant.
35. **multos annos**: accusative of duration of time. *Patres* is predicative, and *duxerunt* means "considered."
38. **maximus capitur**: the adjective forms a secondary predicate, "is reaped in the fullest abundance."

Ch. XX. 5. **queruntur . . . aliquid**: the accusative is used with *queror*, *gemo*, *doleo*, and similar intransitive verbs, to indicate the *subject matter* of the complaint, grief, &c. (accusative of the internal object).
6. **habere . . . quod**: the antecedent, omitted in the Latin, must be rendered in English, "something or other, which, &c." **officiose**: means "in a kindly manner," just as *officium* = "kindness," "service."
7. **queant**: subjunctive dependent on the accus. and infin. construction after *putant*, giving the statement not as a fact (*queunt*), but as alleged by the subject. With *factum* sc. *esse.*
8. **exprobrantium**: "who make a grievance of their services," *i.e.* speak of them in such a way as to make the mention of them unpleasant to their hearer, the man for whom they have done the service.
11. **inferiores**: accusative, object of *extollere* (*debent*).
12. **molestas**: predicative, "make friendship a nuisance."
15. **opinione**: the usual ablative of separation, after *levo*, a verb of taking away. *Verbis* and *opere* are ablatives of the instrument.
16. **cuique**: dative of the recipient (not dative of the agent).
17. **primum**: adverb, "in the first place," answered below by *deinde*, "next."
18. **sustinere**: sc. *possit*, from *possis;* the subjunctive may be explained as consecutive, "as great a quantity as you are able." *Diligas* and *adiuves* are subjunctive as subordinate verbs to a subjunctive. **non . . . neque tu**: "not even you"; the two negatives do not destroy each other.
19. **neque tu possis**: potential, "you would not be able (if you tried)."
21. **efficere**: "to get him made consul." **fratrem eius L.**: "*Rupilius*' brother Lucius." Had *Scipio's* brother been meant, syntax would have required *suum* instead of *eius.*
23. **possit**: subjunctive of indirect question.
25. **iudicandae . . . habere**: there is an anacoluthon (see on ii. 11) in the construction. Normally we should have *iudicandae . . . nec sunt ei habendi necessarii*, or *oportet iudicare de amicitiis . . . nec habere*, &c.; but the infinitive *habere* is made to depend upon the idea of duty implied in the gerundive *iudicandae.*
26. **pilae**: "ball-play"; the genitive is the usual case governed by *studiosus.*

28. **paedagogi**: the slaves whose duty it was to attend their masters' children to and from school, and carry their books. **iure vetustatis**: "by right of long acquaintanceship," *vetustas* being equivalent to *inveterata amicitia.* The genitive *benevolentiae* is partitive depending on *plurimum.*

30. **aliter**: "otherwise," *i. e.* "if you don't wait until mature age," continuing the argument from the first sentence of the section.

31. **stabiles**: predicative, *permanere* being used as a copulative verb, "remain without alteration." **mores**: object of *sequuntur*, "diversity of tastes follows diversity of character."

32. **quorum dissimilitudo**: "dissimilarity in which," *i. e.* in tastes.

37. **intemperata**: "ill regulated," just as the ordinary meaning of *tempero* is "I control."

38. **ut ad fabulas redeam**: "to return to myth," as in xix. 32. For the legend here alluded to, see Index, *s.v.* TROIA.

40. **apud quem**: "in whose house," a common meaning of *apud* when joined with proper names.

42. **ut discedendum sit**: impersonal, "so that a departure becomes necessary."

43. **desiderium**: "because, as he says, he finds it hard to bear the loss (of his friend)." The subjunctive shows that the reason is that which occurs to the mind of him *qui impedire vult* (virtual oblique oration).

46. **postules . . . patiare**: indirect questions, but the deliberative subjunctive would be found in the direct question "what one is to demand," "what one is to allow."

Ch. XXI. 5. **quorum infamia**: short for *infamia in alienos erumpentium vitiorum*, "the disgrace attaching to friends' faults when they affect strangers."

6. **remissione usus**: "by gradual discontinuance of intercourse."

7. **dissuendae . . . discindendae**: "rather to be unstitched than rent asunder," *i. e.* the breaking off of the friendship should be gradual rather than violent.

8. **ut neque**: *ut* is consecutive, "in such fashion that," "with the result that."

12. **partibus**: *partes* in the plural regularly means a political party.

13. **de sapientium**: sc. *amicitiis.*

14. **cavendum erit**: "it will be needful to have a care lest it should seem that there is a quarrel commenced as well as a friendship ended." Join *non* with *solum*, "not only."

17. **vixeris**: perfect subjunctive (consecutive), "with such a one as you have lived with on terms of friendship." "You" is indefinite. **meo nomine**: "on my (Laelius') account." The metaphor is from book-keeping, where *nomen* means an "entry," whether to credit or debit, in a person's "account." Scipio, as Laelius' best friend, quarrelled with Quintus Pompeius in 141 B.C., because the latter, after having promised Scipio that he would aid Laelius' candidature for the

consulship, himself canvassed and won that office, and secured the rejection of Laelius.

19. **collega nostro Metello**: Quintus Caecilius Metellus, surnamed Macedonicus for his military successes when governor of Macedonia 148—147 B.C., quarrelled with Scipio because the latter secured the appointment of his friend Lucius Mummius (brother of Spurius Mummius, xix. 22; xxvii. 15) to the command in the Achaean War in Greece 146 B.C. Metellus had already won a battle at Scarphea, and hoped to have the credit of completing the war, but was disappointed by Mummius' appointment. He was an Augur (see i. 1, note), as was Laelius, and was therefore a *collega* of Laelius.

20. **utrumque**: from *uterque*, "both of these quarrels." **offensione animi non acerba**: "with a not bitter displeasure," *i. e.* "with displeasure without bitterness."

21. **danda opera est**: *dare operam* is "to pay heed," "to take care." Upon it depend the negative clause *ne qua . . . fiant*, and the positive clause *ut . . . videantur*.

22. **ne qua discidia**: the indefinite pronoun and adjective has sing. nom. *quis* or *qui, qua, quid* or *quod;* plur. nom., *qui, quae, quae* or *qua*.

23. **extinctae**: "burnt out." **oppressae**: "smothered." The metaphors are from the dying out of a fire.

29. **vitiorum atque incommodorum**: the genitive is a somewhat strained example of the objective, approaching the so-called genitive of reference, "in regard to errors, &c."

31. **incipiant**: the subject is indefinite, "men." We should use the indefinite "you." *Ut ne* is a variation for the more common *ne*, and *non dignos* = *indignos*.

32. **quibus in ipsis**: *quibus* may be dative, the usual case with compounds of *sum* (*lit.* "to whom there is within themselves"), or ablative governed by *in*, the order being varied for *in quibus ipsis*. **rarum genus**: the words are really in apposition with the preceding clause *quibus . . . diligantur*.

34. **omni ex parte**: "in every part," *i. e.* "altogether." It modifies *perfectum*.

36. **norunt**: a shorter form of *noverunt*. **tamquam pecudes**: accusative. A man's friends are usually not even "something better than his dog, a little dearer than his horse."

38. **capturos**: verbs of hoping require the dependent infinitive to be in the future tense; contrast the English "hope to derive."

40. **nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt**: *ipsi* is nominative, *sibi* dative of advantage, *exemplo* dative of the predicate, "they are not unto themselves patterns of the value (*qualis*) and depth (*quanta*) of this (the perfect) form of friendship." A man loves himself for his own sake, but he is not equally disinterested in his love for his friends.

42. **caritatis**: "reward *for* his love."

45. **alter idem**: *lit.* "the same man a second time over," *i. e.* "one's second self." **apparet**: "is manifest," see note on xix. 10. *Hoc* is explained by the clauses *primum ut . . .* and *deinde ut . . . animantis*. **bestiis**: this substantive is followed by five adjectives, of which

volucribus, nantibus, agrestibus, describe the habitat (air, water and land), and *cicuribus* and *feris* the nature of the animal.

48. **adpetant, ad quas**: the antecedent is *animantis*, accusative plural; note the gender as shown by the relative (sc. *bestias*).

51. **natura**: equivalent to an adverb, "in accordance with nature."

52. **misceat**: the relative has a final force, and hence the mood, "that with that other's heart he may blend his own."

Ch. XXII. 1. ne dicam: the subjunctive is final, "in order that I may not say," "not to say."

4. **par est**: "it is fair," "fitting." *Primum* is adverbial, "in the first place," cp. above, xx. 17.

5. **similem sui**: cp. xiv. 14. **iam dudum tractamus**: "of which we have this long time been treating." Cp. *iam dudum tracto*, xviii. 10, note.

7. **iis, quibus**: both *impero* and *servio* require a dative of the object.

9. **alter pro altero**: "each for *the* other." So *alter ab altero*, "each from the other."

11. **inter se**: used as the equivalent of "each other" in all cases. Here it stands for *alter alterum;* cp. *complexi sunt inter se*, "they embraced each other." In *inter se discesserunt*, "they left each other," it stands for *alter ab altero*.

13. **verecundiam**: "respect," just as *vereri* = "feel respect for."

16. **adiutrix**: predicative, "was given as a handmaid of the virtues." So *comes*.

18. **cum altera**: sc. *virtute, virtus* being in this sentence used as equivalent to "a good man" (abstract for concrete). The tenses of *posset* and *perveniret* show that *data est* is historic ("was given"); but *sunt* is used instead of *essent* because *ea quae summa sunt* includes what is highest both now and at all times.

19. **quae si quos inter**: the order is *quae societas si aut est aut fuit inter quos;* but the preposition is displaced because the indefinite *quos* must, according to rule, follow immediately after *si*. Such anastrophe ("drawing back") of prepositions is rare except with those of two syllables, *e. g. inter, circum, super. Futura est* is stronger than the simple future *erit*.

20. **eorum**: with *comitatus. Optimus* and *beatissimus* form part of the predicate.

26. **opera danda est**: "we must pay heed to"; cp. xxi. 21, above.

27. **expetendam**: a simple attribute, "that is worth striving after," "desirable." **ea . . . neglecta**: sc. *virtute*. The ablative absolute does duty for a concessive clause, "think they have friends, even though they take no account of goodness."

28. **tum . . . denique**: emphatic like *tum demum*, "then and not till then."

30. **saepius**: "more often than once," "again and again." **iudicaris . . . dilexeris**: "when a man has judged," "after judging," the subjunctive is used because the subject of the verb is indefinite ("one" or "you").

32. **neglegentia**: "by reason of our carelessness," ablative of cause.

33. **praeposteris**: *praeposteris consiliis uti* is the same thing as "putting the cart before the horse."

34. **acta agimus**: the proverb corresponds in meaning to the English maxim about "locking the stable-door when the horse is stolen." **quod vetamur**: sc. *facere*, to which *quod* is the object. But *veto* is not seldom found with a simple accusative of the thing prohibited, *e. g. bella vetare*, "to forbid fighting" (Vergil).

35. **ultro et citro**: "mutually," "on both sides" (*lit.* "on the near side and the further side").

36. **exorta aliqua offensione**: ablative absolute, to be translated by a temporal clause, "when some cause for offence has arisen."

Ch. XXIII. 1. **quo**: instrumental ablative, "in consequence of which." **rei**: objective genitive with *incuria*, "such carelessness in a matter of such vital importance." Cp. *vitiorum cautio*, xxi. 29.

2. **una est**: the position of *una* shows that it is emphatically predicative, "friendship is the one thing about which, &c."

3. **uno ore**: "with one mouth," *i. e.* "unanimously."

9. **cetera**: object of *putent*, which is generic subjunctive. *Sunt qui putant* means "there are certain men (A, B, C, &c.) who believe"; *sunt qui putent* means "there is *a class of* men who believe."

11. **omnes ad unum**: "all to a man." *Idem* (neut. sing.) is joined with *sentiunt* as a cognate accusative.

12. **ad rem publicam se contulerunt**: *ad rem publicam se conferre* is the regular phrase for "taking up politics" as a profession.

14. **otiosi**: equivalent to an English adverb, "in a leisurely fashion," *i. e.* without troubling themselves about politics.

15. **sine amicitia . . . nullam**: the accus. and infin. clause explains *idem* above, depending upon *sentiunt*. **si modo velint**: the verb is subjunctive according to rule, being in a clause dependent on an accus. and infin. construction.

16. **liberaliter**: "as becomes the free man" (*liber*), as opposed to the slave. **nescio quo modo**: "in some strange way," cp. i. 41 and note.

18. **sui**: *expers* governs an objective genitive. Distinguish *expers* (*ex+pars*), "without share in," from *expertus* (*experior*), "trying" or "tried."

19. **asperitate . . . inmanitate**: ablatives of quality, the adjective *ea* (=*tali*) doing duty as the necessary epithet.

20. **oderit**: equivalent to a present subjunctive, just as *odi* is present in force though perfect in form. **Athenis**: "at Athens," ablative of place where. See the note on xi. 11, *tanti*. **Timonem nescio quem**: "a certain Timon," *nescio quem* being added to show that Laelius does not profess to know much about him, or expect his hearers to do so. Timon of Athens acquired the surname of the Misanthrope (Man-hater) because of his avoidance of all society, the result of a disappointed life. He lived in the time of Athenian greatness, *circa* 420 B.C., and was a great friend of Alcibiades.

22. **apud quem**: merely "in whose hearing," "in whose ears." Contrast the meaning in xx. 40. The relative has a final force; hence the mood of *evomat*. Cp. *misceat*, xxi. 52.

24. **frequentia**: "crowd."

28. **cuique**: equivalent to *et cui*, the dative being that of the person from whom the thing is taken (dative of disadvantage).

30. **Tarentino**: adjective from Tarentum (*Taranto*), a famous seaport in the N.E. corner of the Gulf of Taranto in Southern Italy. The order of the words is: *illud est verum, quod* (*auditum ab aliis senibus*) *audivi nostros senes commemorare solitum* (*esse*) *dici ab Archyta.* Laelius heard old men say that it was a saying of Archytas which they had themselves heard from other old men. Archȳtas was a famous mathematician of about 400 B.C., and a follower of the philosophy of Pythagoras, which flourished chiefly in Tarentum and the other cities of Magna Graecia (see note, iv. 7).

34. **illam admirationem**: "his wonder *thereat*." So the Romans said *hic dolor*, "grief about this," &c. Archytas' words were: *si quis ascenderit . . . perspexerit . . . insuavis illa admiratio erit*, &c.

37. **in amicissimo quoque**: we should say, "it is the *dearer in proportion* as it is (found) in the *dearer* of our friends."

XXIV.-XXVII. §§ 88-104. ARGUMENT.—*The greatest stumbling-block of friends is truthful candour, for the truth is ofttimes very unpleasant, yet honour demands that it be spoken. Give and receive advice in a kindly spirit: a truth-telling enemy may be worth more than a flattering friend. Flattery is friendship's bane, and only worthy of a parasite; and it is easy to distinguish between truth and flattery, for even the populace in their assembly can do so, as they showed when they chose to side with me rather than with Carbo or Crassus.*

Truth must prevail, and it is the keystone of friendship, while on the other hand flattery hurts none but him who swallows it and thinks it a testimony to his merits, and makes us smile at his boastful gullibility. You remember Thraso in the play? Some forms of flattery are cleverly veiled, but they are not the less dangerous and foolish.

No. Goodness knows its own, and makes for it, and takes it to its heart. It is this which binds friends together, no matter what their ages be. It bound me to Scipio, whose goodness I shall bear in mind even though I have lost him. We never quarrelled, we had but one life and one soul, so to say, and one pursuit; and it is the memory of the past enables me to bear the present. It will not be for long, for I am old, and can abide patiently a little while.

I have no more to say. Believe me that Love is the Greatest Thing in the World.

[See INDEX for **L. Paulus, M. Cato, Tib. Gracchus, Scipio Nasica, Carbo, Crassus,** and **Terentius.**]

Ch. XXIV. 1. **declaret**: the subjunctive is due to the concessive ("though") force of *cum*.

3. **quae ab ea monemur**: *lit.* "the things which we are admonished by her," "the warnings she gives us." *Moneo*, which takes two accusatives in the active, retains the (internal) accusative of the thing when it is used passively.

4. **usus amicitiae**: "intercourse in friendship."

5. **tum . . . tum . . . tum**: "now . . . again . . anon." *Sapientis* is predicative genitive.

6. † **subeunda**: "must be encountered," referring to the friend who *gives* advice. There is a *v. l. sublevanda*, which can only mean "must be made light of," "must be removed." This implies that people must *take* advice and reproof without being offended.

10. **in Andria**: "in his play *The Andrian Girl.*" Terence (see INDEX) was one of the Scipionic circle; hence he was a *familiaris* of Laelius.

12. **siquidem**: a causal not a conditional conjunction, "seeing that," "inasmuch as."

14. **praecipitem**: represented in English by an adverb. *Fero* in the passive is constantly used of rapid or violent motion, "suffers him to rush downhill." **maxuma**: an archaic spelling of *maxima.*

19. **Terentiano verbo**: "Terence' word," *i. e. obsequium.* **adsit . . . amoveatur**: jussive subjunctives.

20. **non modo . . . sed ne . . . quidem**: *non modo* can be used for *non modo non* if it is followed by a second negative clause, which contains the same predicate (*digna est*) as the first.

22. **vivitur**: the passive of *vivo* (intransitive) is of course impersonal, "life with a despot is one thing, with a friend another."

24. **scitum**: "neat," "witty." The substantive to be understood with *illud* is *dictum* or *verbum.* So with *ut multa* (sc. *Catonis*), "as indeed are many of his remarks."

25. **melius de quibusdam**: the sentence is in oratio obliqua, depending upon the idea of saying in *illud.* The accusatives *acerbos inimicos* and *eos amicos* are the subjects of the infinitive *mereri. Mereri de aliquo* is the Latin equivalent for "to deserve of a person."

29. **qua . . . vacare**: for the case, cp. *amico orbatus*, iii. 3.

30. **quod contra**: "as to which, they ought on the contrary to grieve, &c." *Quod* is an accusative of limitation referring to the preceding sentence, and *contra* is an adverb.

31. **delicto**: ablative of the cause, "because of their fault."

Ch. XXV. 2. **libere**: "frankly," "candidly." The first *alterum* refers of course to *monere*—the giving of advice; the second to *moneri*—the taking of it.

3. **sic habendum est**: "even so we must consider that, &c." It would have been more usual to say, *sic habenda est pestis maxima adulatio*, &c., as Latin prefers the *personal* usage with verbs of saying. See the note on *nulla videbatur aptior*, i. 33.

5. **quamvis**: to be joined closely with *multis*, "no matter how many names (*e. g. adulatio, blanditia, adsentatio*) it may have." The genitives in the sentence are possessive, with *vitium* repeated, "to be branded as the fault of worthless characters, &c."

7. † **ad voluntatem**: "to meet your wishes," "in order to please," with practically the same meaning as the variant reading *voluptatem.* **nihil ad veritatem**: sc. *loquentium,* "for truth's sake."

11. **valere non potest**: *lit.* "cannot be strong," *i. e.* "can have no meaning." **in eo**: explained by the following *ut*-clause.

12. **qui id fieri**: *qui* is an old ablative singular of the interrogative *quis* or *qui,* meaning "by what means?" "how?" **ne in uno quidem quoque**: *quōque* (note the quantity) is the ablative of *quisque,* with which *unus* is often conjoined for emphasis, usually as one word, *unusquisque,* "each separate person." [The adverb *quŏque,* "also," is different in quantity.]

16. **alterius**: "of another." Cp. xiv. 30, note.

17. **convertitur**: the verb may be translated as reflexive, "turns (himself)".

18. **negat . . . aio**: *aio* is, "I say aye," as *nego* is, "I say no." Observe the use of *quis* indefinite without one of the usual particles (see vii. 33, note). It is usual to say that, in this and similar passages, there is an ellipsis of *si,* i. e. *negat* and *ait* are respectively the protases to *nego* and *aio.* The lines are quoted from a comedy of Terence, the *Eunuchus.* **egomet**: many forms of the personal pronoun may be made more emphatic by suffixing *-met.*

19. **omnia**: "in every case," adverbial accusative of limitation.

20. **in Gnathonis persona**: "in the character of Gnatho," *i. e.* he makes one of the characters in his play use the words. Gnatho is a professional parasite—one who gets a living by flattery and subservience—in the *Eunuchus.* For *persona,* see note on i. 33.

21. **levitatis**: predicative genitive.

22. **Gnathonum**: in English we use the generic singular, "like *a* Gnatho."

25. **fucata**: "forged," literally "dyed" with the juices of the *fucus,* a variety of seaweed. The ablative absolute *adhibita diligentia* is conditional, "if care be taken."

26. **contio**: "an assembly," especially the name given to a mass meeting of citizens and others, who were addressed by a magistrate before a vote was taken on a measure.

27. **inter popularem . . . et inter constantem**: only one preposition is required in English, and two are unusual even in Latin. For the sense of *intersit,* cp. xiii. 41.

29. **blanditiis influebat**: in English we might say "poured his smooth flatteries into the ears of." *Auris* is accusative plural.

30. **C. Papirius**: see Index, *s. v.* CARBO. **ferret**: *ferre legem* is "to propose a bill," *i. e.* to ask the people to make it law. So also *rogare legem. Perferre legem* is the usual way of expressing "to pass (*i. e.* make law of) a bill."

31. **de tribunis plebis reficiendis**: "concerning the re-election of tribunes of the people," for which see note on i. 17. No magistrate, except the censor, was allowed to hold office for longer than twelve months, nor could he, as a rule, be again made a magistrate for ten years after his first tenure of the office. The tribunes, after the time

of Tib. Gracchus (see INDEX), were most anxious to get themselves excepted from this law, because as soon as ever they laid down their magistracy, they became liable to impeachment and punishment for their conduct when in office, whereas while actually in office they were *sacrosancti*, *i. e.* it was a sin against heaven to molest them in any way whatever. **dissuasimus**: sc. *contioni* or *populo*. *Nos* refers to Laelius, and means nothing more than *ego*.

34. **diceres**: potential, "you would say without hesitation (had you been asked), that he was, &c."

35. **est in manibus**: "is in people's hands," *i. e.* easily obtainable. It was published.

37. **meministis**: parenthetical. **fratre Scipionis**: see the note on xix. 23. Maximus and Mancinus were consuls in 145 B.C.

38. **lex de sacerdotiis**: see Index, *s.v.* CRASSUS.

39. **cooptatio**: the name given to the system whereby, in the various colleges (Augurs, Pontiffs, &c.), any vacancy which might occur was filled up by the choice of the survivors, who were said to "co-opt" the new member of the college.

40. **transferebatur**: "was being converted into a question of popular favour," *i. e.* was to be handed over to the people's elective vote. See Index, *s. v.* CRASSUS. **is primus, &c.**: before Crassus' time, orators when speaking from the platform—the *rostra*, at the N. W. end of the Forum—faced towards the Senate-house, where the nobles assembled. Crassus, possibly to mark his antagonism to the nobles as well as to get freer speaking room, turned about so as to face the whole breadth of the Forum and stood with his back to the Senate-house. For *agere cum aliquo*, "to argue with the people," "to address the people." see the note on i. 28.

41. **vendibilem**: *lit.* "marketable," "such as would easily sell"; and so "specious," "plausible."

42. **religio deorum**: "reverence *for* the gods." *Religio* in the singular means "awe," "religious scruple"; in the plural, "religious ceremonies."

43. **praetore me**: "when I was praetor," 145 B.C. For the ablative absolute, cp. *Q. Maxumo et L. Mancino consulibus* above. *Quinquennio* is an ablative of the measure of difference, depending on *ante*, *lit.* "before by a period of five years."

44. **re**: "by the bare facts of the case," "by its own merits." **summa auctoritate**: such influence as would belong to a consul as the highest magistrate in Rome. As Laelius was only a praetor, he could not have succeeded in defeating Crassus' bill by any personal influence, but simply by the patent merits of his objections to it.

Ch. XXVI. 1. **in scaena**: "on the stage." Cicero means that public speaking is, like the speeches in a play, all artificial and unreal.

2. **rebus fictis**: dative, "where there is so much room for falsity and misrepresentation." *Adumbrare* is "to give in outline," with the implication that what it would be more truthful to reveal is omitted.

4. **quae tota**: "the whole of which depends," *i. e.* "which depends wholly."

6. **amare . . . amari**: the infinitives are dependent upon *exploratum habeas,* and in apposition to *nihil,* "know nothing for certain, not even that you love another or are yourself loved, since you know not how truly such love be given." *Id* means both *amare* and *amari,* to each of which the subject *te* must be supplied.

12. **amans sui**: see the note on *appetens sui,* xiv. 14.

14. **de virtutis opinione**: "about the belief a man has in his own virtue."

16. **ad . . . voluntatem**: "with a view to their own wishes," "to suit their own wishes," as in xxv. 7. **cum adhibetur**: "whenever it is introduced." The indicative with *cum* is the proper mood for expressing indefinite frequency.

17. **testimonium**: predicate. **laudum**: *laus* in the plural often denotes "praiseworthy qualities," "merits."

20. **parasitorum**: such as was Gnatho; see note on xxv. 22.

21. **gloriosi**: "boastful." The line that follows is from the *Eunuchus* of Terence (cp. above, ch. xxv. 18, 20, notes): the braggart warrior is Thraso, who is asking in what way his mistress Thais received the present of which the parasite Gnatho was the bearer. Gnatho flatters Thraso by exaggerating Thais' pleasure.

23. **satis erat**: observe the mood. We say "it would have been enough"; the Latin idiom makes the statement an absolute fact, "it *was* enough." So always with the expressions *longum est,* &c., "it would be wearisome." **magnas**: sc. *gratias tibi Thais agit.*

29. **nemo non videt**: "no one fails to see through."

30. **admodum excors**: "a downright fool." The heart (*cor*) was with the Romans the seat of intelligence. **se insinuet**: so we speak of "worming" one's way in.

32. **quippe qui**: cp. viii. 30. **adversando**: ablative of means; he contrives to make himself agreeable even when attacking the other's arguments, by pretending to be himself beaten in the end.

33. **simulans**: *simulo* = "I pretend to be what I am not"; *dissimulo* = "I hide what I am." **det manus**: "surrenders," because to throw aside one's weapons and raise the hands is the natural sign of submission.

34. **plus vidisse**: the flatterer's show of dissent, and subsequent agreement, are only meant to give the other a pleasant opinion of his superior wisdom and foresight.

36. †**cavendum est**: some editions add here *ut in Epiclero,* "as in the (play called) Epiclerus (*The Heiress*)," from which the line is supposed to be taken. It was a comedy of Caecilius Statius, who flourished 180 B.C.

37. **ut me hodie**: so-called "exclamatory *ut,*" "How you twisted me round your fingers." There is an ellipsis of some such phrase as "to think (how, &c.)." The verbs are in the perfect subjunctive. **comicos . . . senes**: a *comicus senex* is an old man who appears as a character in a *comoedia.*

38. **inlusseris**: i. e. *inluseris*, double *s* being commonly written in early Latin after a long vowel such as *ū* or a diphthong, *e. g. caussa* (*causa*). **lautissume**: "right royally," "splendidly." *Lautus*, properly the participle of *lavo*, means "well-washed," and so "sumptuous," "rich."

39. **persona**: "rôle," "character."

42. **cadere**: "to befall an ordinary man," as distinct from the superfine wisdom of the philosophers, alluded to in ch. v.

44. **redeamus . . . concludamus**: jussive subjunctives. *Aliquando* here means "at length"; more usually it means "at some time or other."

Ch. XXVII. 3. convenientia rerum: "agreement on (all) subjects," the genitive being objective.

9. **nulla indigentia**: ablative of attendant circumstances (ablative absolute). *Quaesita* belongs to *utilitate* only, "not from any need of him, or because you seek for any advantage from him." **quae**: referring to *utilitas*.

10. **ecflorescit**: archaic spelling of *efflorescit*, *ec*, an old form of the preposition *e*, *ex*, not being assimilated to the following *f*.

14. **aequales**: cp. ix. 38, note.

15. **vicissim**: "in my turn," *adquiescimus* being merely an example of the plural verb used of himself by a single speaker.

17. **Tuberonis**: Quintus Tubero, nephew of Scipio Minor, was a member of the Scipionic Circle and a leader of the Stoic philosophy. He was tribune in 133 with Tib. Gracchus, whom he bitterly opposed. Of Aulus Verginius little is known except that he was an eminent lawyer.

20. **cum aequalibus**: resumed by *cum isdem* below.

21. **tanquam e carceribus**: in the plural, *carcer* means the "starting-post" of a race, the stalls in which horses and horse-chariots were stationed side by side, waiting the signal for advancing to the *calx*, a chalk-line such as is marked at the start of our foot-races. The competitors passed the length of the *spatium*, turned the halfway post (*meta*), and so raced back to the *calx*, which hence came to mean (as here) the "winning-post."

24. **diligamus . . . diligamur**: the subjunctives are final.

26. **mihi quidem**: dative of the person judging, "to my thinking." Below *mihi soli* is a dative of advantage, like *posteris*.

29. **in manibus habui**: cp. note on xxv. 35. Here it means simply "close at hand."

31. **animo aut spe**: "in thoughts or hopes." **sibi . . . proponendam**: *sibi* is not dative of the agent, but dative of the indirect object corresponding to that in the active sentence *hoc mihi propono*.

32. **putet**: after *qui* consecutive.

36. **oblectationis**: the usual genitive with a word implying "full of." *Plenus* admits the ablative also.

37. **quod . . . senserim**: "as far at least as I could see." *Quod* is used adverbially as a limiting accusative (cp. *quod contra*, xxiv. 30,

note), and *senserim* is an example of the subjunctive found in a relative sentence which restricts a general assertion. This usage is a variety of the consecutive subjunctive. Cp. *Omnium quidem oratorum, quos quidem ego cognoverim, acutissimum iudico Q. Sertorium,* "Of all orators—of all, at least, with whom I am acquainted—I deem Q. Sertorius the readiest."

38. **quod nollem**: "such as I disliked (to hear)," consecutive subjunctive.

39. **victus**: a substantive. *Una* and *idem* are both emphatic predicates.

44. **una cum illo**: "together with him."

45. **possem**: for the imperfect tense in apodosis to a pluperfect protasis, cp. above, iv. 5, note on *fecissent.* It means: "I should not *have been able then or* be able now."

47. **illis**: with the ablative, cp. *tali amico,* iii. 3.

48. **diutius**: "very long."

51. **quae dicerem**: "to say," final subjunctive.

52. **ut . . . ut**: the first *ut* introduces the object-clause to *hortor,* the second answers to *ita.*

53. **amicitia**: ablative of the standard of comparison.

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES.

A.

Apollo, -inis, m.: the Greek god of prophecy, whose most famous oracle was at Delphi in Phocis, on the slope of Mount Parnassus. It was said that Socrates, desiring to know who was the wisest of men, consulted the oracle and received answer that it was himself. He concluded then that he must be wise because he was aware of his own want of knowledge, while other men both knew nothing and did not know that they knew nothing (ii. 17; iv. 9).

Athēnae, -arum, f.: Athens, the capital of modern Greece, anciently the chief city of Attica, and the home of most of the artists, writers, and statesmen, of the Greece of 500—300 B.C. (ii. 16; xxiii. 20).

Attĭcus, -i, m.: Titus Pomponius, a Roman knight, a rich banker, and a bosom friend of Cicero. He obtained the name of Atticus either from his constant residence at Athens, or from his thorough acquaintance with the Greek language. He was born 109 B.C., and died 32 B.C. He went to school with Cicero, kept up an intimate acquaintance with him throughout his life, and constantly gave him sound and useful advice. Cicero dedicated several of his treatises to Atticus, including this (i. 15).

B.

Blossius, -i, m.: Gaius Blossius of Cumae, a *hospes* of Scaevola's family, was an intimate friend of Tiberius Gracchus, and was said to have urged the latter to bring forward his Agrarian Law. On the death of Gracchus in 133 B.C., Blossius was brought before the Consuls. He fled to Aristonīcus, a pretender to the kingdom of Pergămus, and eventually committed suicide, in order to avoid falling into the hands of the Romans, B.C. 130 (xi.).

C.

Carbo, -ōnis, m.: Gaius Papirius Carbo was one of the leading followers of Tib. Gracchus, and continued the democratic agitation after the latter's death in opposition to Scipio Minor whom he was suspected of having assassinated (xii. 11, note). Aided by C. Cato and the younger Gracchus (xi. 41) he passed a bill, when consul in 131 B.C., to extend the system of secret ballot to include voting on

the passing of laws. [It had been in use in the election of magistrates since 139 B.C.; see *s.v.* GABINIA LEX.] This was the *Lex Papiria Tabellaria.* After the failure and death of Gaius Gracchus (121 B.C.), Carbo endeavoured to make friends with the nobles by deserting his party, but they refused his advances, impeached him for his share in the Gracchan Revolution, and compelled him to commit suicide. See also ch. xxv., where is mentioned another proposed law of his to permit the re-election of the same man to the tribunate for consecutive years—a bill of which the effect would be to make any revolutionary tribune virtually sovereign of Rome.

Cassia Lex: the law passed by the tribune, L. Cassius Longīnus, in 137 B.C., by which juries in criminal cases were directed to vote by ballot. This Cassius was the author of the famous saying, "Cui bono?" = "For whose good?" *i. e.* find out who profits by any matter, if you desire to find out who is the author of it. See the note on xii. 18.

Cassius, -i, m.: Spurius Cassius Vecellīnus was consul in 502, 493, and 486 B.C. During his third consulship, in 486 B.C., he promulgated his famous Agrarian Law, which according to the traditional account proposed to divide the country of the newly conquered Hernĭci equally among (1) the Hernici, (2) the Plebs, and (3) the Latins. All parties were offended by this, and Cassius was accused of aiming at the kingship, and was accordingly put to death. His *cognomen* is also spelled *Viscellinus* (viii. 34; xi. 4).

Căto, -ōnis, m.: (1) **Marcus Porcius Cato** was born at Tusculum, 234 B.C., son of a poor plebeian farmer, became a *protégé* of L. Valerius Flaccus, and after seeing service at the sieges of Capua (214 B.C.) and Tarentum (209 B.C.) in the Second Punic war, obtained his first office as Quaestor to Scipio Major in 205 B.C. He became the leader of the old Conservative party in the Senate, violently opposing the Liberal party of Scipio and all tendencies towards Greek influence. He successively held the offices of Aedile (199 B.C.), Praetor (198 B.C.), Consul (195 B.C.), and Censor (184 B.C.). When Consul he pacified Spain; four years later he contributed essentially to the great victory of Glabrio over Antiochus of Syria at Thermopylae. As censor he offended the nobles by his severity, but won new favour with the people for his public works and improvements, though the *agnomen* (i. 1, note) of *Censorius* always clung to him. The last years of his life were spent in the effort to foment war with Carthage, and whenever asked his opinion upon any matter in the Senate his invariable conclusion was, *Delenda est Carthago*, "we must destroy Carthage." He lived to see the task begun by Scipio Minor, but died (149 B.C.) three years before its completion, soon after the death of his eldest son (ii. 41). He was a prolific writer in Latin on various subjects, especially Antiquities and Agriculture (*Origines* and *De Re Rustica*), and the constant need of defending himself against the attacks of his enemies made him a ready orator. Cicero makes him the chief speaker in his Dialogue *De Senectute*, which is for this reason known also as *Cato Maior* (iii. 24); quotes him as a pattern of *Virtus* (vi. 15), and a friend of Laelius

Roman army in Sardinia, where he attracted the notice of Cato, who brought him to Rome. Here he found many patrons, particularly Scipio Africanus Maior. He was taken to the Aetolian War in 189 B.C., and later in life was presented with the Roman franchise. He wrote mostly Epic poetry, notably a poem in eighteen books styled *Annales*, a verse history of Rome down to the close of the war with Hannibal. He died in 169 B.C., and his statue was placed on the sepulchre of the Scipios. He is quoted in vi. 19 ; xvii. 41.

F.

Fabrĭcius, -i, m.; Gaius Fabricius Luscīnus, when sent (B.C. 280) as an ambassador to Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, who had invaded Italy, refused the most tempting bribes by which it was sought to purchase his treason (v. 19 ; viii. 32 ; xi. 30). Both as consul (282 and 278 B.C.) and as Censor (275 B.C.) he had for his colleague Aemilius Papus.

Găbīnia Lex: The *Lex Gabinia de Magistratibus Mandandis* introduced secret ballot into the election of all magistrates chosen in the Comitia, the object being to prevent the nobles and wealthy from intimidating the poorer voters and so influencing the elections (xii. 17).

Gālus, -i, m.: (or **Gallus**) *s. v.* SULPICIUS.

Gracchus, -i, m. : (1) Tiberius Gracchus, father of Tiberius and Gaius mentioned below, consul in 177 B.C., conquered Sardinia. He was son-in-law of the elder Scipio, and father-in-law of the younger Scipio (xxvii. 12). (2) **Tib. Sempronius Gracchus** (xi. 11, 40 ; xii. 8), born 164 B.C., tribune of the plebs in 133, brought forward a famous agrarian law (*Lex Sempronia*), by which certain portions of the *ager publicus* were to be divided among the poorer citizens and Italians. In order to carry this proposal, Tib. Gracchus had to move that his colleague, the tribune Octavius, who had vetoed the law, should be deposed. This was done, and the law was passed ; but such deposition was illegal, and as soon as his tribunate was over, Gracchus was open to impeachment. He accordingly became a candidate for the next year: another illegality, since it was not legal for the same man to hold the same office for any two consecutive years. During a debate in the Senate, Tiberius raised his hand to his head, to show that his life was in danger. His enemies shouted that he wanted a crown, so as to be king over them. Scipio Nasīca called upon the consul to save the State, and in the tumult that followed Gracchus was slain. (3) **Gaius Sempronius Gracchus**, the younger brother of (2), born about 155 B.C., was quaestor in Sardinia 126, and tribune 123. For some years after his brother's death he remained in comparative obscurity, only acting as one of the three commissioners to carry out the provisions of his brother's Agrarian Law. When tribune, however, he went much further than did Tiberius, quarrelling at once with the Senate and nobles, and introducing a number of laws for the benefit of the poorer Romans and the Italian peasants and provincials. He was sent to Africa to found a new colony, Junonia, on the site of Carthage. In 121 his enemy Opīmius was consul, and a law was proposed prohibiting the colony. Gracchus and his friends returned to oppose the

law; a tumult ensued, in consequence of which Gracchus had to flee, and on being pursued, ordered his slaves to kill him (xi. 41; xii. 14).

Graeci, -orum, m. : natives of Graecia, Greeks (v. 4).

H.

Hannibal, -ălis, m. : Hannibal, the famous Carthaginian general, who defeated the Romans in several battles, especially at Lake Trasimēnus, 217 B.C., and at Cannae, 216 B.C., but was himself recalled to defend Carthage, and was defeated by Scipio Major at the battle of Zama in 202 B.C. After this defeat he retired to the court of King Antiochus III., and in 190 B.C. to the court of Prusias, King of Bithynia. The Romans demanded his surrender, to prevent which he killed himself by poison in 183 B.C. The Romans always regarded Hannibal as the type of cruelty and barbarity; but we do not know on what acts of his this reputation rests (viii. 38).

L.

Laenas, -ātis, m. : Publius Popilius Laenas, fellow consul with Rupilius (*q. v.*) in 132 B.C., shared in the latter's punishment for his strong measures against the partisans of Tiberius Gracchus, being exiled by Gaius Gracchus, 123 B.C., but restored three years later (xi. 9).

M.

Maelius, -i, m. : Spurius Maelius, a plebeian of great wealth. About 440 B.C. there was a great famine at Rome, and Maelius bought up vast quantities of corn from Etruria, and distributed it for nothing, or for a small price, among the poor. The patricians accused him of trying to become king; they appointed as dictator Cincinnatus, who sent Ahāla, his master of the horse, to summon Maelius to explain his conduct. Maelius refused, and Ahala struck him dead, an exploit which Cicero always regards with the greatest approbation (viii. 34; xi. 5).

Mancīnus, -i, m. : L. Hostīlius Mancinus served in the third Punic War, and was one of the first to enter Carthage when it was stormed. He was consul (B.C. 145) with Q. Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, the year in which Laelius defeated the bill *De Sacerdotiis* of Licinius Crassus (xxv. 37).

Mănīlius, -i, m. : Marcus Manilius. See note on iv. 15.

Maximus, -i, m. : Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, by birth the eldest surviving son of Aemilius Paulus, and therefore brother of Scipio Minor (xxv. 37). See the note on xix. 23.

O.

Orestes, -is, m. : according to the legend, Orestes, son of Agamemnon, put to death his mother Clytaemnestra for her murder of his father. For this crime he was driven mad, and was commanded by Apollo to expiate his offence by bringing to Greece the image of the Tauric Artĕmis, goddess of a savage tribe in the region of the Crimea,

at whose altar were sacrificed whatever strangers landed on the coast. Aided by his comrade **Pylădes, (-is, m.)**, Orestes attempted to carry off the statue, was caught, and would have been sacrificed, had it not been discovered that the priestess of the goddess was his own long-lost sister Iphigenia, whom Clytaemnestra believed Agamemnon to have sacrificed to Artemis. The scene in which, when carried before the King of the Tauric land, Pylades endeavoured to save Orestes' life by dying in his stead, while Orestes with equal resolve refused to allow it, became a proverb for truest friendship (vii. 26).

P.

Pācŭvius, -i, m. : M. Pacuvius, the son of Ennius' sister, was born at Brundusium, B.C. 220. He early distinguished himself through his talents both in poetry and painting. Most of his plays were translations or adaptations from the Greek. The play referred to in vii. 25, is by some regarded as the *Dulorestes*, which perhaps followed the *Iphigenia in Tauris* of Euripides, dealing with the story of Orestes (*q. v.*) and Pylades. Pacuvius probably never became a Roman citizen, and is accordingly called *hospes* by Cicero. He died at Brundusium, B.C. 130 (vii. 25).

Paulus, -i, m. : L. Aemilius Paulus was the conqueror of Perseus, King of Macedon, in the third Macedonian War (171-168), and was hence called *Macedonicus*. He was the father of Q. Fabius Maximus and of Scipio Africanus Minor, each of whom took from him the name of Aemilianus (see note on xix. 23). See Introd., § 2. His great victory was at Pydna, 168 B.C., and the spoils of his success were so large that from this time forth the war-loan (*tributum*) was never levied in Rome (vi. 15; xxvii. 11).

Persicum Bellum: the famous war (500-479 B.C.) between the Greeks and the Persians. It had three periods: (1) the Ionic Revolt, 500-494 B.C., in which the Persians won a great naval victory at Lade, 496 B.C.; (2) the Marathonian War, in which Militiades and the Athenians repulsed an army and fleet under Datis at Marăthon, 490 B.C.; and (3) the Salaminian War, in which Themistocles directed the famous victory of Sălămis (480 B.C.), Leōnĭdas fell fighting at Thermopylae (480 B.C.), and the united Greek army and fleet won respectively the battles of Plătaea and Mycăle (479 B.C.).

Phĭlus, -i, m. : Lucius Furius Philus. See note on iv. 15 (vi. 15; vii. 41; xix. 22).

Pompeius, -i, m. : (1) Quintus Pompeius (i. 17), once tne friend of Sulpicius; *s. v.* SULPICIUS. (2) Quintus Pompeius, first of the *Gens Pompeia* to attain public office, secured the consulship of 141 B.C. by an underhand trick which lost him the friendship of Scipio Minor. He conducted a campaign against the Spaniards of Numantia with such ill-success that they forced him to make a peace, which he treacherously disowned at the first opportunity (139 B.C.). See xxi. 17, note.

Pyrrhus, -i, m. : Pyrrhus, king of Epīrus, invaded Italy in order to assist the Tarentines against the Romans. He won the battle of

(ii) Lucius Cornelius Scipio, commanded in the war against Antiochus of Syria in 190 B.C., he being elected to that office only because his brother (Scipio i) offered to aid him if he were named consul and commander.

(iii) P. Cornelius Scipio, an invalid and childless.

(iv) P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Minor, adopted son of Scipio iii, and surnamed Aemilianus after his father. See INTRODUCTION, § 2.

(v) P. Cornelius Scipio Nasīca Corcŭlum, father of Scipio vi. Pontifex Maximus, 150 B.C.

(vi) P. Cornelius Scipio Nasīca Serapio, Pontifex Maximus was the first man to commence the riot in which Tib. Gracchus (*q. v.*) lost his life. Popular vengeance made it unsafe for him to remain in Rome, and he was sent to Asia for safety, where he killed himself (see note on xii. 11).

Socrătes, -is, m. : the famous Athenian philosopher, born 469 B.C., was the teacher of Plato, Xenophon, and others. The oracle of Apollo pronounced him to be the wisest man in Greece, although he was constantly saying that he knew nothing. He was put to death by the Athenians, 399 B.C., on a charge of impiety (ii. 16, 44 ; iv. 9).

Sulpicius, -i, m. : (i) **Gaius Sulpicius Galus,** one of the leading men of science in the time of Laelius, and a writer. He was one of the Scipionic circle, and Cicero mentions (ii. 42) the resignation wherewith he bore the loss of his son. See also vi. 15 ; xxvii. 12.

(ii) **Publius Sulpicius Rufus,** quarrelled with his great friend Q. Pompeius and the rest of the party of the nobles, because he went over to the side of the people and proposed a variety of laws in favour of the populace when plebeian tribune, 88 B.C. Riots followed: Sulpicius' friends caused the death of Pompeius' son, and thereupon the nobles secured the death of Sulpicius (i. 16). Cicero says that it was this quarrel first suggested to him the idea of a discussion on friendship.

T.


Tarquinius, -i, m. : L. Tarquinius, surnamed Superbus ("The Arrogant") for his tyranny, the last King of Rome (534-510 B.C.), disregarded the interests of the people, and failed to restrain the wild tempers of his sons. In consequence, among other things, of an outrage committed by his youngest son Sextus, the people revolted and expelled Tarquin, 510 B.C. (viii. 34 ; xv. 13).

Tĕrentius, -i, m. : P. Terentius Afer, the Roman comic poet, born 195 B.C., was originally a Carthaginian slave, but was manumitted by his master, and became a leading member of the literary side of the Scipionic circle. Most of Terence's works were adaptations of the Greek of Menander. He is said to have been assisted in his writings by his two friends and patrons Scipio and Laelius. Only six of his comedies survive, among them being the *Andria* and *Eunuchus.* He died in Greece, 159 B.C. (xxiv. 10 ; xxv. 20). Adjective, **Terentianus, -a, -um,** "of Terence" (xxiv. 19).

Themistocles, -is, m. : the famous Athenian general and statesman,

GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE SCIPIONES, GRACCHI, & AEMILII

(259—123 B.C.).



born 514 B.C. He fought at the battle of Salamis, 480 B.C., but was afterwards banished by the Athenians on a charge of treacherous correspondence with the Persians (471 B.C.). He took refuge with the Persian king Artaxerxes, whom he promised to help in taking vengeance upon the Greeks. He died about 450 B.C. Cicero quotes him as an example of lack of patient patriotism (xii. 28).

Troia, -ae, f.: the famous city of N. W. Asia Minor (Phrygia), capital of the Troad, which for ten years resisted the arms of all Greece under Agamemnon, who sought to recover Helen, wife of his brother Menelaus, whom Paris, a son of Priam of Troy, had carried off. It was fated that Troy could not be taken until the Greeks secured the aid of Philoctētēs' bow. Philoctetes had been cast away on the island of Lemnos, suffering from a horrible and incurable disease, and had sworn that he would never aid the Greeks. Neoptŏlĕmus (or Pyrrhus), son of Achilles, went to him in disguise, and by dint of mingled treachery and persuasion induced him to come to Troy. Neoptolemus himself had been brought up by Lȳcŏmēdēs, King of the isle of Scyros, and there remained until Ulysses sent for him on hearing that only he could prevail upon Philoctētēs to come to Troy (xx. 39).

TEST PAPERS

ON

CICERO, DE AMICITIA.

FIRST SERIES.

TEST PAPER 1. (Ch. 1—4.)

1. Translate:—(*a*) Ch. 2, ll. 11—18, Te autem alio ... iudicatum.
(*b*) Ch. 3, ll. 10—18, Nisi enim ... bella delevit.

2. Parse and give the principal parts of *natus*, *fore*, *evolet*, *disseruit*, *mentiar*, *habetote*, *vixerim*. Distinguish *egeo* and *careo*, *spero* and *opto*, *memini dicere Catonem* and *memini dixisse Catonem*.

3. Write a brief note to explain the following:—(*a*) capitale odium; (*b*) hemicyclium; (*c*) persona; (*d*) nonae proximae; (*e*) vir spectatus; (*f*) patres conscripti; (*g*) toga virilis.

4. Translate:—
(*a*) Hanc esse in te sapientiam existumant ut omnia tua in te posita esse ducas.
(*b*) Quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne "inquam" et "inquit" saepius interponerentur.
(*c*) Idque eo mihi magis est cordi, quod ex omnibus saeculis vix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum.

TEST PAPER 2. (Ch. 5—9.)

1. Translate:—(*a*) Ch. 5, ll. 11—18, Sed hoc primum ... debemus.
(*b*) Ch. 7, ll. 24—31, Qui clamores ... iudicarent.

2. Parse and give the principal parts of the following verbs:—*petatis*, *peperit*, *sublata*, *gignit*, *colare*, *conquiescat*, *vaticinatum*, *dirimi*.

3. Give the meaning of:—(*a*) norma; (*b*) ad vivum resecare; (*c*) caducus; (*d*) in angustum adducere; (*e*) patronus; (*f*) cavea; (*g*) faeneror; (*h*) aequales; (*i*) antiquior causa.

4. Translate:—
(*a*) Agamus igitur pingui, ut aiunt, Minerva.
(*b*) Principio qui potest esse vita vitalis, ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescat?

TEST PAPER 3. (Ch. 10—15.)

1. Translate:—(*a*) Ch. 10, ll. 19—24, Magna etiam ... nollent.
(*b*) Ch. 12, ll. 34—40, Quare talis ... hodie sit.

2. Give the gender and all genitives of *faces*, *menses*, *Fannius*, *hospes*, *supellex*, *quippiam*. Write down the comparative and superlative of *bene*, *multus*, *difficile*, *prope*, *parvus*.

3. Give the principal parts of *auderent*, *profiteri*, *inveterata*, *progredi*, *ignoscerem*, *păret*, *pāret*, *sanciatur*, *incĭderint*, *incīderint*.

4. What is the meaning of:—(*a*) condicio uxoria; (*b*) honoris certamen; (*c*) argutiae; (*d*) muliercula; (*e*) redamare; (*f*) dumtaxat; (*g*) inmunis.

TEST PAPER 4. (Ch. 16—21.)

1. Translate :—(*a*) Ch. 17, ll. 1—8, His igitur ... possit.
(*b*) Ch. 21, ll. 4—10, Erumpunt ... faciunda sit.

2. Write down all genitives of *virus, stirpis, disparia, cicuribus, discidia, genere, genero,* and give the gender of such of them as are substantives. Compare *saepe, diu, vetus, bonus, ferreus.*

3. Parse and give the principal parts of *scitis, norunt, consuevit, diligere, deligere, colent, vixeris, dissuendae.*

4. What is the meaning of :—(*a*) ansa ; (*b*) condimentum ; (*c*) modius ; (*d*) famulatus ; (*e*) pila ; (*f*) meo nomine ; (*g*) operam dare ; (*h*) dissuere.

TEST PAPER 5. (Ch. 22—27.)

1. Translate :—(*a*) Ch. 23, ll. 30—35, Verum ergo ... habuisset.
(*b*) Ch. 24, ll. 16—22, Omni ... vivitur.

2. Give the principal parts of *contrivimus, sinit, adquiescimus, senserim, adgnovit, ecflorescit.* Parse in full :—*ferret, inlusseris, praecipitem, soli, victus.* Compare *benevole, necessarius, libenter, facile, posterus, diu.*

3. Give the meaning of :—(*a*) vendibilis oratio ; (*b*) venditatio ; (*c*) acta agere ; (*d*) fucatus ; (*e*) legem ferre ; (*f*) manus dare ; (*g*) miles gloriosus ; (*h*) praeposteris uti consiliis ; (*i*) implicati ultro et citro.

4. Translate carefully :—

(*a*) Scitum est illud Catonis, ut multa : melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri quam eos amicos qui dulces videantur.

(*b*) Optandum est ut cum aequalibus possis, quibuscum tamquam e carceribus emissus sis, cum isdem ad calcem pervenire.

SECOND SERIES.

TEST PAPER 6. (Ch. 1—4.)

1. Translate :—Ch. 3, ll. 26—36, Quam ob rem ... inferos pervenisse.

2. Translate the following passages and explain the syntax of the words in italics :—

(*a*) Nulla videbatur aptior persona, quae de illa aetate *loqueretur.*
(*b*) Tu *velim* a me animum parumper *avertas.*
(*c*) Non adfuisti, qui diligentissime illud munus *solitus esses* obire.
(*d*) *Triduum* disseruit de republica.

3. State briefly to what the following passages allude :—

(*a*) Nam qui septem appellantur, eos, qui ista subtilius quaerunt, in numero sapientium non habent.
(*b*) Duabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic imperio non modo praesentia verum etiam futura bella delevit.
(*c*) Consulatum petivit numquam, factus consul est bis.

(*d*) Qui Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est iudicatus.

4. Name the speakers in this dialogue, and state very briefly what you know about each.

TEST PAPER 7. (Ch. 5—9.)

1. Translate :—(*a*) Ch. 5, ll. 24—30, Agamus igitur ... ducem.
   (*b*) Ch. 9, ll. 9—15, Quam si qui ... secus est.
2. Translate the following, and explain why the subjunctive mood is used :—
   (*a*) Quis est qui C. Fabrici, M'. Curi non cum caritate memoriam usurpet, quos numquam *viderit?*
   (*b*) Quae domus tam stabilis, quae non odiis funditus *possit* everti?
   (*c*) Haud scio an excepta sapientia nihil melius homini *sit* a dis inmortalibus datum.
3. Explain the allusions in the following extracts, *which are not to be translated :—*
   (*a*) Agrigentinum quidem doctum quendam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura constarent, quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam.
   (*b*) Cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum.
4. State briefly who were Philus, Ennius, Pacuvius, C. Fabricius, M'. Curius, Ti. Coruncanius.

TEST PAPER 8. (Ch. 10—15.)

1. Translate :—Ch. 13, ll. 8—17, Nam quibusdam ... pro pluribus.
2. Translate the following, and explain the allusions :—
   (*a*) At vero Tib. Gracchum sequebantur C. Carbo, C. Cato, et minime tum quidem C. frater nunc idem acerrimus.
   (*b*) Qui cum imperator bello Persico servitute Graeciam liberavisset, propterque invidiam in exilium expulsus esset, ingratae patriae iniuriam non tulit.
   (*c*) Videtis, in tabella iam ante quanta sit facta labes, primo Gabinia lege, biennio autem post Cassia.
3. Explain the syntax of the italicized words in the following :—
   (*a*) Causam adferebat, quod *tanti* Tib. Gracchum *fecisset,* ut, quidquid ille *vellet, sibi* faciendum putaret.
   (*b*) Ne *expectemus* dum *rogemur.*
   (*c*) O praeclaram *sapientiam!*
   (*d*) Benevolentia, *qui* est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus.
4. Translate the following :—
   (*a*) Haud scio an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis.
   (*b*) Serpit deinde res, quae proclivis ad perniciem, cum semel coepit, labitur.

TEST PAPER 9. (Ch. 16—21.)

1. Translate :—(*a*) Ch. 16, ll. 44—50, Quare hoc ... putabat.
(*b*) Ch. 21, ll. 45—51, Quodsi hoc ... natura !

2. Translate carefully :—
(*a*) Est igitur prudentis sustinere ut cursum, sic impetum benevolentiae, quo utamur quasi equis temptatis, sic amicitia ex aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum.
(*b*) Hoc quidem est nimis exigue et exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum.

3. (i.) Write short notes in explanation of the following, ***which are not to be translated*** :—
(*a*) Q. Maximum fratrem tamquam superiorem colebat.
(*b*) Scipio alienatus est a collega nostro Metello.
(*c*) Nec enim Troiam Neoptolemus capere potuisset, si Lycomedem ... iter suum impedientem audire voluisset.

or,

(ii.) Retranslate :—(*a*) "A friend in need is a friend in deed"; (*b*) "Hateful indeed is the class of men who are always casting their good offices in your teeth"; (*c*) "Such friendships should be unstitched rather than rent asunder."

4. (i.) Explain the syntax of :—
(*a*) His *finibus utendum* arbitror.
(*b*) Tantum *cuique* tribuendum quantum ipse efficere *possis*.
(*c*) Neque tu *possis*, quamvis *excellas*, omnes tuos ad honores perducere.

or,

(ii.) Say briefly who were Mummius, P. Rupilius, Q. Pompeius.

TEST PAPER 10. (Ch. 22—27.)

1. Translate :—(*a*) Ch. 25, ll. 29—36, Quibus blanditiis ... repudiata est.
(*b*) Ch. 26, ll. 1—7, Quodsi ... ignores.

2. Write short notes to explain the following :—
(*a*) Cooptatio enim collegiorum ad populi beneficium transferebatur.
(*b*) C. Papirius ... cum ferret legem de tribunis plebis reficiendis.
(*c*) Primus instituit in forum versus agere cum populo.

3. Explain the syntax of the italicized words in the following :—
(*a*) Quis tam ferreus *esset* qui eam vitam ferre *posset*, *cui*que non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo ?
(*b*) Quod amici genus adhibere omnino *levitatis* est.
(*c*) Numquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi, *quod* quidem *senserim*.

4. Write a brief life either (*a*) of Scipio Minor, or (*b*) of Cicero, mentioning any six of the latter's philosophical writings. Add dates in each case.

VOCABULARY.

I.

2. memoriter ...... adv., *by memory.*
   iucunde .... adv., *in a pleasant style.*
4. deductus .... deduco, deduxi, deductum, 3, *to introduce.*
   virili .... virilis, -e, *of manhood.*
5. quoad .... conj., *so far as.*
   latere .... latus, -eris, n., *side.*
6. disputata......... disputo, 1, *to argue.*
7. commode......... adv., *aptly.*
8. studebam ...... studeo, 2, *to be anxious.*
9. contuli............ confero, contuli, collatum, conferre, *to betake.*
10. praestantissi-
    mum... praestantissimus, -a, -um, *most distinguished.*
11. alias .... adv., *at another time.*
12. hemicyclio ...... hemicyclium, -i, n., *fauteuil.*
13. admodum ...... adv., *very.*
14. familiares ...... familiaris, -e, *intimate.*
    incidere .... incĭdo, incĭdi, incāsum, 3, *to fall into.*
15. profecto .... adv., *of a surety.*
16. eo .... adv., *on this account.*
    utebare .... utor, usus, 3, (*to use*), *to be friendly with.*
17. capitali .... capitalis, -e, *deadly.*
18. dissideret......... dissideo, dissedi, dissessum, 2, *to be estranged.*
19. admiratio ...... admiratio, -onis, f., *surprise.*
    querela............ querela, -ae, f., (*complaint*), *disgust.*
21. exposuit .... expono, exposui, expositum, 3, *to set forth.*
    sermonem ...... sermo, onis, m., *conversation.*
25. induxi .... induco, induxi, inductum, 3, *to bring on the boards.*
26. interponeretur . interpono, interposui, interpositum, 3, *to intersperse.*
28. ageres .... ago, egi, actum, 3, *to plead.*
31. prodessem ...... prosum, profui, prodesse, *to benefit.*
33. persona .... persona, -ae, f., (*mask*), *personage.*

36.	accepissemus	accipio, accepi, acceptum, 3, *to receive, learn.*
37.	idonea	idoneus, -a, -um, *fitting.*
38.	dissereret	dissero, disserui, dissertum, 3, *to set forth, expound.*
41.	pacto	pactum, -i, n., (*agreement*), *manner.*
42.	gravitatis	gravitas, -atis, f., *weight.*
	adficior	adficio, adfeci, adfectum, 3, *to influence.*
49.	parumper	adv., *for a little while.*
	avertas	averto, averti, aversum, 3, *to turn from.*

II.

8.	usum	usus, -ūs, m., *experience.*
9.	provisa	provĭdeo, provīdi, provisum, 2, *to foresee.*
10.	ferebantur	fero, tuli, latum, ferre, (*to bear*), *to relate.*
	quasi	conj., *as it were.*
12.	doctrina	doctrina, -ae, f., *learning.*
19.	ducas	duco, duxi, ductum, 3, (*to lead*), *to consider.*
20.	inferiores	inferior, -ius, *of less might.*
21.	item	adv., *as well.*
23.	commentandi	commentor, 1, *to deliberate.*
25.	munus	munus, -eris, n., *duty.*
	obire	obeo, obivi, obĭtum, obire, (*to meet*), *to attend to.*
29.	commoveri	commŏveo, commōvi, commotum, 2, *to affect.*
31.	valetudinem	valetudo, -inis, f., (*health*), *weak health.*
	maestitiam	maestitia, -ae, f., *sorrow.*
34.	usurpavi	usurpo, 1, *to perform regularly.*
36.	officii	officium, -i, n., *duty.*
38.	adgnosco	adgnosco, adgnovi, adgnitum, 3, *to acknowledge.*
	postulo	postulo, 1, *to demand.*
43.	spectato	specto, 1, (*to view*), *to approve.*

III.

1.	desiderio	desiderium, i, n., *regret.*
3.	orbatus	orbo, 1, *to bereave.*
4.	confirmare	confirmo, 1, *to assert confidently.*
6.	angi	ango, anxi, anctum, *or* anxum, 3, *to torment.*
8.	incommodis	incommodum, -i, n., *discomfort.*
10.	actum	ago, egi, actum, 3, (*to do*), passive impersonal, *to fare.*
11.	optare	opto, 1, *to covet.*
	adeptus	adipiscor, adeptus, 3, *to obtain.*
13.	continuo	adv., *forthwith.*
17.	eversis	everto, everti, eversum, 3, *to overthrow.*
18.	delevit	deleo, delevi, deletum, 2, *to extinguish.*
19.	pietate	pietas, -atis, f., *filial affection.*
21.	maerore	maeror, -oris, m., *grief.*
23.	accessio	accessio, -onis, f., *addition.*
25.	aufert	aufero, abstuli, ablatum, auferre, *to take away.*
	viriditatem	viriditas, -atis, f., (*verdancy*), *vigour.*

31. celeberrimos ... celeberrimus, -a, -um, *most festive.*
33. vesperum......... vesper, -eri, m., *evening.*
conscriptis ...... conscribo, conscripsi, conscriptum, 3, *to enroll.*
34. pridie .... adv., *on the day before.*

IV.

2. interire .... intereo, interii, interitum, interire, *to perish.*
4. maiorum .... maiores, -um, m., *ancestors.*
religiosa .... religiosus, -a, -um, *hallowed.*
6. pertinere .... pertineo, 2, *to affect.*
8. institutis......... institutum, -i, n., *principle.*
erudierunt ...... erudio, 4, *to instruct.*
9. oraculo............ oraculum, -i, n., *oracular response.*
12. excessissent...... excedo, excessi, excessum, 3, *to depart.*
patere .... pateo, 2, *to lie open.*
13. expeditissimum. expeditissimus, -a, -um, *most speedy.*
14. praesagiret ...... praesagio, 4, *to have a presentiment.*
16. disseruit .... dissero, disserui, dissertum, 3, *to discourse.*
18. visum .... visum, -i, n., *vision.*
20. evolet .... evolo, 1, *to fly away.*
22. maerere .... maereo, 2, *to sorrow.*
23. invidi .... invidus, -a, -um, *envious.*
26. amisso .... amitto, amisi, amissum, 3, *to lose.*
28. laetabitur ...... laetor, 1, *to be glad.*
30. aequius .... compar. *of* aequus, -a, -um, (*equal*), *fitting.*
31. recordatione ... recordatio, -onis, f., *recollection.*
fruor .... fruor, fructus, 3, *to enjoy.*
34. militia............ militia, -ae, f., *military service.*
35. studiorum ...... studium, -i, n., *zeal,* in plur. *pursuits.*
37. praesertim ...... adv., *especially.*
38. sempiternam ... sempiternus, -a, -um, *eternal.*
39. cordi .... cor, cordis, n., *heart;* cordi esse, *to be dear.*
40. paria .... par, paris, n., *a pair.*
45. quem ad modum conj., *as.*
47. disputaris ...... disputo, 1, *to discourse.*
50. antevortit ...... antevorto, antevorti, antevorsum, 3, *to anticipate.*
51. admodum......... adv., *very.*

V.

1. gravarer .... gravor, 1, (*to feel vexed*), *to be reluctant.*
4. consuetudo ...... consuetudo, -inis, f., *custom.*
6. exercitatione ... exercitatio, -onis, f., *practice.*
8. profitentur ...... profiteor, professus, 2, *to profess.*
10. conveniens ...... conveniens, -entis, *adapted.*
secundas .... secundus, -a, -um, *prosperous.*
12. reseco .... reseco, resecui, resectum, 1, *to cut open.*
13. subtilius .... compar. *of* subtiliter, *with subtlety.*

18. fingunter......... fingo, finxi, fictum, 3, (*to fashion*), *to imagine.*
21. normam .... norma, -ae, f., *standard.*
22. invidiosum ...... invidiosus, -a, -um, *offensive.*
24. pingui .... pinguis, -e, *crass, dull.*
Minerva .... Minerva, -ae, f., (*Minerva*), *wits.*
28. habiti .... habeo, 2, (*to hold*), *to think.*
32. societas .... societas, -atis, f., *social tie.*
33. potiores .... potior, -ius, *of more account.*
peregrini .... peregrinus, -i, m., *foreigner.*
35. peperit............ pario, peperi, partum, 3, *to produce.*
36. praestat .... praesto, praestiti, praestĭtum, *or* praestātum, 1, *to surpass.*
37. sublata............ tollo, sustuli, sublatum, 3, *to remove.*
41. conciliavit ...... concilio, 1, *to knit together.*
42. angustum ...... angustus, -a, -um, *narrow.*
caritas .... caritas, -atis, f., *affection.*

VI.

3. consensio......... consensio, -onis, f., *agreement.*
5. praeponunt...... praepono, praeposui, praepositum, 3, *to prefer.*
valetudinem ... valetudo, -inis, f., *health.*
potentiam ...... potentia, -ae, f., *power.*
6. honores .... honor, -oris, m., *official post.*
beluarum......... belua, -ae, f., *beast.*
7. caduca .... caducus, -a, -um, *fleeting.*
10. continet .... contineo, continui, contentum, 2, *to contain, involve.*
14. metiamur ...... metior, mensus, 4, *to measure.*
habentur......... habeo, 2, *to hold, account.*
18. opportunitates opportunitas, -atis, f., *advantage.*
19. vitalis .... vitalis, -e, *worth living.*
20. conquiescat...... conquiesco, conquievi, conquietum, 3, *to repose.*
21. quicum .... *for* cum quo.
22. fructus .... fructus, -ūs, m., (*fruit*), *profit.*
25. expetuntur ...... expeto, expetivi, expetitum, 3, *to seek after.*
opportunae ...... opportunus, -a, -um, *adapted.*
28. fungare .... fungor, functus, 3, *to perform.*
29. quoquo .... adv., *in whatever direction.*
praesto............ adv., *at hand.*
30. intempestiva ... intempestivus, -a, -um, *out of season.*
36. communicans ... communico, 1, *to share.*

VII.

2. nimirum .... adv., *certainly.*
3. praelucet......... praeluceo, praeluxi, 2, *to shine forth.*
4. intuetur .... intueor, 2, *to look upon.*
5. exemplar .... exemplar, -aris, n., *copy, reflection.*
6. inbecilli .... inbecillus, -a, -um, *feeble.*

8. prosequitur...... prosequor, prosecutus, 3, *to attend.*
9. exemeris .... eximo, exemi, exemptum, 3, *to take out.*
15. discidiis .... discidium, -i, n., *dissension.*
funditus .... adv., *utterly.*
17. carminibus ...... carmen, -inis, n., *poem.*
18. vaticinatum ... vaticinor, 1, *to sing by inspiration.*
19. contrahere ...... contraho, contraxi, contractum, 3, *to unite.*
22. extitit .... exto, extiti, extitum, 1, *to display oneself.*
23. communicandis communico, 1, *to share.*
24. ecferat .... ecfero, extuli, elatum, ecferre, *to extol.*
cavea .... cavea, -ae, f., (*hollow*), *theatre.*
hospitis .... hospes, -itis, c., *guest-friend.*
25. fabula .... fabula, -ae, f., *play.*
27. necaretur......... neco, 1, *to put to death.*
28. stantes .... sto, steti, statum, 1, *to stand.*
32. hactenus .... adv., *thus far.*
34. quaeritote ...... quaero, quaesivi, quaesitum, 3, *to inquire.*
37. filum .... filum, -i, n., *thread, texture.*
40. patronus .... patronus, -i, m., *advocate.*
accuratam ...... accuro 1 *to take pains with, to elaborate.*

VIII.

2. refert .... rēfert, retulit, referre, *it imports.*
3. generorum ...... gener, -eri, m., *son-in-law.*
4. obsistere .... obsisto, obstiti, obstitum, 3, *to resist.*
7. inopiam .... inopia, -ae, f., *poverty.*
9. vicissim .... adv., *in return.*
10. antiquior......... compar. *of* antiquus, -a, -um, (*old*), *venerable.*
12. princeps .... princeps, -ipis, *chief.*
13. utilitates .... utilitas, -atis, f., *advantage.*
percipiuntur ... percipio, percepi, perceptum, 3, *to receive.*
14. observantur ... observo, 1, *to court.*
15. temporis .... tempus, -oris, n., (*time*), *occasion.*
fictum .... fingo, finxi, fictum, 3, *to feign.*
17. indigentia ...... indigentia, -ae, f., *poverty.*
18. adplicatione ... adplicatio, -onis, f., *bent.*
21. animadverti ... animadverto, animadverti, animadversum, 3, *to observe.*
25. dirimi .... dirimo, diremi, diremptum, 3, *to destroy.*
detestabili ...... detestabilis, -e, *horrible.*
26. nacti .... nanciscor, nactus, 3, *to meet with.*
27. congruamus ... congruo, congrui, 3, *to be in harmony.*
29. adliciat .... adlicio, adlexi, adlectum, 3, *to induce.*
33. usurpet .... usurpo, 1, (*to make use of*), *to recall* (*to mind*).
36. decertatum ...... decerto, 1, *to struggle.*

IX.

4. usu .... usus, -ūs, m., (*use*), *friendship.*
5. bonitatem ...... bonitas, -atis, f., *goodness.*
7. consuetudine ... consuetudo, -inis, f., (*custom*), *close intercourse.*
8. adhibitis .... adhibeo, 2, *to add.*
9. exardescit ...... exardesco, exarsi, exarsum, 3, *to blaze up.*
10. inbecillitate ... inbecillitas, -atis, f., *weakness.*
12. generosum ...... generosus, -a, -um, *high-born.*
ortum .... ortus, ūs, m., *birth.*
15. secus............... adv., *otherwise.*
18. expetendis ...... expeto, expetivi, expetitum, 3, *to seek out.*
20. hercule............ interj., *by Hercules, indeed.*
22. moribus .... mos, moris, m., *habit;* pl., *character.*
23. auxit .... augeo, auxi, auctum, 2, *to increase.*
26. exigamus......... exigo, exegi, exactum, 3, *to exact.*
27. faeneramur ...... faeneror, 1, *to lend on interest.*
propensi .... propensus, -a, -um, *inclined to.*
30. pecudum .... pecus, pecŭdis, f., *beast.*
ritu ... . ritus, -ūs, m., *manner.*
32. suspicere .... suspicio, suspexi, suspectum, 3, *to look up to.*
36. significatione ... significatio, -onis, f., *intimation.*
38. usu .... usus, -ūs, m., *society.*
39. fruantur .... fruor, fructus, 3, *to enjoy.*
41. honesta .... honestus, -a, -um, *honourable.*
certatio .... certatio, -onis, f., *rivalry.*
44. conglutinaret ... conglutino, 1, *to cement.*
45. idcirco .... conj., *on this account.*
48. perge .... pergo, perrexi, perrectum, 3, *to continue.*

X.

3. quamquam ...... conj., *and yet.*
5. vel .... *either.*
incidere .... incido, incidi, 3, *to fall out, happen.*
7. alias............... adv., *sometimes.*
ingravescente ... ingravesco, 3, *to grow heavy.*
10. praetexta......... praetexo, praetexui, praetextum, 3, (*to weave at the edge*), *to border.*
11. contentione...... contentio, -onis, f., *rivalry.*
12. condicionis ...... condicio, -onis, f., *marriage alliance.*
13. adipisci .... adipiscor, adeptus, 3, *to secure.*
14. provecti .... proveho, provexi, provectum, 3, *to advance.*
labefactari ...... labefacto, 1, *to shake.*
18. exstitisse......... exsisto, exstiti, exstitum, 3, *to arise.*
19. discidia .... discidium, -i, n., *dissension.*
21. ministri .... minister, -tri, m., *minister.*
23. arguerentur...... arguo, argui, argutum, 3, *to charge with.*
obsequi .... obsequor, obsecutus, 3, *to be compliant, oblige.*

26. querela............ querela, -ae, f., *complaint.*
inveterata ...... invetero, 1, *to make permanent.*
28. inpendere......... inpendeo, 2, *to overhang.*
29. subterfugere ... subterfūgio, subterfūgi, subterfugitum, *to escape*
felicitatis .... felicitas, -atis, f., *good fortune.*

XI.

2. quatenus .... conj., *how far.*
4. adpetentem...... adpeto, adpetivi, adpetitum, 3, *to aim at.*
6. vexantem ...... vexo, 1, *to harass.*
aequalibus ...... aequalis, -e, *contemporary.*
8. Cumanus......... Cumanus, -a, -um, *of Cumae.*
hospes .... hospes, -itis, m., *guest-friend.*
9. consilio .... consilium, -i, n., (*counsel*), *committee of advice.*
13. faces............... fax, facis, f., *torch.*
18. amentia .... amentia, -ae, f., *frenzy*
quaestione ...... quaestio, -onis, f., *court of enquiry.*
21. conciliatrix ...... conciliatrix, -īcis, f., *she that produces.*
26. vitii .... vitium, -i, n., *unsoundness.*
28. communis ...... communis, -e, *ordinary.*
31. familiarem ...... familiaris, -is, m., *an intimate friend.*
una .... adv., *together.*
34. proditum......... prodo, prodidi, proditum, 3, *to hand down.*
37. adtinet............ adtineo, adtinui, adtentum, 2, *to touch, concern.*
38. sanctissimi ...... superl. *of* sanctus, -a, -um, *conscientious, pure.*
39. nefas .... indecl. n., *wrong.*

XII.

1. sanciatur .... sancio, sanxi, sanctum, 4, (*to make sacred*), *to enact.*
5. fateatur .... fateor, fassus, 2, *to avow.*
6. prospicere ...... prospicio, prospexi, prospectum, 3, *to look out beforehand.*
7. deflexit .... deflecto, deflexi, deflexum, 3, *to swerve aside.*
spatio .... spatium, -i, n., *race-course.*
curriculo ...... curriculum, i, n., *course.*
8. occupare .... occupo, 1, *to seize.*
12. queo............... queo, quivi, quitum, quire, *to be able.*
14. sustinuimus ... sustineo, sustinui, sustentum 2, *to bear with.*
15. serpit .... serpo, serpsi, serptum, 3, *to make way gradually*
proclivis .... proclivis, -e, *sloping, swift.*
16. labitur............ labor, lapsus, 3, *to glide.*
tabella .... tabella, -ae, f., *voting ticket.*
17. labes............... labes, -is, f., *corruption.*
21. quorsum .... adv., *to what end?*
22. praecipiendum . praecipio, praecepi, praeceptum, 3, *to instruct.*
24. alligatos .... alligo, 1, *to bind rigidly.*

27. impietatis ...... impietas, -atis, f., *undutifulness.*
30. invidiam .... invidia, -ae, f., *unpopularity.*
31. tulit .... fero, tuli, latum, ferre, *to endure.*
34. conscivit .... conscisco, conscivi, conscitum, 3, (*to resolve upon*), *to inflict.*
35. excusatione...... excusatio, -onis, f., *plea.*
36. vindicanda ...... vindico, 1, *to punish.*

XIII.

2. honesta .... honestus, -a, -um, *honourable.*
3. exspectemus ... exspecto, 1, *to await.*
6. auctoritas ...... auctoritas, -atis, f., *authority.*
10. persequantur ... persequor, persecutus, 3, *to follow up, ride to death.*
argutiis .... argutiae, -arum, f., *subtleties.*
13. implicari .... implico, 1, *to involve.*
14. laxissimas ...... superl. *of* laxus, -a, -um, *slack.*
habenas .... habena, -ae, f., *rein.*
adducas .... adduco, adduxi, adductum, 3, *to draw tight.*
15. caput .... caput, -itis, n., (*head*), *the principal thing.*
16. securitatem ...... securitas, -atis, f., *freedom of care.*
17. parturiat .... parturio, 4, *to be in labour.*
18. inhumanius...... compar. *of* inhumane, *brutally.*
locum .... locus, -i, m., *topic.*
19. perstrinxi ...... perstringo, perstrinxi, perstrictum, 3, *to touch upon.*
adiumenti ...... adiumentum, -i, n., *assistance.*
22. mulierculae...... muliercula, -ae, f., *a weak woman.*
28. blanda .... blandus, -a, -um, *seductive.*
reapse .... adv., *in reality.*
29. consentaneum... consentaneus, -a, -um, *agreeing, becoming.*
30. actionem .... actio, -onis, f., (*pleading*), *course of action.*
33. malitiam .... malitia, -ae, f., *ill-wish.*
40. funditus .... adv., *utterly.*
43. truncum .... truncus, -i, m., *log.*
46. tenera .... tener, -era, -erum, *gentle.*
48. angor .... angor, -oris, m., *anxiety.*
49. tollat .... tollo, sustuli, sublatum, 3, *to remove.*

XIV.

1. contrahat......... contraho, contraxi, contractum, 3, *to contract.*
2. significatio ...... significatio, -onis, f., *sign.*
eluceat .... eluceo, eluxi, 2, *to shine forth.*
4. absurdum ...... absurdus, -a, -um, *unreasonable.*
6. vestitu .... vestitus, -ūs, m., *clothing.*
animante......... animans, -ntis, m., f. *or* n., *living creature.*
praedito .... praeditus, -a, -um, *endowed.*

7. redamare .... redamo, 1, *to love back.*
admodum ...... adv., (*in full measure*), *exceedingly.*
9. vicissitudine ... vicissitudo, -inis, f., *reciprocity.*
13. adsciscant ...... adscisco, adscivi, adscitum, 3, *to adopt, attach to.*
14. appetentius ..... compar. *of* appetens, -ntis, *eager.*
16. constet............ consto, constiti, constatum, 1, *to hold good.*
20. inmunis .... inmunis, -e, *unserviceable.*
21. tueri .... tueor, 2, *to protect.*
24. nodum .... nodus, -i, m., (*knot*), *bond.*
25. parta .... pario, peperi, partum, 3, (*to produce*), *to obtain.*
27. studio .... studium, i, n., (*zeal*), *affection.*
30. indigeant......... indigeo, 2, *to be in need of.*

XV.

1. deliciis .... deliciae, -arum, f., *luxury.*
diffluentes ...... diffluo, 3, (*to dissolve*), *to be dissolute.*
2. quando .... indef. adv., *at any time.*
3. pro .... interj., *O.*
7. nimirum .... conj., *of course.*
8. fiducia .... fiducia, -ae, f., *reliance.*
11. coluntur .... colo, colui, cultum, 3, (*to cultivate*), *to court.*
dumtaxat ...... adv., *at least.*
12. ceciderunt ...... cado, cecĭdi, casum, 3, *to fall.*
14. exulantem ...... exulo, 1, *to be in exile.*
16. quamquam ...... conj., *and yet.*
inportunitate ... inportunitas, -atis, f., *perversity.*
19. praepotentium praepotens, -ntis, *very powerful.*
22. efferuntur ...... effero, extuli, elatum, efferre, *to be carried away.*
insipiente ...... insipiens, -ntis, *foolish.*
24. commodis ...... commodus, -a, -um, *obliging.*
27. facultatibus...... facultas, -atis, f., *resources.*
28. famulos .... famulus, -i, m., *slave.*
29. egregiam .... egregius, -a, -um, *fine.*
30. supellectilem ... supellex, supellectilis, f., *furniture.*
36. hactenus .... adv., *thus far.*

XVI.

1. constituendi ... constituo, constitui, constitutum, 3, *to determine.*
2. termini .... terminus, -i, m., *bound.*
3. ferri .... fero, tuli, latum, ferre, (*to bear*), *to express.*
4. adfecti .... adficio, adfeci, adfectum, 3, (*to affect*), pass., *to feel.*
8. prorsus............ adv., *absolutely.*
10. animatus .... animatus, -a, -um, *minded.*
12. invehi .... inveho, invexi, invectum, 3, (*to carry against*), pass., *to inveigh against.*
insectari .... insector, 1, *to rail.*
15. detrahunt ...... detraho, detraxi, detractum, 3, *to subtract.*
17. definit .... definio, 4, *to limit.*
18. exiliter............ adv., *narrowly.*

19.	calculos	calculus, -i, m., (*pebble*), *counter.*
	ratio...............	ratio, -onis, f., *account.*
	acceptorum	accipio, accepi, acceptum, 3, *to receive.*
21.	restricte	adv., *narrowly.*
24.	congeratur	congero, congessi, congestum, 3, *to heap up.*
	finis	finis, -is, m., *limit.*
	deterrumus	deterrumus, -a, -um, *worst.*
26.	abiectior	compar. *of* abiectus, -a, -um (abicio), *abject, crushed.*
28.	eniti	enitor, enisus, *or* enixus, 3, *to strive.*
34.	osurus	odi, odisse, *to hate.*
35.	quem ad modum	conj., *as.*
37.	impuri	impurus, -a, -um, *low.*
	ambitiosi	ambitiosus, -a, -um, *designing.*
40.	quin	conj., *nay.*
41.	quo	conj., *in order that.*
42.	ansas	ansa, -ae, f., *handle.*
	rursum............	adv., *again, on the other hand.*
43.	angi	ango, anxi, anctum, 3, *to vex.*
45.	tollendam	tollo, sustuli, sublatum, 3, *to abolish.*

XVII.

2.	emendati	emendo, 1, *to free from faults.*
4.	qua	quis, qua, quid, *any.*
6.	caput	caput, capitis, n., (*head*), *civil status.*
	declinandum ...	declino, 1, *to deviate.*
7.	quatenus	conj., *up to which.*
8.	venia	venia, -ae, f., *indulgence.*
9.	telum	telum, -i, n., *weapon.*
10.	colligere	colligo, collegi, collectum, 3, *to acquire.*
14.	capras	capra, -ae, f., *she-goat.*
15.	quot	conj., *how many.*
16.	adhibere	adhibere, 2, *to apply, exercise.*
20.	expertum.........	experior, expertus, 4, *to make trial.*
23.	impetum	impetus, -ūs, m., *impulse.*
24.	temptatis.........	tempto, 1, *to make trial of.*
25.	periclitatis	periclitor, 1, *to test.*
29.	sordidum.........	sordidus, -a, -um, *mean.*
30.	imperia	imperium, -i, n., *military command.*
	potestates	potestas, -atis, f., *civil authority.*
32.	ius	ius, iuris, n., (*rights*), *claims.*
37.	re publica	res publica, f., *public matters.*
	versantur.........	versor, 1, *to be engaged in.*
39.	calamitatum ...	calamitas, -atis, f., *misfortune.*
40.	societates.........	societas, -atis, f., *association.*
	descendant	descendo, descendi, descensum, 3, *to bring one-self down to.*
42.	convincunt	convinco, convici, convictum, 3, *to convict.*
45.	praestiterit	praesto, praestiti, praestitum *or* praestatum, 1, *to show, afford.*

XVIII.

1. firmamentum ... firmamentum, -i, n., *foundation.*
2. fides .... fides, -is, f., *loyalty.*
3. simplicem ...... simplex, -icis, *frank.*
4. communem...... communis, -e, *sociable.*
5. par .... par, paris, (*equal*), *right.*
6. multiplex ...... multiplex, -icis, (*manifold*), *deceitful.*
tortuosum ...... tortuosus, -a, -um, *tortuous.*
9. criminibus ...... crimen, -inis, n., *charge.*
11. dudum............ adv., *for some time.*
15. fronte .... frons, -ntis, f., (*brow*), *appearance.*
16. occultare .... occulto, 1, *to conceal.*
19. accedat .... accedo, accessi, accessum, 3, *to join on.*
20. condimentum ... condimentum, -i, n., *seasoning.*

XIX.

1. quaestio .... quaestio, -onis, f., *inquiry.*
2. subdifficilis ...... subdifficilis, -e, *of some difficulty.*
3. vetulis .... vetulus, -a, -um, *oldish.*
8. modios............ modius, -i, m., *bushel.*
edendos .... ĕdo, ēdi, esum, 3, *to eat.*
expletum......... expleo, explevi, expletum, 2, *to perform fully.*
12. consuetudinis ... consuetudo, -inis, f., *familiarity.*
15. intractato......... intractatus, -a, -um, (*unhandled*), *unbroken.*
16. inanima .... inanimus, -a, -um, *inanimate.*
17. montuosis ...... montuosus, -a, -um, *mountainous.*
silvestribus ...... silvestris, -e, *woody.*
24. nequaquam...... adv., *by no means.*
25. colebat............ cólo, colui, cultum, 3, (*to cultivate*), *to honour.*
26. ampliores ...... compar. of amplus, -a, -um, *dignified.*
27. praestantiam ... praestantia, -ae, f., *pre-eminence.*
28. inpertiant ...... inpertio, 4, *to communicate.*
33. stirpis .... stirps, -pis, f., *stock, race.*
famulatu......... famulatus, -ūs, m., *servitude.*
37. fructus............ fructus, -ūs, m., *fruit.*
39. confertur......... confero, contuli, collatum, conferre, *to confer.*

XX.

2. necessitudine ... necessitudo, -inis, f., *connection.*
5. queruntur ...... queror, questus, 3, *to complain.*
exprobrant ...... exprobro, 1, *to upbraid.*
6. officiose .... adv., *dutifully.*
8. officia .... officium, -i, n., *kind office.*
9. commemorare ... commemoro, 1, *to recall.*
11. summittere ...... summitto, summisi, summissum, 3, *to humble.*
14. fere .... adv., *as a rule.*

16. levandi .... levo, 1, *to relieve.*
18. sustinere .... sustineo, sustinui, sustentum, 2, *to bear.*
22. deferre............ defero, detuli, delatum, deferre *to confer.*
24. conroboratis ... conroboro, 1, *to strengthen.*
26. venandi .... vēnor, 1, *to hunt.*
    pilae............... pĭla, -ae, f., *ball.*
    necessarios ...... necessarius, -i, m., *intimate friend.*
28. paedagogi ...... paedagogus, -i, m., *slave-attendant.*
32. studia .... studium, -i, n., *taste.*
35. distantia .... distantia, -ae, f., *divergence.*
36. praecipi .... praecipio, praecepi, praeceptum, 3, *to teach, lay down as a principle.*
37. intemperata...... intemperatus, -a, -um, *ill-regulated.*
39. fabulas............ fabula, -ae, f., *myth.*
43. desiderium ...... desiderium, -i, n., *craving, sense of loss.*
45. iustus .... iustus, -a, -um, *considerate.*
46. patiare .... patior, passus, 3, *to allow.*

XXI.

1. dimittendis ...... dimitto, dimisi, dimissum, 3, *to break off.*
3. delabitur .... delabor, delapsus, 3, *to sink.*
4. erumpunt ...... erumpo, erupi, eruptum, 3, *to break out.*
5. redundet .... redundo, 1, *to flow back.*
6. remissione ...... remissio, -onis, f., *abatement.*
    usus .... usus, -ūs, m., *familiarity.*
    eluendae .... eluo, elui, elutum, 3, *to dissolve.*
7. dissuendae ...... dissuo, dissutum, 3, *to unstitch, unravel.*
    discindendae ... discindo, discidi, discissum, 3, *to rend.*
8. admodum ...... adv., *exceedingly.*
14. communibus ... communis, -e, *ordinary.*
21. acerba .... acerbus, -a, -um, *bitter.*
22. discidia .... discidium, -i, n., *rupture.*
23. oppressae......... opprimo, oppressi, oppressum, 3, *to crush.*
25. iurgia .... iurgium, -i, n., *quarrel.*
30. cautio .... cautio, -onis, f., *safeguard.*
    provisio .... provisio, -onis, f., *precaution.*
36. norunt .... =noverunt, *from* nosco, novi, notum, 3, *to learn.*
    fructuosum ...... fructuosus, -a, -um, *profitable.*
37. potissimum ...... adv., *most of all.*
39. expetita .... expeto, expetivi, expetitum, 3, *to desire.*
42. mercedem ...... merces, -edis, f., *reward.*
43. idem .... īdem, eadem, ĭdem, (*the same*), *self.*
45. apparet .... appareo, 2, *to be manifest.*
46. volucribus ...... volucer, -cris, -cre, *flying.*
    nantibus .... no, 1, *to swim.*
    cicuribus......... cicur, -ŭris, *tame.*
    feris .... ferus, -a, -um, *wild.*

47. animante......... animans, -ntis, m., f., or n., *living creature.*
49. adplicent......... adplico, adplicavi *or* adplicui, adplicatum *or* adplicitum, 1, *to attach.*
52. anquirit .... anquiro, anquisivi, anquisitum, 3, *to search after.*

XXII.

3. desiderant ...... desidero, 1, (*to miss*), *to expect.*
4. par .... par, paris, (*equal*), *fair.*
6. dudum............ adv., *for some time.*
tractamus ...... tracto, 1, (*to handle*), *to discourse about.*
10. honestum ...... honestus, -a, -um, *honourable.*
11. colent .... colo, colui, cultum, 3, (*to cultivate*), *to regard.*
12. verebuntur ...... vereor, 2, (*to fear*), *to respect.*
13. verecundiam ... verecundia, -ae, f., *respect.*
15. patere .... pateo, 2, *to lie open.*
21. comitatus ...... comitatus, -ūs, m., *companionship.*
22. societas .... societas, -atis, f., *association.*
23. honestas .... honestas, -atis, f., *honour.*
27. consequi .... consequor, consecutus, 3, *to attain to.*
29. experiri .... experior, expertus, 4, *to make trial of.*
cogit .... cogo, coegi, coactum, 3, *to constrain.*
30. quocirca .... conj., *wherefore.*
32. plectimur ...... plecto, 3, (*to strike*), *to punish.*
33. praeposteris ... praeposterus, -a, -um, *inverted.*
35. ultro............... adv., *to the other side.*
citro............... adv., *to this side.*
37. disrumpimus ... disrumpo, disrupi, disruptum, 3, *to break asunder.*

XXIII.

1. vituperanda ... vitupero, 1, *to blame.*
2. incuria............ incuria, -ae, f., *carelessness.*
5. venditatio ...... venditatio, -onis, f., *fraud.*
6. victus .... victus, -ūs, m., *fare.*
7. cultus .... cultus, -ūs, m., *living.*
14. otiosi .... otiosus, -a, -um, *without public duties.*
16. liberaliter ...... adv., *like a free man.*
serpit .... serpo, serpsi, serptum, 3, *to insinuate.*
17. degendae .... dego, degi, 3, *to pass* (*life*).
18. rationem .... ratio, -onis, f., (*reckoning*), *method.*
19. inmanitate ...... inmanitas, -atis, f., *fierceness.*
22. evomat............ evomo, evomui, evomitum, 3, *to disgorge.*
virus .... virus, -i, n., *venom.*
24. frequentia ...... frequentia, -ae, f., *throng.*
25. uspiam............ adv., *anywhere.*
suppeditans ... suppedito, 1, *to supply.*
27. potestatem ...... potestas, -atis, f., *opportunity.*
34. insuavem......... insuavis, -e, *without pleasure.*

37. adminiculum ... adminiculum, -i, n., *prop.*
adnititur .... adnitor, adnisus, *or* adnixus, 3, *to lean upon.*

XXIV.

2. obsurdescimus .. obsurdesco, obsurdui, 3, *to become deaf.*
4. multiplex ...... multiplex, -ĭcis, *manifold.*
6. elevare .... elevo, 1, *to make light of.*
subeunda .... subeo, subii, subitum, subire, *to undergo.*
8. obiurgandi ...... obiurgo, 1, *to reprove.*
10. familiaris .... familiaris, -is, m., *friend.*
11. obsequium ...... obsequium, -i, n., *flattery.*
parit .... pario, peperi, partum, 3, *to produce.*
13. venenum .... venenum, -i, n., *bane.*
17. ratio .... ratio, -onis, f., *carefulness.*
19. comitas .... comitas, -atis, f., *courtesy.*
adsentatio ...... adsentatio, -onis, f., *flattery.*
20. adiutrix .... adiutrix, -icis, f., *handmaid.*
procul .... adv., *far away.*
24. scitum .... scitus, -a, -um (scisco), *shrewd.*
27. absurdum ...... absurdus, -a, -um, *absurd.*
29. vacare .... vaco, 1, *to be free from.*
anguntur .... ango, anxi, anctum, 3, *to distress.*
31. delicto .... delictum, -i, n., *fault.*

XXV.

3. repugnanter ... adv., *with repugnance.*
4. pestem .... pestis, -is, f., *plague.*
5. blanditiam ...... blanditia, -ae, f., *fawning.*
6. notandum ...... noto, 1, *to brand.*
9. adulterat .... adultero, 1, *to adulterate.*
12. qui .... adv., *how.*
15. flexibile .... flexibilis, -e, *pliable.*
devium .... devius, -a, -um, *unreasonable.*
17. nutum .... nutus, -ūs, m., *nod.*
20. persona .... persona, -ae, f., (*mask*), *character*
21. adhibere .... adhibeo, adhibui, adhibitum, 2, *to attach.*
23. vanitatem ...... vanitas, -atis, f., *worthlessness.*
24. secerni .... secerno, secrevi, secretum, 3, *to distinguish.*
25. internosci ...... internosco, internovi, internotum, 3, *to discern.*
fucata .... fuco, 1, *to dye.*
26. sinceris .... sincerus, -a, -um, *genuine.*
contio .... contio, -onis, f., *public meeting.*
27. constat .... consto, constiti, constatum, 1, *to be constituted.*
30. nuper .... adv., *lately.*
ferret .... fero, tuli, latum, ferre, (*to bear*), *to propose.*
31. reficiendis ...... reficio, refeci, refectum, 3, *to re-elect.*
33. gravitas .... gravitas, -atis, f., *dignity.*

39. cooptatio .... cooptatio, -onis, f., *the right of a college to fill its own vacancies.*
40. instituit .... instituo, institui, institutum, 3, *to start.*
versus .... adv., *towards.*
41. vendibilem ...... vendibilis, -e, (*saleable*), *specious.*
42. religio .... religio, -onis, f., *reverence.*
43. quinquennio ... quinquennium, -i, n., *a space of five years.*
44. re .... res, rei, f., (*fact*), *merits of the case.*

XXVI.

1. scaena .... scaena, -ae, f., *stage.*
2. adumbratis ...... adumbro, 1, (*to sketch*), *to misrepresent.*
3. patefactum ...... patefacio, patefeci, patefactum, 3, *to set forth openly.*
inlustratum ... inlustro, 1, *to bring into full light.*
4. perpenditur...... perpendo, perpendi, perpensum, 3, (*to weigh carefully*), pass., *to depend on.*
14. opinione .... opinio, -onis, f., *belief.*
15. praediti .... praeditus, -a, -um, *endowed.*
19. mentiendum ... mentior, 4, *to lie.*
20. parasitorum...... parasitus, -i, m., *parasite.*
faceta .... facetus, -a, -um, *humorous.*
21. gloriosi............ gloriosus, -a, -um, *braggart.*
26. blanda .... blandus, -a, -um, *soothing.*
adlectant .... adlecto, 1, *to court.*
28. animadvertant animadverto, animadverti, animadversum, 3, *to take care.*
30. callidus .... callidus, -a, -um, *clever.*
admodum ...... adv., *quite.*
excors .... excors, -dis, *devoid of sense.*
31. cavendum ...... caveo, cavi, cautum, 2, *to beware.*
adgnoscitur...... adgnosco, adgnovi, adgnĭtum, 3, *to recognize.*
32. litigare............ litigo, 1, *to take the other side.*
34. inlusus............ inludo, inlusi, inlusum, 3, *to ridicule.*
38. versaris .... versor, 1, *to turn.*
inlusseris......... archaic for inluseris, inludo, inlusi, inlusum, 3, *to befool.*
lautissume ...... adv., *most splendidly.*

XXVII.

2. conciliat .... concilio, 1, *to unite.*
3. convenientia ... convenientia, -ae, f., *harmony.*
6. exardescit ...... exardesco, exarsi, exarsum, 3, *to be kindled.*
9. indigentia ...... indigentia, -ae, f., *need.*
10. ecflorescit ...... ecfloresco, ecflorui, 3, *to blossom forth.*
14. elucet .... eluceo, eluxi, 2, *to flash out.*
aequales .... aequalis, -e, *of the same generation.*
16. adquiescimus ... adquiesco, adquievi, adquietum, 3, *to rest.*

17. equidem .... adv., *indeed.*
18. ratio .... ratio, -onis, f., *plan.*
19. comparata ...... comparo, 1, *to arrange.*
21. carceribus ...... carcer, -eris, m., *pen, prison;* pl., *starting-point of a race.*
22. calcem .... calx, calcis, f., (*lime, chalk*), *goal.*
23. caducae .... caducus, -a, -um, (*falling*), *perishable.*
24. anquirendi ...... anquiro, anquisivi, anquisitum, 3, *to seek after.*
27. ereptus............ eripio, eripui, ereptum, 3, *to snatch away.*
30. posteris .... posterus, -a, -um, *one to come after.*
32. imaginem ...... imago, -inis, f., (*image*), *impression.*
36. oblectationis ... oblectatio, -onis, f., *delight.*
39. victus .... victus, -ūs, m., *style of living.*
40. peregrinationes peregrinatio, -onis, f., *travelling.*
rusticationes ... rusticatio, -onis, f., *sojourn in the country.*
41. studiis .... studium, -i, n., *pursuit.*
42. otiosum .... otiosus, -a, -um, *free from public business.*
43. contrivimus ... contero, contrivi, contritum, 3, (*to wear away*), *to spend.*
recordatio ...... recordatio, -onis, f., *recollection.*
44. desiderium ..... desiderium, -i, n., *sense of loss.*
46. aluntur .... alo, alui, alitum *or* altum, 3, *to nourish, strengthen.*
47. orbatus .... orbo, 1, *to deprive.*
48. aetas............... aetas, -atis, 1, *time of life.*
diutius............ adv., *too long.*
52. locetis .... loco, 1, *to put in a position.*

CICERO
DE AMICITIA

A TRANSLATION

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CICERO DE AMICITIA.

A TRANSLATION.

I.—1. QUINTUS Mucius Scaevola, the Augur, used to relate many a tale about Gaius Laelius, his father-in-law, with perfect memory and in a pleasant style, nor did he hesitate whenever he spoke to call him Wise. Now I, on assuming the dress of manhood, had been introduced to Scaevola by my father with the idea that, so far as I could and it was permitted me, I should never quit the old man's side. And so I used to commit to memory many able arguments, and many terse and pointed sayings of his, and I was all on fire to become, by his skill, more learned in the law. And when he died, I betook myself to Scaevola the Pontifex, who I venture to say was beyond doubt the man in our state most distinguished for ability and justice. But I will speak of him another time; I now resume my remarks about the Augur.

2. I remember much that he said on many occasions, but especially that once, when he was at home sitting according to his wont upon a *fauteuil*, myself and a very few intimate friends being with him, he fell into a discourse on a subject which happened at that time to be on many people's lips. For of a surety, Atticus, you remember, and remember all the more vividly because you were a close friend of Publius Sulpicius, how deep was men's surprise and disgust when he, as tribune of the people, was estranged by a deadly feud from the then consul, Quintus Pompeius, a man with whom he had lived in the strongest bonds of affection.

3. And so at that time, since Scaevola had chanced to mention that very occurrence, he set forth to us that discourse concerning friendship which Laelius had held with him and his other son-in-law, Gaius Fannius, the son of Marcus Fannius, a few days after the death of the younger Africanus. I committed to memory the chief opinions maintained in that conversation, and I have set them forth in this book in my own way; for I have brought upon the boards the very men themselves, so to speak, in order that the words 'say I' and 'says he' might not be scattered too thickly, and that the discussion might seem to be held as it were by men present face to face.

4. For since you often pleaded with me to write something about Friendship, the subject seemed to me worthy alike of the consideration of all and our own friendship in particular. Therefore I have taken pains—no unwilling task—to benefit many at your request. But, just as in the "Cato Major," which I dedicated to you, on the subject of Old Age, I introduced Cato discussing it in his old age, because no personage appeared to me more fit to speak of that time of life than he, who had not only been an old man for a very long time, but had also even in his old age outstripped other men in prosperity; so, since we had learned from our fathers that the friendship of Gaius Laelius and Publius Scipio was especially proverbial, the personage of Laelius seemed to me a proper one to set forth those very points about friendship which Scaevola had called to mind as having been discussed by him. Now this kind of discourse seems in some strange way to have more weight, if it rests on the authority of men of old, particularly such as are famous; and so, when I myself am reading my own writings, a feeling at times comes over me, that I imagine Cato, and not myself, to be speaking.

5. And just as in the De Senectute I as an old man wrote to an old man on the subject of old age, so in this volume I, the sincerest of friends, have written to a friend about friendship. In my former book the spokesman was Cato, than whom there was hardly anybody of greater age in those days and none wiser; while in this treatise Laelius, who was both wise (for so he was esteemed) and dis-

tinguished for the celebrity of his friendship, shall speak about friendship. I should like you for a little while to turn your attention from me, and fancy Laelius himself to be speaking Gaius Fannius and Quintus Mucius come to their father-in-law after the death of Africanus; the conversation is opened by them and Laelius replies. To him belongs the whole of this discourse about friendship, and while reading it you will recognize your own portrait.

II.—6. FANNIUS. Quite true, Laelius; a better man or a greater than Africanus never lived. But you ought to consider that the eyes of all are turned upon you, and men both style and think you wise. This title was a little while since bestowed upon Marcus Cato, and we know that Lucius Acilius was in the time of our fathers called "the Wise." Each however was so styled in a somewhat different manner: Acilius was "the Wise" because he was reputed to be skilled in civil law; Cato, because he had experience in many things. Many stories used to be related of his wise foresight, his resolute action, and his shrewd answers, alike in the senate and in the forum; and therefore by the time he reached old age he had already acquired the surname, so to speak, of "the Wise."

7. You however we know to be wise after another fashion; you are wise, not only by nature and character, but also by your industry and learning; "wise," not in the sense in which the common crowd but the learned are wont to call a man "wise." Such an one, we have heard, there was not in the rest of Greece; for those who enquire into these matters with more than usual exactness do not include those who are termed the Seven in the class of "wise" men; while at Athens there was one only, and he indeed adjudged by the oracle of Apollo to be wisest of all. Men think such wisdom to be in you, that you hold all your happiness to rest upon yourself, and regard the chances of man's life as of less might than virtue. Therefore they enquire of me, and I believe of Scaevola here as well, in what manner you bear the death of Africanus; and the more so, because on these last Nones when we had come, as is our custom, into the pleasure grounds of Decimus Brutus the Augur for the purpose of practising our art, you were not present, though

you had always been accustomed to pay the most careful attention to that day and that duty.

8. Scaevola. Many people do indeed enquire, Gaius Laelius, as Fannius has said; but I reply to them just what I have observed—that you bear with resignation the grief you have suffered by reason of the death of a man who was not only very great, but your dearest friend; that you could not fail to be affected, nor was such insensibility possible to your gentle disposition; and as to the fact that you were not present on these last Nones at the meeting of our college, your weak health and not your sorrow was the cause.

Laelius. You answer indeed aright, Scaevola, and truly: for I had no right to withdraw through any trouble of my own from that duty, which I have always performed regularly when I was well, nor do I think it can happen by any chance to a man of principle, that he should neglect a duty.

9. Now you, Fannius, speak as a friend when you say that so much is ascribed to me by people—such a tribute I neither acknowledge nor demand; but, in my opinion, you do not judge rightly concerning Cato. For either he was a wise man, or else no one was ever wise—the alternative to which I rather incline. To omit other circumstances, with what firmness did he endure his son's death! Now I remembered Paulus, and I had seen Galus; but the sons they lamented were mere children, whereas Cato's grief was aroused by the death of a full grown and distinguished man.

10. Wherefore be not hasty to prefer to Cato even that man himself whom Apollo, as you say, judged to be wisest of all; for men praise Socrates' words, but Cato's deeds. Of myself however, to speak now with both of you, form your opinion thus.

III. Were I to deny that I feel the loss of Scipio, how far I should do so aright I must leave the wise to judge; it would certainly be a lie. For I am sore grieved at being bereft of a friend, the like of whom, as I think, there never will be again—the like of whom, as I can confidently assert, there never was before. But I have no

need of a remedy; I console myself, and especially with the comforting thought, that I am free from the delusion wherewith on the decease of friends most men are wont to be tormented. No misfortune, I think, has happened to Scipio; misfortune, if it has happened at all, has fallen upon me; but to be grievously tormented by one's own discomforts is characteristic of one who loves not his friend but himself.

11. Who however would deny that Scipio's career was most glorious? For unless he chose to covet immortality, —a desire which never entered his mind—what of all it is lawful for a man to desire did he fail of obtaining? As a youth, he forthwith by his marvellous merit surpassed the lofty hopes which his fellow-countrymen had already conceived of him when he was but a boy. He was never a candidate for the consulship, yet was made consul twice; on the first occasion before the legal age, on the second, as regards himself at a fitting age, but as regards the commonwealth almost too late. Two cities most hostile to this empire did he overthrow, and thus extinguished not only present but also future wars. What can I say of his courtesy, his affection towards his mother, his generosity to his sisters, his kindness towards his relatives, his justice towards all? They are well known to you. Moreover how beloved he was by the state, men showed by their grief at his funeral. How then could a few years more have benefited him? For although old age is not a burden, as I remember Cato explained to Scipio and myself the year before he died, nevertheless it takes away that vigour which was still Scipio's.

12. Wherefore his life indeed was such in respect of both fortune and fame, that nothing could be added to it, while the suddenness of his death took away the consciousness of dying. Concerning a death of this nature it is difficult to make any positive assertion, but you are aware what men suspect. We may however make this one statement with truth, that out of the many days, full of the greatest festivity and joy, which he saw in his lifetime, that day was the most glorious, when, after the senate had broken up, he was escorted home at eventide by the

conscript fathers, the Roman people, the allies and Latins. That was the day before he died. From so high a position of dignity, he seems rather to have reached a place among those above, that is the gods, than those below.

IV.—13. I do not agree with those who have of late begun to argue, that the soul perishes with the body, and that everything is blotted out by death. I am more influenced by the authority of the ancients, whether they be our own forefathers, who paid to the dead the most ceremonious rites, which assuredly they would not have done if they had thought that nothing affected them; or whether they be those who once dwelt in this land, and by their principles and maxims instructed Magna Graecia, which now indeed is destroyed, but was then flourishing; or whether it be the man who was judged by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of all. On this subject, he was not wont to teach first this doctrine and then that, as he did on most points, but was always true to one opinion; the souls of men, he believed, came from God, and when they had departed from the body, a return to heaven lay open to them, all the speedier in proportion as a man was more virtuous and just.

14. Scipio too believed this, and, just as though he had a presentiment, a few days before his death, when Philus and Manilius were present and several others, and you also, Scaevola, had come with me, he discoursed for three days concerning the Commonwealth; and the end of this discussion chiefly dealt with the immortality of souls, things which he said he had learnt in his sleep from the elder Africanus through a vision. If it is the case that the souls of all the best men most easily escape in death from the prison-house, so to speak, and bonds of the body, to whom can we think that the passage to the gods was easier than to Scipio? Wherefore to sorrow for the fate that has befallen him would, I fear, be more like one who envied him than a friend. But if that other opinion is more true, that the same destruction involves soul and body, and no consciousness remains, though there is nothing good in death, yet is there nothing evil. For when consciousness has been lost, it is with a man as

though he had not been born at all; still, for the fact that he was born both we rejoice, and this State, so long as it shall last, will be glad.

15. Therefore, as I said above, the fates have been most propitious to him, to me less kind; for it had been more fitting that I who entered life first should quit it first. Still I enjoy the recollection of our friendship so keenly that my life seems to have been a happy one, because it was passed with Scipio. He shared my cares about public and private matters alike; with him I spent my life at home and in the army, and—a circumstance wherein lies the whole strength of friendship—we had the most profound agreement in wishes, pursuits, and opinions. Therefore it is not so much my reputation for wisdom, which Fannius mentioned just now, that delights me, especially as it is unfounded, as that I hope the recollection of our friendship will last for ever; and I have this the more at heart, since from time immemorial hardly three or four pairs of friends are mentioned, and in this class I think I may hope that the friendship of Scipio and Laelius will be known to posterity.

16. Fannius. Your hope, Laelius, will certainly come to pass. But since you have made mention of friendship, and we are at leisure, you will confer a great favour on me, and I hope on Scaevola as well, if, in the same way as you are wont to reply about other matters when questions are asked of you, you will discourse about friendship, and tell us what you think of it, of what nature you conceive it to be, and what maxims you would lay down with regard to it.

Scaevola. It will indeed be agreeable to me, and I was essaying to make that very request of you, when Fannius anticipated me. Therefore you will confer a great favour on both of us.

V.—17. Laelius. I should raise no objection to doing so, if I felt equal to the task: for the subject is a splendid one, and, as Fannius has said, we are at leisure. But who am I, and what special aptitude have I for the task? It is the custom of philosophers, and that too of Greek philosophers, to have a subject set before them about which to argue extempore. But the task is a great one,

and requires no little practice. Wherefore I think you should enquire concerning the points that can be discussed about friendship from those who make these things their profession: I can only exhort you to place friendship before everything else on earth; for there is nothing in such harmony with nature, or so well adapted alike to prosperity and adversity.

18. Well, in the first place I feel that friendship can exist only among the good; but I do not press this statement too far, as those do who go with more subtlety into these matters, perhaps correctly, but with little result for the general good, for they say that no one is good, except the wise man. Let us grant by all means the truth of that assertion; but they explain wisdom to be something which no mortal has as yet attained. We however ought to have an eye to those things which occur in practice and everyday life, not to those things which are imagined or desired. Never will I say that Gaius Fabricius, or Manius Curius, or Titus Coruncanius, whom our ancestors adjudged wise, were wise according to the standard of those philosophers. Let them, therefore, keep to themselves a definition of wisdom which is both offensive and unmeaning; let them only grant that these were good men. But they will not even do this, for they will declare that this cannot be granted except to a wise man. 19. Let us do the best we can, then, with our own homespun wit, as the proverb runs. Those who so conduct themselves and live in such a fashion that their honour, their uprightness, their sense of justice, and their generosity are approved; that they are unstained by avarice, or caprice, or effrontery; that they are men of strong principle, as those were whom I have just mentioned—let us hold that these, even as they have been thought good, also ought to be called good, on the ground that, so far as men can, they follow Nature, the best guide to living well.

I can see clearly, that we were born under the condition that there should exist among us all a certain social tie, and that the nearer each approached us, the stronger it should be. Therefore fellow-citizens are of more account than foreigners, and relations than strangers; for with these Nature herself has created friendship,—but this has not

sufficient stability. For in this respect friendship surpasses relationship, because kindly feeling can be removed from relationship, whereas it cannot from friendship; for when kindly feeling has vanished, the name of friendship disappears as well, while that of relationship remains. 20. How great moreover the power of friendship is can be most fully understood from the fact that, starting from the undefined social bond among the human race which Nature herself has knit together, the whole idea has been so contracted and drawn within narrow limits, that every union of affection takes place between two or among a few persons.

VI. Now friendship is nothing else than perfect agreement on all divine and human things, joined to kindliness and affection; and than this, wisdom alone being excepted, I am inclined to think that no better gift has been given to man by the immortal gods. Some prefer riches, some good health, some power, some office, many prefer even sensual pleasures. The last of these is the attribute of beasts, and even the first-named are fleeting and unstable, for they depend not so much on our own plans, as on the blind hazard of fortune. Those however who place the greatest good in virtue make an admirable decision; but this very virtue both creates and maintains friendship, nor can friendship by any means exist without virtue. 21. Let us now explain virtue according to the usage of our life and common talk, and not, as certain philosophers do, measure it with high-flown grandiloquence; but let us hold as good those who are so accounted, men like Paulus, Cato, Galus, Scipio, Philus. With these our everyday life is satisfied, and let us pass by those ideal men who are not found anywhere at all.

22. Among men of this kind therefore friendship has advantages so great, that I can hardly describe them. In the first place, how can there be a "life worth living," as Ennius says, which does not find repose in the mutual kindliness of a friend? What can be more pleasant than to have one with whom you can venture to talk about all things in the same way as with yourself? Where would there be such great advantage in prosperity, unless you had

one who should rejoice in it equally with yourself? Adversity again would indeed be hard to endure without some one who would bear it with even greater concern than yourself. Finally, all the other objects of desire are each as a rule adapted to a single purpose only: riches, that you may enjoy them; influence, that you may be honoured; public offices, that you may be extolled; pleasures, that you may rejoice; health, that you may be free from pain and perform the functions of the body. But friendship comprises a very great number of things; wherever you turn, she is at hand, from no place is she shut out, never is she out of season, never troublesome; and so we do not use water and fire, as the proverb goes, on more occasions than we do friendship. Nor am I now speaking of common or ordinary friendship, which nevertheless is both delightful and beneficial, but of true and flawless friendship, such as was that of those few men whose names are proverbial. For friendship makes prosperity more bright, and adversity, by dividing and sharing it, more supportable.

VII.—23. Now while friendship comprises very many and very great advantages, in one point she certainly surpasses everything else, inasmuch as she sends forth the light of a good hope for the future, and does not suffer the spirits to be weakened or to sink. For he who looks upon a true friend looks upon a kind of reflexion of himself. Wherefore the absent are present, the poor have plenty, the feeble are strong, and, what is still more difficult to assert, the dead live; so great is the respect, the recollection, the regret on the part of their friends that attends them. From which circumstance the death of those seems to be happy, the life of these worthy of praise. Take away from our world the bond of kindly feeling, and neither house nor city will be able to stand; the very land will cease to be tilled. If it is not sufficiently understood how great is the power of friendship and concord, it can be grasped from disagreements and quarrels. For what house is so firmly established, what state so stable, that it cannot be utterly overthrown by animosities and dissensions? From this consideration we can judge how much good there is in friendship.

24. They say indeed that a certain learned Agrigentine sang in Greek verses like one inspired, that friendship unites and discord scatters those objects in the constitution of things and the entire universe which are at rest, and those as well which are in motion. And this statement all mortals not only understand but prove by experience. Consequently if at any time any duty of a friend has been displayed in facing dangers or sharing them, who does not extol the deed with the highest praise? What acclamations lately rang throughout the whole theatre at the performance of the new play of my guest and friend Marcus Pacuvius, when, the king not knowing which of the two was Orestes, Pylades said that he was Orestes, so that he might be put to death in his stead, while Orestes maintained, as indeed was the case, that he was Orestes. The audience rose and applauded at an imaginary incident; what do we think they would have done in real life? Nature herself easily showed her power, inasmuch as men pronounced that what they themselves could not do was rightly done in the case of another. Thus far I think I have been able to say what are my opinions about friendship. If there are any further points to be discussed—and I am sure that there are many—enquire, if it seems good to you, of those who handle such matters.

25. Fannius. But we would rather hear from you; and yet I have also often made enquiries for them, and listened to them willingly enough; but the texture of your discourse is something quite different.

Scaevola. You would say so still more, Fannius, if you had been present not so long ago in Scipio's gardens, when there was a discussion about the State. What an advocate of justice was he then against the skilful speech of Philus!

Fannius. Nay, it was easy for the justest of men to defend justice.

Scaevola. What! and is it not an easy thing for him to make a defence of friendship, who has won the greatest glory for having preserved it with the utmost loyalty, firmness, and integrity?

VIII.—26. This is indeed to use violence against me. What does it matter by what means you compel me? you

certainly use compulsion. For it is difficult, and not even fair, to resist the earnest wishes of one's sons-in-law, especially in a good cause. Very often, therefore, when I am thinking about friendship, the following point seems to me deserving of especial consideration—whether the want of friendship was felt on account of weakness and poverty, so that in giving and receiving benefits each man might receive from another, and pay back in return that which he was unequal to accomplish by himself; or whether, while this was indeed an attribute of friendship, its origin was more venerable and honourable, and proceeded more directly from nature itself. For love, from which friendship received its name, is the chief means to the formation of the bond of kindly feeling. For advantages indeed are often received from those who under the pretence of friendship are courted and have attention paid them as occasion demands; but in friendship there is neither feigning nor pretence, and whatever feeling exists is real and sincere.

27. Wherefore it seems to me that friendship has sprung rather from nature than from poverty, more through a certain bent of the mind together with a certain feeling of affection than through calculation about the amount of advantage that the connection was likely to bring. Its nature indeed can be observed even in certain beasts, which so love their offspring up to a certain time, and are so loved by them, that their feelings are easily discerned. And this in the case of man is much more evident, first of all from that affection which exists between children and parents, and which cannot be destroyed without horrible wickedness; and next it is evident on occasions when a sense of love similar to that between parent and child has arisen, if we have met with some one, with whose character and disposition we are in harmony, because in him we seem to see clearly a certain bright light, as it were, of goodness and virtue.

28. For nothing is more loveable than virtue, nothing which more strongly induces love, seeing that we love in a fashion, because of their virtue and goodness, even those whom we have never seen. Who is there that does not recall with some affection and kindly feeling the memory

of Gaius Fabricius and Manius Curius, though he has never seen them? On the other hand, who is there that does not hate Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius, Spurius Maelius? There was a protracted struggle for empire in Italy against two generals, Pyrrhus and Hannibal: for the one, on account of his uprightness, we have no great aversion; the other, because of his cruelty, this state will always detest.

IX.—29. Now if the power of uprightness is so great that we love it even in those whom we have never seen, or what is still more astonishing, even in an enemy, what wonder is it if the minds of men are stirred when they seem to see the virtue and the goodness of those with whom they can be united in friendship? And yet love is strengthened by the receiving of a service, by the perception of a liking in others for us, and by the addition of close intercourse, and when these things have been added to that first impulse of the mind and of the affection, there blazes up a wonderful amount of kindly feeling. And if any think that this has its origin in weakness, in order that there may be some person through whom each man may gain what he lacks, they leave us an origin of friendship truly mean and (so to speak) far from high-born, in wishing it to be the child of want and poverty. Now if this were so, the fewer resources each person thought he possessed in himself, the better adapted he would be for friendship; but this is far from being the case.

30. For the more confidence a man has in himself, and the more he is so fortified by virtue and wisdom that he stands in need of no one, and judges that all his elements of happiness depend on himself, the more does he excel in seeking out and cultivating friendships. Just think. Was Africanus in need of me? No, indeed! and assuredly I was not in need of him; but I loved him through a certain admiration of his virtue, and he in return loved me, perhaps for some good opinion which he had of my character, and social intercourse increased the kindly feeling. But though advantages many and great followed this friendship, yet it was not in the hope of these that our attachment originated. 31. For just as we do a kindness and show generosity, not that we may exact gratitude (for we are not

usurers in the matter of benefits, but are by nature inclined to liberality), so we think that friendship ought to be sought, not because we are attracted by the hope of reward, but because the whole of its profit lies in the love itself.

32. But those who, like brute beasts, refer everything to the standard of sensual pleasure, dissent strongly from this opinion, and no wonder; for those who have cast away all their thoughts on a thing so mean and contemptible, are capable of looking up to nothing lofty, great, and divine. Wherefore let us exclude these teachers from our discourse, and let us for our part feel convinced that it is from nature that the sentiment of loving and the affection that springs from kindly feeling are born, when intimation has been given of goodness. And those who have sought for this goodness, devote themselves to it, and draw still nigher, in order that they may enjoy both the society of the man whom they have begun to love, and also his moral character, and may be commensurate and equal in love, and more inclined to confer favours than to ask them back. And let there be between them a noble rivalry on this point. Thus both the greatest advantages will be received from friendship, and its origin from nature will be alike more dignified and more real than if it had been the child of weakness. For if it were expediency that cemented friendships, a change in expediency would in its turn break them up; but since nature cannot be changed, true friendships are everlasting. The origin indeed of friendship you now perceive, unless you wish, perchance, to make some reply to my views.

FANNIUS. Pray continue, Laelius; for by virtue of my right of seniority I reply for my friend here, who is younger than I.

33. SCAEVOLA. Quite right. And so let us listen.

X. LAELIUS. Hear then, my excellent friends, the discussions which very often used to take place between Scipio and myself about friendship. Now he used to say that nothing was more difficult than that a friendship should last right up to the last day of a man's life. It often happened, he said, either that the same thing was not advantageous to two friends, or that the same opinion in politics was not

held by both of them. Again, the characters of men also change, sometimes through adversity, anon by the growing burden of old age. He used to find instances of these changes by referring to the early days of life, inasmuch as the warmest affections of boys were often laid aside at the same time as the child's garb, (34) and even supposing they had continued their friendship to manhood, yet it was nevertheless sometimes broken off by rivalry for a marriage alliance, or some other advantage which they could not both secure. But if some had lived on still longer in friendship, it was nevertheless often shaken should they have become competitors for office; for nothing was a greater bane to friendship than the desire for money felt by the average man, and the strife for office and glory waged by all the nobler citizens. From this cause the most bitter enmity had often arisen between the dearest friends.

35. In the next place, he would say, great dissensions, and those for the most part justifiable ones, arose, when something that was not right was demanded from friends, so that they should be either the ministers of lust, or abettors in injustice. And those who refused, though they did so from an honourable motive, were none the less charged with neglecting the claims of friendship by those whom they are unwilling to oblige; but those who dared to make any and every demand from a friend, by that very demand professed that they would do everything for the sake of a friend. Through perpetual complaints of these men, not only were friendships broken up, but eternal hatreds produced as well. These numerous causes, fatalities, so to speak, were ever threatening friendships, so that he used to say, that it seemed to him to require not only wisdom, but good fortune as well, to escape them all.

XI.—36. Wherefore let us first, if you please, investigate the point, how far affection ought to proceed in friendship. If Coriolanus had friends, was it their duty to carry arms against their country with Coriolanus? Was it the duty of the friends of Spurius Cassius Vecellinus and of Maelius to assist them, when aiming at kingly power? 37. We saw Tiberius Gracchus indeed, when he was causing confusion in the state, deserted by Quintus Tubero and such

of his contemporaries as were his friends. But Gaius Blossius of Cumae, the friend of your family, Scaevola, came to me to pray for pardon when I was present as one of the committee of advice to the consuls Laenas and Rupilius, and the plea that he brought forward to induce me to pardon him, was to the effect that he had esteemed Tiberius Gracchus so highly, that he thought it his duty to do whatever his friend wished. Then said I: "What, even if he wished you to set fire to the Capitol?" "That," he replied, "he would never have wished; but had he done so, I should have obeyed him." You see, what an impious utterance! And, by Hercules, he did so or even more than he said he would: for he was not a follower of the infatuation of Tiberius Gracchus, but its director, and he did not show himself the companion of Gracchus' mad folly, but its leader. And so, being in this state of frenzy and terrified by the newly-appointed court of enquiry, he fled into Asia, went over to the enemy, and paid a penalty to the state which was both severe and well deserved. It is therefore no excuse for a sin, if one commits it for the sake of a friend. For since it was the belief in your virtue that won his friendship, it is difficult for the friendship to remain if you have abandoned virtue.

38. But supposing we lay it down as a right principle, either to grant to friends whatever they may wish, or to get from them whatever we may wish, the principle would be sound if we were to prove to be men of perfect wisdom; but we are speaking of those friends who are before our eyes, whom we have seen or about whom we have heard by tradition, with whom everyday life is acquainted. From their number we must take our examples, and especially indeed from those who approach nearest to wisdom. 39. We see that Papus Aemilius was the intimate friend of Luscinus,—so we have learned from our fathers,—that they were twice consuls together, and colleagues in the censorship; and it is related, that in those days Manius Curius and Titus Coruncanius were most intimate both with them and with each other. Therefore we cannot even suspect that any one of these made the slightest demand from his friend that violated a promise

or an oath, or was detrimental to his country. For as to a request of this kind, what need to say that if any of these men had made it, he would not have obtained his wish? Certainly not, since they were the purest of men, and it is just as wrong to grant a request of this kind as to ask it. But truly Gaius Carbo and Gaius Cato used to take the part of Tiberius Gracchus, as did his brother Gaius, who then was by no means active, but is now exceedingly so.

XII.—40. Let this law therefore be enacted in friendship, that we neither ask any one to pursue a dishonourable course, nor follow it ourselves when asked to do so. For such an excuse is disgraceful, and one by no means to be accepted in the case of any wrongful act; but it is especially so if one avows that he has injured the state for the sake of a friend. For we are now placed, Fannius and Scaevola, in such a position, that it is our duty to look out beforehand for the disasters that are fated to come upon the state. Our traditional policy has already swerved far aside from its wonted course and career. 41. Tiberius Gracchus endeavoured to seize kingly power, or rather for a few months was actually king. Had the Roman people either heard or seen anything like it? And what his friends and relations, following in the steps of the dead leader, have done in the case of Publius Scipio, I cannot relate without tears. We bore with Carbo as patiently as we could, owing to the recent punishment of Tiberius Gracchus; but what I forbode with regard to the tribuneship of Gaius Gracchus, I hardly dare predict. The evil soon waxes, and when once it has taken a start, it glides with increasing speed down the road to ruin. You see, in the case of the ballot box what great corruption has already been caused, first by the Gabinian law, and two years afterwards by the Cassian. I think I already see the populace at loggerheads with the senate, and the most important measures carried by the caprice of the multitude. More men will learn how these things come to pass than how they can be resisted.

42. But what is my object in making these remarks? This, that without comrades no one attempts anything so outrageous. We must therefore instruct all good men, that if by some chance they should unawares fall into a friend-

ship of this nature, they are not to consider themselves so rigidly bound by their friendship as not to quit their friends when they are sinning in some important public matter; against the wicked however we must enact a penalty, equally severe to followers and to leaders in impiety. In Greece who was more distinguished or more powerful than Themistocles? This man, when commander-in-chief in the Persian war, freed Greece from slavery, but was afterwards driven into exile through his unpopularity. But instead of patiently enduring the wrong inflicted on him by his ungrateful country, as was his duty, he acted in the same wise as Coriolanus twenty years before had done among us. These men found no one to support them against their country, and each fell by his own hand.

43. Wherefore such an agreement among wicked men, instead of being sheltered beneath the cloak of friendship, must rather be visited with every punishment, so that no one may think it permissible to follow a friend even when he is waging war upon his native land. Yet this extremity, considering the way matters have begun to tend, will, I am convinced, some day come about; and to me it is a matter of not less anxiety, what the state will be like after my death, than what it is like to-day.

XIII.—44. So let this be enacted as the first law of friendship—to seek what is honourable from our friends, to do what is honourable for them, and not even to wait until we are asked. Let zeal ever be present, and hesitation absent; and let us dare to give advice with all freedom. Let the authority of friends who give good counsel have the most weight in friendship, and let it be employed in warning not merely with frankness, but even with sternness, if the occasion shall demand; and when it is so employed, let obedience follow. 45. Now I believe that certain men, who I hear have been considered wise in Greece, have held some strange doctrines—there is really nothing which those men do not worry to death with their hair-splitting. Some of them say that too warm friendships must be avoided, so that it may not be necessary for one man to be anxious for a multitude. Every man has enough and more than enough to do with his own troubles:

it is a nuisance to be too much involved in the affairs of others. It is most convenient to hold the reins of friendship as loosely as possible, so that you can tighten them or slacken them at your pleasure: for the chief consideration towards a happy life is, so they assert, freedom from care, and the mind cannot enjoy this if one man is, as it were, in labour for many.

46. And it is said that others of these wise thinkers affirm in a much more brutal strain—I touched briefly upon this topic a little time ago—that friendships are to be sought after for the sake of protection and assistance, not of kindly feeling or affection; and therefore the less steadfastness and strength a man has, the more he desires friendships, whence it happens that weak women seek the protection of friendships more than men, the poor more than the rich, and people in distress more than those who are considered prosperous.

47. What surpassing wisdom! Why, they seem to take away the sun from the universe when they take away friendship from life, than which we have received no nobler or more blessed gift from the immortal gods. What is that freedom from care? In appearance it is indeed seductive, but in reality to be rejected on many grounds. It is unbecoming to refuse to undertake any honourable business or course of action, or to lay it aside when it has been undertaken, simply from the fear of being troubled by it. Now if we flee from anxiety, we must flee from virtue as well, and virtue must needs with some anxiety despise and abominate her opposite, even as kindness of heart loathes ill-will, and self-control hates lust, and bravery hates cowardice. And therefore you will find that it is the just who are most indignant at injustice, the brave who most resent cowardice, the law-abiding who most resent an outrage. Thus it is characteristic of a well-ordered mind to rejoice at good things and feel pain at the opposite.

48. Hence, if grief of mind befalls the wise man—and assuredly it does befall him, unless we are to suppose that all human feeling is rooted from his breast—what reason is there for us to utterly banish friendship from life, merely to avoid undergoing some troubles because of it? For take

away the emotions of the mind, and what difference is there, I do not say between a beast and a man, but between a man and a log or a stone, or anything of the same kind? We must not listen to those men, who want to make out that virtue is a certain hard and, as it were, iron quality: on the contrary, it is in many things, and in friendship especially, gentle and pliant, so that it is, so to speak, expanded by a friend's prosperity and contracted by his misfortunes. Consequently that pain, which must often be felt on a friend's account, is not so potent as to banish friendship from life, any more than that the virtues should be rejected because they bring with them some anxieties and troubles.

XIV.—Since however a man contracts a friendship, as I have said above, if any sign of virtue shines forth in another to which a like disposition may incline and attach itself; when this happens, love must needs arise. 49. For what is so unreasonable as to be delighted with many empty things, such as office, glory, a house, or the clothing and adornment of the body, and not to be delighted beyond measure with a living creature endowed with virtue, and which can either love, or, as I may say, love back? For there is nothing more delightful than the repayment of kindly feeling, nothing more delightful than the interchange of affection and of good offices.

50. And suppose we also add this remark, which can be added with perfect truth, that nothing so allures and attracts anything to itself as likeness of disposition attracts men to friendship. It will assuredly be acknowledged as a truth that the good love the good, and attach them to themselves just as though they were bound to them by a kind of relationship and natural affinity. For nothing is more eager and greedy for things like itself than Nature. Wherefore let this point, Fannius and Scaevola, be established, that, as I think, there is between good men and good men a necessary feeling of kindliness, and this has been appointed by Nature as the fountain-head of friendship. But the kindliness also extends to the multitude. For virtue is not unfeeling or unserviceable or haughty, since she is wont to protect even whole nations, and consult their interests in

the best manner, which she assuredly would not do if she shrank from kindness towards the common people.

51. And again, those who conceive friendships to exist for the sake of expediency, seem to me to take away the tenderest bond of friendship. For it is not so much the advantage obtained through a friend as a friend's love that delights us, and that which has proceeded from a friend becomes delightful only if it has proceeded from affection; and so far is it from being the case, that friendships are cultivated on account of poverty, that those who, by reason of their wealth and their resources, and their virtue in particular, in which there is the greatest protection, are least in need of another, are the most generous and the most ready to confer a favour. And yet I should rather fancy that it is not indispensable for friends never to lack anything at all. For how could our zealous affection have displayed its activity, if Scipio had never needed my advice or help, either at home or in the army? Therefore friendship is not the result of advantage, but advantage of friendship.

XV.—52. Accordingly, men who are enervated by luxury must not be listened to if they ever hold discussions on friendship, of which they have no experience either in practice or theory. Who, by the faith of gods and men, would wish to overflow with wealth and to live amid an abundance of all things on condition that he should neither love any one nor be himself loved by any one? This, of course, is the life of tyrants, in which there can be neither confidence, nor affection, nor firm reliance on the kindly feeling of others: their whole life is full of mistrust and anxiety, and for friendship there is no room.

53. For who could love either a man whom he fears, or a man by whom he thinks that he is feared? Yet tyrants are courted through hypocrisy, at least for a season. But if, as usually happens, they chance to fall, then men see how poor they were in friends. And so Tarquinius is related to have said when in exile, that he knew at last which of his friends were faithful and which unfaithful, since then he could show gratitude to neither. 54. And yet I am surprised that a man of his haughtiness and perversity could have any friend. Again, just as the

character of this man, whom I have mentioned, could not procure true friends, so the riches of many who are very powerful makes a faithful friendship impossible. For not only is fortune herself blind, but she also generally blinds those whom she has embraced. So they are as a rule carried away by disdain and obstinacy, nor can anything more unbearable be found than a fool favoured by fortune. And we can see, that those who before were of obliging character, are changed by military power, and office, and prosperity; old friendships are despised by them, and new ones indulged in.

55. Yet what is more foolish than for men who have unlimited power through their riches, resources, and influence, to procure everything else which money can buy—horses, slaves, fine raiment, costly vases—and not to procure friends, the best and most beautiful furniture of life, so to speak? When they procure the other things, they know not for whom they are procuring them, nor for whose sake they toil,—for each of these things belongs to him who has prevailed by his strength,—whereas the possession of friendships remains sure and certain to all; so that, even should there remain to them those things which are as it were the gifts of fortune, still a life that is barren and destitute in respect of friends cannot be pleasant. But enough on this point.

XVI.—56. We must now determine, what are in friendship the limits and, as it were, the bounds of loving. I see that three opinions are expressed about these limits, none of which I approve. The first is, that we should feel towards a friend just as we do towards ourselves; the second, that our kindly feeling towards our friends should answer to the same extent and degree to their kindly feeling towards us; the third, that a man should be estimated by his friends at the same value he sets upon himself. 57. With no one at all of these three opinions do I agree. The first is not true, namely, that a man should feel towards his friend as he feels towards himself. For how many things there are which we should never do for our own sake, that we do for the sake of our friends! Begging and praying of one that is unworthy, attacking a man with

great bitterness and railing at him vehemently—things which would be altogether improper in our own affairs—can be done with the utmost honour in the affairs of our friends. And there are many circumstances in which good men subtract much from their own advantages, or suffer much to be subtracted, that their friends rather than themselves may enjoy it.

58. The second opinion is that which limits friendship by an equal interchange of benefits and kindly feeling. This indeed is to call friendship to a reckoning with overmuch meanness and illiberality, so that the account of what is received and what is disbursed may balance. True friendship appears to me to be richer and more bountiful, and not to watch narrowly, lest it should pay more than it has received. A friend must not be afraid lest something should be lost, or should fall to the ground, or lest more than what is fair be heaped upon the measure of friendship.

59. But that third limit is the worst, that a man should be estimated by his friends at the value at which he estimates himself. For often, in some men, either their spirit is too crushed, or the hope of mending their fortune is too broken. It is not therefore the part of a friend to be towards him such as he is towards himself, but rather to strive and bring it about, that he may raise his friend's dejected spirits, and lead him on to more cheerful hopes and thoughts. I shall therefore have to set up another limit of true friendship, as soon as I have stated what Scipio reserved for his severest censure. He used to say that no utterance could have been found more hostile to friendship than that of him who had said, that one ought to love in such a way as if some time or other he was likely to hate; and that he refused to believe that this sentiment was, as currently supposed, uttered by Bias, who was considered a wise man, and one of the Seven. It was rather, he considered, the opinion of some degraded or selfish wretch, or of one who regarded all things as they affected his own influence. For how can any one possibly be a friend to a man to whom he thinks he may perhaps become an enemy? Why, it will be necessary to desire

and pray that a friend may sin as often as possible, in order that he may offer the more handles, if I may so speak, for catching hold of him; and on the other hand, it will be necessary to be vexed, grieved, and envious at the good actions and advantages of friends.

60. Wherefore this precept, to whomsoever it may belong, tends to destroy friendship; it should rather have taken this form, that we ought to exercise such vigilance in forming friendships, that we never begin to love a man whom we could possibly come to hate. Nay further, if we should have been unfortunate in loving, Scipio thought that we should exercise patience rather than cast about for an opportunity for a quarrel.

XVII.—61. I think therefore we must adopt these limits: when the character of friends is free from faults, let there be complete community of all things, of plans and wishes, without any exception: so that, even if it should happen by some chance that it is necessary to forward a friend's unjust wishes, in which either his status as a citizen or his reputation is at stake, we must deviate from the straight path, provided only that no very deep disgrace follows; for there is a point up to which indulgence can be granted to friendship. We must not, however, neglect our own reputation, nor ought we to consider the goodwill of our fellow-citizens an unimportant weapon in public life, though it is disgraceful to try to win it by wheedling and flattery. Least of all must we abandon virtue, which brings affection with it as a matter of course.

62. Scipio was wont to complain—I often return to him from whom came the whole of this discourse concerning friendship—that men used to take greater pains in everything than in friendship. Every man, he declared, could tell how many goats and sheep he had, yet knew not the number of his friends. In procuring the former men exercised care, while in choosing friends they were negligent, and had not, as it were, signs and marks by which they might discover those who were suited for friendship. The firm, the steadfast, and the constant ought therefore to be chosen; but of this kind there is a great scarcity, and it is indeed difficult to form a judgment, except for

one that is experienced; and experience must be gained in friendship itself. So friendship outstrips the judgment, and takes away our opportunity of gaining experience.

63. It is therefore a prudent man's way to check the impulse to kindly feeling, just as he would a horse's speed, in order that we may indulge in friendship only when our friends' characters have been in some degree tested, just as we do with tried steeds. The fickleness of certain men is often discovered in the case of a small sum of money, while others, whom a small sum could not have affected, are found out when a large sum is in question. But suppose there shall be some found who think it mean to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find those who do not place public office, magistracies, military commands, civil authority, influence, above friendship, so that when these things are put before them on the one side, and on the other the claims of friendship, they do not much rather prefer the former? For our nature is weak when it is a question of despising power; and even if men have obtained power by neglecting friendship, they think that this neglect will be concealed, because it is not without good cause that friendship has been disregarded.

64. Therefore true friendships are very rarely found among those who are busied in public office and affairs of state; for where would you find the man who would prefer the political advancement of his friend to his own? Why, to pass over this point, how burdensome and hard does an association in misfortune appear to most men, and it is not easy to find people who would care to face it! And yet Ennius rightly says, "A friend in need is a friend indeed." Still these two things convict most men of fickleness and weakness—if in their own prosperity they despise a friend, or in his adversity desert him.

XVIII. Accordingly, the man who shows himself under both these conditions, true, consistent, and steady in the matter of friendship, we ought to consider to belong to an especially rare and almost divine class of men.

65. Now the foundation of firmness and constancy is the loyalty of him whom we seek in friendship: for nothing is firm which is without loyalty. Besides, it is right that for

a friend one should be chosen who is frank, sociable, and sympathetic—and by sympathetic I mean one who is affected by the same circumstances as ourselves; all these qualities have to do with loyalty. A nature that is deceitful and tortuous cannot be loyal; nor indeed can a man who is not affected by the same circumstances as ourselves, and is not naturally sympathetic, be either loyal or firm. To these characteristics we must add, that he shall not take delight in bringing forward charges against another, or believe them when they are made—qualities which all have to do with that constancy of which I have now for some time been treating. So that is shown to be true which I said at the beginning: friendship cannot exist except among the good. For it is the part of a good man, whom we may also call a wise man, to hold fast these two things in friendship: first to see that there be nothing feigned or pretended in him, for it is more characteristic of one who is frank to show his hatred openly than to conceal his real feeling behind a mask; next, not only to repel the charges brought by some one against a friend, but himself to abstain from suspicion, and from always imagining that some infidelity has been committed by his friend. 66. There ought to be added to this a certain pleasantness of conversation and manners, which is a seasoning of no mean importance to friendship. Now sternness and hardness on all occasions bring with them dignity indeed, but friendship ought to be less strict, more free, more pleasant, and more inclined to all forms of courtesy and friendly intercourse.

XIX.—67. There arises, however, at this point a certain problem which is attended by some difficulty, whether at any time new friends, who are worthy of friendship, should be preferred to old ones, just as we are accustomed to prefer young horses to old hacks. Doubt unworthy of man! For there ought not to be satiety of friendships as there is of other things; all the oldest friendships ought to be the sweetest, just as with those wines which bear age well; and the proverbial saying is true, "many bushels of salt must be eaten together, that the function of friendship may be fully carried out."

68. Now new friendships, provided they bring with them the hope that fruit will appear, even as it does in blades of corn which do not disappoint their promise, should not indeed be rejected, yet the old friendship should be preserved in its own place; for the power of age and long custom is very great. Nay, even in the case of the horse, of which I just now made mention, if no circumstance hinder, there is no one who would not with greater pleasure use that which he has grown accustomed to use than one that is unbroken and strange to him. And not only in this case, where an animal is concerned, but in those things also which are inanimate, habit is strong, since we take delight in those very places, though they be mountainous and woody, in which we have dwelt for a considerable time.

69. But it is of the highest importance in friendship that the better man should put himself on an equality with his inferior. For there are often certain instances of superiority, such as was that of Scipio in our own flock, if I may so call it. He never set himself before Philus, or Rupilius, or Mummius, or his friends of humbler rank; while Quintus Maximus his brother, an admirable man it is true, but by no means equal to himself, he used to honour as though he were his superior, because he surpassed him in years; and he used to wish that all his friends could receive more dignity by his efforts.

70. And this ought to be done and imitated by all—that is, if they have attained any pre-eminence in merit, genius, or fortune, they must communicate these things with their friends and share them with their relations, so that if they are born from humble parents, or have relations possessed of less genius or a humbler position than their own, they may increase their influence, and be a credit and dignity to them. Just as in legends, those who, owing to ignorance of their origin and family, have for some time formed part of another's household, retain their affection for the shepherds, whom they have looked upon as their fathers for many years, even after they have been recognized and found to be sons of either gods or kings. And this ought much more to be done in the case of real and undoubted

fathers. For the fruit of talent and virtue and of every excellence is then only gathered in greatest abundance, when it is conferred on all those nearest to us.

XX.—71. As therefore those who are superior among a group of friends and relations ought to place themselves on a level with their inferiors, so the inferiors ought not to feel chafed that they are surpassed by their own friends either in ability or fortune or dignity. The majority of these are either always complaining of some grievance or even upbraiding their friends; and this they do all the more if they think they have something which they can point to as done by themselves in a kind and friendly manner, and at the cost of some exertion. Hateful, assuredly, is that class of persons who fling their good services in one's teeth; the man upon whom these benefits have been conferred ought to be mindful of them, but he who conferred them should not recall the fact.

72. Wherefore, just as those who are superior ought to humble themselves in friendship, so in a certain sense ought they to raise up their inferiors. For there are some persons who make friendship a nuisance, when they fancy that they themselves are slighted. As a rule, this only happens to those who have a suspicion that they deserve to be slighted; and they must be relieved from this idea by deeds as well as by words. 73. You must confer upon each of your friends, first, as much as you yourself can effect, secondly, as much also as he whom you love and aid is able to bear. For no matter how high your position, you could not carry through all your friends to the highest honours; just as Scipio was strong enough to make Publius Rupilius consul, but could not do the same for the latter's brother Lucius. But even if you were able to confer any benefit on another, you must nevertheless see what he can bear.

74. On the whole we must form our judgment about friendships when both our intellect and years have arrived at their full strength and maturity; nor if in early life people have been fond of hunting or ball-playing, need they retain as intimate friends those whom they loved at that time because they were endowed with the same tastes as

themselves. For on that principle our nurses and slave-attendants would demand the largest share of kindly feeling by right of long-standing friendship: certainly they ought not to be slighted; still they must be regarded in some other manner than our other friends. If you do not wait until mature age, friendships cannot remain without alteration. For with diversity of character there comes diversity of tastes, and dissimilarity in this respect severs friendships; nor is there any other cause why the good cannot be friends with the wicked, or the wicked with the good, except that there is between them the greatest possible divergence of habits and tastes.

75. It may also be laid down as a principle in friendships, that a kind of ill-regulated goodwill must not, as very often happens, be a hindrance to the important interests of friends. To revert to the myths, Neoptolemus could never have taken Troy if he had been willing to listen to Lycomedes, with whom he had been brought up, when he tried with many tears to prevent his journey. And indeed weighty circumstances often befall which make it necessary to part with friends; and the man who wishes to over-ride these, because, as he says, he cannot easily bear the loss of his friends, is naturally weak and effeminate, and for that very cause far from upright in his friendship. 76. And so on every occasion you must consider, both what you ought to demand from a friend, and what you should allow to be obtained from yourself.

XXI. There is also a kind of calamity, sometimes inevitable, consisting in breaking off a friendship; for now our discourse sinks from the intimacies of the wise down to common friendships. The faults of friends often break out; sometimes they affect their friends, at other times they affect strangers; yet even in the latter case the disgrace flows back upon their friends. Such friendships therefore must be dissolved by the abatement of familiarity, and, as I have heard Cato say, should be unravelled rather than rent, unless some utterly intolerable wrong has blazed out, which renders it neither right, nor honourable, nor possible, that estrangement and disunion should not take place forthwith. 77. But if in either habits or tastes

any change, as is wont to happen, has taken place, or disagreement has occurred between political parties—for I speak now, as I said a little while ago, not of the friendships of the wise, but of ordinary friendships—we must be on our guard, lest it seem that not only are friendships laid aside, but animosities also are incurred. For nothing is more disgraceful than to wage war with a man with whom you have lived on familiar terms. Scipio, as you know, had broken off, on my account, his friendship with Quintus Pompeius, and by reason of the disagreement there was in the state, he was estranged from my colleague Metellus; yet on both occasions he acted with dignity, and moderation, and displeasure which showed no bitterness.

78. Wherefore we must, in the first place, take care that no ruptures between friends occur; but if anything of the kind should take place, that the friendship may seem rather to have died out than to have been forcibly extinguished. And we must indeed be on our guard that friendships do not turn even into bitter hatreds: from them quarrels, foul words, and insults are bred. These however must be put up with if they are endurable, and this honour should be paid to a long-standing friendship, that he shall be in fault who inflicts, not he who suffers, the injury.

To sum up: against all these faults and disadvantages there is one safeguard and precaution; it is that men should not begin to love too quickly, and that they should not love the unworthy. 79. Now those are worthy of friendship who possess in themselves some reason why they should be loved. A rare class! And in truth all things that are excellent are rare; nor is there anything more difficult than to find that which is altogether perfect of its kind. But most men do not recognize anything good in human affairs, except what is profitable; and with friends, just as they do with cattle, they love those most of all from whom they hope that they will derive the largest profit.

80. Thus they are destitute of that very lovely and exquisitely natural friendship, which is an object of desire in itself and for itself, nor can they learn from themselves how valuable and powerful such a friendship is. For each

man loves himself, not that he may get from himself some reward for his own affection, but because each one is of himself dear to himself. And unless this same feeling be transferred to friendship, a true friend will never be found; for a true friend is one who is, as it were, a second self.

81. And if it is a manifest truth in beasts, whether they fly or swim or live in the fields, whether they are tame or wild, that in the first place they love themselves—for self-love is a feeling equally born with every creature—next that they seek out and long for some creature of the same race to which they may attach themselves, and do this with longing and with a certain likeness to human love, how much more in accordance with nature does this process take place with man, who both loves himself, and seeks another whose spirit he may so blend with his own as almost to make one out of two!

XXII.—82. But most men wrongly, not to say shamelessly, wish to have as a friend such an one as they themselves cannot be, and expect from their friends what they do not bestow upon them; whereas it is fair that a man should first of all be good himself, and then seek another like himself. In the case of such persons, that steadfastness of friendship about which we have now been for some time discoursing can be strengthened, since men who are united by kindly feeling will in the first place be masters of those passions to which others are slaves, and secondly will take delight in fairness and justice, and the one will do anything for the other, nor will the one ever demand from the other anything but what is honourable and right, and not only will they cherish and love each other, but will also respect each other. For he who takes away respect from friendship takes away its greatest ornament.

83. Therefore those who think that there lies open in friendship a free indulgence to all passion and sin make a ruinous mistake; friendship has been given by Nature as a handmaid of the virtues, not as a companion of the vices, in order that, since virtue could not unaided arrive at the highest perfection, it might arrive thither when united and associated with another. And if this association either exists, or has existed, or shall exist between any persons,

their companionship must be considered the best and the happiest for the highest good of our nature. 84. This is, I say, an association which contains everything that men consider to be objects of desire—honour and glory, peace of mind and enjoyment—so that when these are present life is happy, and without them must be miserable. And since this is the best and the greatest blessing, we must, if we wish to attain it, pay attention to virtue, without which we are able to attain neither friendship nor anything that is worthy of desire. But when virtue has been neglected, those who think that they have friends, then, and then only, feel their mistake, when some severe misfortune constrains them to make trial of them.

85. Wherefore—for I must say it again and again—you must love when you have exercised your judgment, not use your judgment after you have loved. We are punished for our lack of prudence in many matters, but especially in loving and cherishing friends; for we put the cart before the horse in our plans, and lock the stable door when the steed is gone, which we are forbidden to do by the old proverb. For being entangled mutually either by daily intercourse or even by kind offices, suddenly in mid-career we break up a friendship as soon as some cause for offence has arisen.

XXIII.—86. Wherefore such great carelessness in a matter of the highest consequence is all the more to be blamed. For friendship is the one thing in human affairs concerning the advantage of which all with one voice agree. Virtue itself is despised by many, and said to be a fraud and a pretence. Many despise riches, who are contented with little, and delighted by simple fare and living; while as to public office, with the desire for which some men are all aflame, how many despise it so utterly, that they think there is nothing emptier or more trifling! And so with regard to all other things, while some men think them admirable, very many more consider them as of no account. But concerning friendship, all to a man have the same feeling—both those who have devoted themselves to public life, and those who take pleasure in the investigation of nature and in learning, and those who attend to

their own business without caring for public duties, and lastly those who have given themselves up wholly to sensuality—they all feel that life is nothing without friendship, if they wish, that is, to live at all as a free man ought.

87. For friendship creeps, I know not how, through the lives of all, nor does it suffer any method of passing life to be free from itself. Nay more, if any one is so harsh and fierce of nature, that he flees and loathes the society of men, being a man such as we have heard a certain Timon of Athens was, nevertheless he would not be able to refrain from searching after some one to whom he might pour out the venom of his bitterness. This question would best be determined, if it could so happen that some god should remove us from this throng of men, and place us somewhere in a desert, and there, supplying us with abundance and plenty of all things that nature craves for, should take away from us altogether the opportunity of beholding a human being. Who is made of such stern material that he could endure that life, and from whom would not solitude take away the enjoyment of all pleasures?

88. So the following remark is true which I have heard our old men say was wont to be made by Archytas of Tarentum, I believe, they having heard it from other old men: "If any one had ascended to heaven, and beheld the nature of the universe and the magnificence of the stars, all his wonder thereat would be without pleasure to him; whereas it would have been most agreeable if he had had some one to whom he might describe it." Thus Nature loves nothing that is solitary, and ever leans towards some prop, so to speak; and this is the sweeter, the dearer that the friend is.

XXIV. But although Nature declares by so many signs what she wishes, requires, and longs for, we nevertheless somehow or other shut our ears against her, and do not listen to her admonitions. For intercourse in friendship is varied and manifold, and many grounds for suspicion and offence are given, which it is the duty of a wise man at one time to avoid, at another to make light of, at another to bear quietly. But there is one cause of offence which must be encountered, in order that advantage and

loyalty may be retained in friendship: our friends must be often admonished and reproved, and these reproofs must be received in a friendly spirit when they are offered in kindness.

89. But somehow or other, what my friend Terence says in his Andria is true—"Deference begets friends, while truth begets hatred." Truth is troublesome, inasmuch as from it springs hatred, which is the bane of friendship, but flattery is much more troublesome, because by granting indulgence to faults, it allows a friend to be borne headlong to his ruin: but the greatest fault rests with the man who despises truth, and is driven on by flattery to destruction. In all this matter, therefore, carefulness and diligence must be employed, first that warning may be free from bitterness, and next that reproof may be free from insult. In paying deference, however (for I gladly adopt the word used by Terence), let courtesy be present, but let flattery, the handmaid of the vices, be removed far away; for flattery is unworthy not only of a friend, but even of a free man; for we live in one way with a tyrant, in another with a friend.

90. But as for the man whose ears are closed against the truth, so that he cannot bring himself to hear the truth from a friend, his welfare must be despaired of. For that saying of Cato, like many of his, is a shrewd one—"Bitter enemies deserve better from some men than those friends who seem agreeable; for the former often speak the truth, the latter never." It is also absurd, that those who are admonished do not feel that annoyance which they ought to feel, but feel that from which they ought to be free; for they are not distressed because they have done wrong, but are offended because they are reproved; whereas, on the other hand, they ought to grieve at the fault and rejoice at its correction.

XXV.—91. Since therefore it is essential to true friendship that a man should both give and take advice, and that he who gives advice should speak frankly yet not harshly, and that the other should receive what is said with forbearance and not with repugnance, so we must conclude, that there is no plague in friendship greater than

flattery, fawning, and adulation. For no matter how many names it may have, we must set a brand on this defect as the fault of fickle and deceitful men, who speak everything with a view to please, and nothing with a view to truth. 92. But while hypocrisy in all things is blameworthy—for it does away with our power of judging truth, and adulterates it—so it is especially opposed to friendship; for it destroys truth, without which the name of friendship has no meaning. For while the strength of friendship lies in the fact that one soul is, as it were, made by it out of many, how can this be effected, if not even in each individual is there a soul one and always the same, but a soul fickle, changeable, manifold?

93. For what can be so pliable, so unreasonable, as the soul of him who shifts about, not only in accordance with the feelings and wishes, but even with the look and nod of another? "If one says no, I say no too; if he says yes, I say yes; in fact, I have charged myself to agree with him in all things," as the same Terence says, but in the character of Gnatho, a kind of friend which it is a mark of worthlessness to attach to oneself at all. 94. But since there are many like Gnatho, who are higher in position, fortune, and reputation, the flattery of these is a curse when to their worthlessness is added influence. 95. But a fawning friend can be distinguished from a true one, and discerned just as easily, if only we are careful, as everything that is dyed and counterfeit can be distinguished from the genuine and the true. A public meeting, which consists of the most inexperienced men, is nevertheless capable of judging what difference there is between the popular demagogue, that is, the flatterer and worthless citizen, and the consistent, the serious, and dignified one.

96. What smooth flattery did Gaius Papirius lately pour into the ears of a public meeting, when he proposed the law concerning the re-election of the tribunes of the people! I spoke against it; but I will say nothing of myself, it is about Scipio that I will speak more willingly. How great, ye immortal gods, was that dignity of his, how great the majesty that appeared in his speech! so that you would say without hesitation that he was the leader, not the boon-

companion, of the Roman people. But you were present, and the speech is in everybody's hands. Therefore the bill, though drawn up to please the people, was rejected by the votes of the people. And to return to myself: you remember when Quintus Maximus, Scipio's brother, and Lucius Mancinus were consuls, how popular the bill of Gaius Licinius Crassus concerning the priesthoods appeared to be. For he wanted to transfer to the patronage of the people the right of the colleges to fill up their vacancies; and he was the first who began to address the people with his face turned towards the forum. Nevertheless reverence for the immortal gods, with myself as advocate, easily defeated his specious oration; and this happened when I was only praetor, five years before I was made consul; so that the cause owed its successful defence more to its own merits than because I possessed any especial authority.

XXVI.—97. But if on the stage,—the public assembly, I mean,—where there is the widest scope for falsehood and misrepresentation, the truth nevertheless prevails, if only it has been set forth openly and brought into full light, what ought to take place in friendship, which depends entirely upon truth? In friendship, unless, as men say, you see your friend's heart and bare your own, you can have no faithfulness or certainty, not even as to whether you love and are loved, since you know not how much truth there is in the love. And yet that flattery, however baneful it may be, can nevertheless injure no one, except him who accepts it and is pleased with it. And so it happens that the man who flatters himself and is most highly pleased with himself, listens with the greatest eagerness to flatterers.

98. No doubt virtue is a lover of herself, for she knows herself best, and understands how loveable she is. But it is not about virtue that I am now speaking, but about the belief a man has in his own virtue. For the people who wish to be actually endowed with virtue are not so numerous as those who wish to appear so. To such people flattery is delightful, and when language is addressed to them which is framed to suit their own wishes, they regard these empty words as a testimony to their own merits. It is therefore

no friendship when one party will not listen to the truth, and the other is prepared to lie. Nor would the flattery of parasites in comedies seem to us humorous unless there were braggart soldiers as well. "Does Thais then return me many thanks?" It would have been enough to reply—"many thanks"; but the parasite says, "a million." The flatterer always exaggerates that which the man for whose gratification he is speaking wishes to be great.

99. Wherefore, although it is with those who court and encourage it, that this soothing falsehood has weight, still even the more serious and firm among men must be warned to take care that they are not ensnared by clever flattery. For unless he is utterly devoid of sense, no one fails to perceive the barefaced flatterer; but we must take great care that the skilful and secret flatterer does not ingratiate himself with us; for he is not easily recognized, inasmuch as he is one who often flatters even by opposing, and, while pretending to take the other side of the question, acts the flatterer, and in the end gives in and permits himself to be beaten, so that he who has been the dupe appears to have been the keener-sighted of the two. But what is more disgraceful than to be duped? We must all the more carefully take care that this may not happen. "How you have to-day twisted me round your finger and splendidly duped me, beyond all the silly old men of comedy."

100. For even in plays this character of a blind and credulous old man is the most foolish. But, somehow or other, our discourse has descended from the friendships of perfect men, that is, of wise men (I speak of wisdom such as befalls the average man), to common friendships. Wherefore let us return to the principle I first laid down, and let us at length bring our remarks to a close.

XXVII. It is virtue, Gaius Fannius and Quintus Mucius, virtue, I say, that both produces and preserves friendships. For upon virtue depends harmony in all things, and stability, and firmness; and when it has lifted itself up and shown forth its light, and has seen and recognized the same thing in another, it draws near to it, and in return receives that which is in the other; and hence there is kindled either love or friendship. Both these qualities have

been named from "loving"; but "to love" is nothing else than to have an affection for him whom you love, not from any need of him, or because you seek for any advantage from him; yet advantage blossoms forth from friendship, even though you were never to look for it.

101. It was with this kindly feeling that we as young men loved those old men, Lucius Paulus, Marcus Cato, Gaius Galus, Publius Nasica, Tiberius Gracchus, the father-in-law of my friend Scipio; and this manifests itself even more between those of the same age, as between myself and Scipio, Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius, Spurius Mummius. And in return we old men feel pleasure in the affection of young men, as with yourself and Quintus Tubero; I for my part also take delight in my friendship with those very young men Publius Rutilius and Aulus Verginius. And since the manner of our life and of our constitution has been so ordained that one generation is ever springing from another, it is very greatly to be desired that you should be able to arrive at the goal, as the proverb has it, along with those of your own age, with whom you have been let loose, so to speak, from the starting-point.

102. But since human affairs are frail and perishable, some persons must always be sought, whom we may love and by whom we may be loved; for when affection and kindly feeling has been removed, all pleasure has been removed from life. To me indeed Scipio, although he was snatched away suddenly, nevertheless still lives and ever will live; for it was the virtue of that man which I loved, and that has not been extinguished; nor does it dwell before my eyes alone, who always had it at hand, but even to posterity it will be a bright and shining light. No one will ever either in thought or in hope undertake greater tasks than ordinary without thinking that he must keep before him a remembrance and impression of that man.

103. For my part, out of all the things which either fortune or nature has assigned to me, I have nothing which I can compare with the friendship of Scipio. In it I found agreement in politics, and advice about my private affairs, and repose full of delight. Never, so far as I could perceive,

even in the smallest matter, did I displease him; never did I myself hear from him aught that I was unwilling to hear. We had one house, the same style of living, and that in common, and not only our campaigns, but even our travels and our sojourns in the country were in common.

104. For why should I speak about our devotion in constantly acquiring and learning something? In this pursuit, far removed from the gaze of the people, we spent all our leisure time. And if the recollection and memory of these things had died along with him, I should not now be able to bear in any way my grief for the closest of friends and most loving of men. But they are not destroyed; rather they are strengthened and increased through my reflexion and remembrance, and if I should be entirely deprived of them, nevertheless the mere lapse of time brings to me great consolation. For at my time of life I cannot remain longer in this state of regret. And all things that are of short duration ought to be bearable, even if they are great.

This is what I have had to say about friendship. But I exhort you to put virtue, without which friendship cannot exist, in such a position, that you may think that with the exception of virtue nothing is more excellent than friendship.

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